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ABSTRACT 
DE-TERRITORIALIZING THE CHILD: TOWARDS A THEORY OF AFFECT IN 
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND RESEARCH 
by Marta Ferreira Pires 
This dissertation explores the paradox between the normalizing and equalizing 
purpose of public education, stated in the rhetoric of policy and politics, and the social 
gaps it actually produces and perpetuates.  The purpose of the study is to deterritorialize 
the ideal rational child of formal education and policy texts by juxtaposing it with the 
affective child found at the margin, outside of the rational regime of perception that 
permeates policy, and political discourse.  I discuss what I believe are instances of 
children’s deterritorialized/ing experiences often missed, not only by formal education, 
but also by policy writers across the board, and children’s rights organizations.  These 
instances are often found in the life conditions of disadvantaged communities, and the 
mechanisms people create in order to alleviate, or cope within less than ideal conditions, 
such as poverty, or warfare.  I argue that an approach to the child as affective, will impact 
current beliefs about human individuals, increasing possibilities of being, and political 
action and relationships for individuals, as well as communities.  In order to remain 
consistent with the Deleuzian frame that permeates the overall approach taken to the 
problem in the dissertation, rhizomatics was used as a methodological frame, and rhizo 
and schizoanalysis were used as methods for collecting and analyzing the 
rhizomatic/transgressive data.  As an expression of ways in which childhood can be 
deterritorialized, the dissertation includes an attempt at schizoanalysis of my own 
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experience as a child, both through memory and memories, as well as in the becoming-
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PREFACE 
(...) the intensive writing style particular to Deleuze spells the end of the linguistic 
turn, as he releases the subject from the cage of representational thinking.  
Writing is therefore, not explained with reference to psychoanalytic theories of 
symbolic “lack”, or reduced to an economy of guilt, nor is it the linguistic powers 
of the master signifier.  Writing is an intensive approach that stresses the 
productive, more than the regressive.  (Braidotti in Parr, 2005, p. 307) 
*** 
In her article “Deleuzian Concepts for Education: The subject undone” (2004), 
Elizabeth St. Pierre says that at one point in her career and life she needed new 
language, new concepts to help her describe her field of work, to describe space and time 
in a no longer linear reality, to describe herself as a new found subject.  She found that 
new language through the reading of Gilles Deleuze’s thought, she says.  In reading her 
article, I could read it as written by my own self - a simulated self for the occasion, a 
subject in relation and circumstantial dialogue with the text: the subject that immanently 
coincided with my consciousness at that moment too found new and more adequate 
language to describe its world in the readings of Deleuze.  Challenged by change, by 
constant flow and travel, my self wonders at the possibility of reinscribing itself in the 
world as needed – consciously, unconsciously – becoming what I am is a non-stop 
activity.  Far from being ready for a life that never seems to begin, I live, I am – I am 
now.  I become woman, student, child, lover, wanderer; I become other, language, social, 
political; I become, and am, and become again.  Become difference, multiplicity, 
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multitude.  Identity becomes an illusion as the body differs and diverges, and becomes 

















I write this document at a daunting time in the social and political history of the 
U.S.  Not long ago, in an unsuspecting, uneventful community of Connecticut, a 20-year-
old human body turned cyborg (Gough, 2004; Haraway, 1991) entered an elementary 
school and killed 26 people.  This is unfortunately only one of many instances in recent 
years where the social and the political were severely shaken by events caused by the 
invisible workings of affective forces.  A “body-agent” (Protevi, 2009), overcome with 
some mysterious emotion, encounters the means to unleash that emotion in an 
unreasonable way.  He is likely to have “known” at some point that the combination of a 
firearm, a finger, and a human target can cause harm to that target; he is also likely to 
have “known” at some point that to cause harm to someone else’s body is something his 
society disapproves of (for the most part); and that causing harm to another’s body will 
carry consequences for himself and his own life, whether he gets arrested and taken to 
court, lives the rest of his life as a fugitive, or ends his own life.  Yet, it happens.  The 
invisible becomes painfully visible, and a seemingly territorialized body (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987) becomes deformed in front of our very eyes.  And while the media and 
the public agree to designate this body-agent as a 20-year-old white man with guns, that 
designation becomes irrelevant in the face of how little he resembled, both physically as 
well as in his actions, what one usually thinks of when thinking of a middle-class 20-
year-old white man living in Connecticut in the year 2012.  Once again we are fooled by 
the visible, by that which is seemingly predictable in the behavior of a 20-year-old white 
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man who, according to some, experienced a sheltered existence in the company of his 
mother.  Allegedly incapable of becoming the “normal” individual of his society due to 
mental illness – already a form of intrinsic “abnormality”, this body-agent finds a way to 
eliminate his abnormality by eliminating the normal.  That this unleashing occurred in a 
school he had himself attended as a young child, speaks perhaps of an even further 
attempt at eliminating the place where he first found himself to be different.  He becomes 
equal in affect. 
*** 
The episode above describes the exceptional and inexplicable behavior of a young 
man.  Said to suffer from a mental disorder, this young man’s short life seemingly 
proceeded with the level of normalcy expected for “someone like him”.  He owes his 
normalcy to his diagnosis, which puts his “dis-order” back in the order lost when he first 
began to behave in a way different from other children his age (Mozère, 2007).  The 
diagnosis serves to rationalize, for the adult, the child’s behavior, and inscribe it in the 
discourse of scientific explanation (Cole, 2005): once it occurs, the child’s behavior 
“makes sense”, and order is, to an extent, reestablished (Mozère, 2007).  
While this order is reestablished for the adults surrounding the child, providing 
them with ways to intervene that will help approximate the child’s behavior to that of a 
normal child, it is not necessary that a diagnosis does the same for the child receiving it.  
Especially for the young child, the way she is treated or related to by the adults 
surrounding her is just that – the way she is treated and related to; and the way she acts is 
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also just that – the way she acts.  Thus, the diagnosis, while helping the adult make sense 
of the child’s behavior, it does not change that behavior, changing only potentially the 
way the adult is going to relate to the child thereafter, which may or may not 
subsequently impact the child's behavior.  Paradoxically, stating of a child that she is 
normal has for the adult the same function as a diagnosis, in that it inscribes the child 
within a certain set of parameters or standards according to which the child is supposed to 
behave, at once “eliminating” the unpredictable, as well as diminishing the possibility for 
dis-order. 
In either case, the attempt to inscribe the child in a particular developmental 
segment will impact the formal, as well as the informal education that particular child 
will “receive”, or be exposed to.  And in either case, whether the child is diagnosed, or 
called normal - i.e. in order, the social purpose of that education is to approximate the 
behavior of the child as much as possible to that which is considered by the experts 
normal, so the child can grow up to be a “normal adult” (Mozère, 2007).   
Inscribing the child in a particular developmental segment, either normal or 
abnormal, and using formal education as a tool to ensure all become normal adults 
(Mozère, 2007), become ways to normalize and universalize human behavior.  Under the 
pretense of equality, social and political unity, safety, and order, governments, namely 
through policy, impose certain modes of being and behaving that are considered optimal 
for maintaining social and political order, thus privileging specific subjectivities.  These 
usually include some level of conformity to the social and political structure, and acting 
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in predictable ways that can be regulated and enforced.  It can then be said that both 
normal and abnormal constitute forms of re-territorializing the body of the individual 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Massumi, 2002), i.e. imposing upon the individual 
preexisting identitarian categories within which he or she must find ways to fit. 
In sum, while the young man in the shooting episode above is said to have had a 
disorder, he can also be said to have behaved “in order” in his everyday existence before 
the shooting day – his existence was according to the standards and norms that define his 
disorder.  By inscribing this young man in the identity of the abnormal, society is 
attempting to eliminate the unknown, the unpredictable in his behavior, and ultimately 
normalize it.  Thus, though abnormal, the shooter lived a territorialized existence, which 
he gained from his diagnosis; by being normal within the identity of the abnormal, he 
became, in the eyes of society, predictable – in sum: in order. 
As evidenced by this episode, and others such as Columbine (Protevi, 2009), or 
the multiple situations in which human behavior seems to escape the norm, or challenge 
common sense, the territorialized, or over-coded existence of the human body (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987; Massumi, 2002) does not guarantee social order, safety, or a more just 
and united society, though it might provide us with an illusion of all three.  It effectively 
camouflages the invisible affective dimension of human experience, the communal bios 
within the colliding bodies that are part of each human and non-human interaction, and 
the virtual powers lying beneath those encounters.  While attempting to keep society 
“safe”, and “orderly” through normalizing and territorializing the human body, and 
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attempting to unify human experience, those in political power may, in fact, be creating 
the conditions for the opposite to unfold, exposing society to the dangers of the 
unforeseen and the unpredictable – namely the unforeseen and the unpredictable within 
each of us in the inability to recognize and use affect, and desire in productive and 
creative ways (Deleuze & Guattari,1983; 1987; Deleuze, Lapoujade & Taormina, 2004; 
Mozère, 2007).   
The dangers of normalization and territorialization are not normalization and 
territorialization alone, or the potential social and political conformity they enforce as 
mechanisms used by the state to maintain social and political status quo.  Beneath the 
dangers of conformity, lay the dangers of the invisible – of that which we choose to 
exclude from our educational efforts when we exclude affect (Deleuze, 1988; 1990; 
Spinoza, 1930) and desire, and the unpredictable affective interactions between bodies 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 1987; Deleuze et al., 2004).  Recognizing the impact of the 
invisible in human action and interaction will not only help uncover the dangers of that 
invisible that become manifest in destructive, or unethical social dynamics, and which are 
the result of an over-coded existence.  It will, conversely, suggest that we can harness the 
potential, the virtual creative power of that invisible and use it to re-imagine society and 
politics, increasing social awareness, and the possibilities for ethical lived experience 
(Deleuze, 1998; Means, 2011).  This entails beginning to transform dominant 
psychological views of child development that emphasize and impose the division 
between normal and abnormal, and children as incomplete adults-to-be, and construing 
education as the mechanism by which this linear developing child becomes the normal 
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adult (Mozère, 2007).  This transformation entails deterritorializing the child and the 
adult, through the “systematic liberation of desire” (Deleuze et al., 2004) from the role 
attributed to it by modern psychology and psychoanalysis - as the theater in which 
individuals “re-present” their experiences as they attempt to make sense of them and gain 
control over them, into a role of creative production of possibility as suggested by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1987).  Among the creative and productive uses of desire 
and affect is the possibility to imagine “more just and ethical modes of practice and 
[political] recognition” (Means, 2011, p. 11), and to make “decisions” that can impact 
specific social and political situations (Means, 2011).    
The expressions in this dissertation are an attempt at exposing the multiple 
opportunities for relative deterritorialization that inherently and immanently occur within 
children's common encounters with one another, with the adults in their lives, and with 
the non-human objects that also populate their immediate world.  Regardless of whether 
or not adults and society would deem them appropriate, or “developmentally 
appropriate”, they impact children directly.  Exploring some of those encounters will help 
begin to think of education as a virtual space for positive deterritorialization, and teaching 
as a praxis of affect and liberation of desire, rather than a means by which society 
encourages individuals to conform to, and reproduce dominant ways of being, behaving, 
and interacting that perpetuate the social inequalities it claims to have the purpose of 
helping eliminate, according to policy and political rhetoric (Lall, 2012; Püschel & 
Vorman, 2012).   
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Moreover, and as seen above through the example of the body turned cyborg, 
beneath the dangers of conformity, lay the dangers of the invisible, and of what is further 
made invisible/unrecognizable through the over-coding and seeming normalization of the 
body of both children and adults.  In order to better serve all children, it is imperative that 
we begin to look for alternatives to normalization, thus beginning to properly attend to 
difference.    
Problem Statement 
In attempting to universalize and generalize social life and individual experience, 
policy texts describe people and education ideally (Honan, 2004; 2005; Honan & Sellers, 
2008), and propose unrealistic expectations for education and what it means to be 
educated (Goodman, 2004).  Notions of an ideal literate child and adult permeate policy 
texts both nationally as well as internationally (Honan & Sellers, 2008), framing the ways 
in which we come to perceive ourselves and others (Lall, 2012), at the same time that 
they suggest the social and political legitimacy and hegemony of ideally educated literate 
persons and nations (Cole, 2005; Lyotard, 1984).   
This issue becomes especially problematic if one looks at the numbers of children 
and adults around the world who will never become educated and literate in the Western 
sense, and as described by current policy texts.  According to a recent document 
published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 
(UNESCO) Education for All project, in 2011 at least 28 million children in conflict-
affected countries were out of school and this number represents only 40% of all children 
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that are out of school worldwide (UNESCO, 2011).  In the United States, policies like No 
Child Left Behind (2001) have become controversial in part due to the fact that they 
describe impossible to attain levels of proficiency, particularly amongst less successful 
students.  Between 1992 and 2000 the percentage of African-American, Hispanic, and 
American-Indian children who scored at, or above the proficiency level (as defined by the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress, NAEP) in the fourth grade reading NAEP 
administrations, was less than 20% (Goodman, 2004); amongst White and Asian/Pacific 
students the percentage barely reached 50% (Goodman, 2004).  This means that even for 
children that do have the opportunity to attend school, a large number will likely never 
attain reading “proficiency”.  The fact that such a large number of people remain at the 
margin of this ideal education, suggests that a large number of people around the world 
will never become the ideal person described in current policies.   
If we agree that being educated is the way by which individuals gain both social 
and political visibility, as well as legitimacy, through becoming literate, how do people 
who remain “uneducated” claim their rights in the societies they live in?  Will they ever 
have a voice, or will they remain at the margin of their societies?  People who remain 
uneducated (as per the Western notion) tend to remain invisible, as well as voiceless, both 
socially as well as politically.  Under the claim of “equal education for all”, the “ideal” 
becomes a tool of exclusion, rather than inclusion.  
This is the problem I will be addressing in this dissertation: a problem that stems 
from policies that speak of an ideal literate child and adult, and construe knowledge and 
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learning as a matter mostly exclusive to the mind and intellect.  The body, though 
commonly referred to for assessing intellectual development, particularly in early 
childhood, often appears as secondary in the learning process, or as a paradoxically 
incorporeal platform (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Massumi, 2002), or locus where the 
subject is supposed to develop despite its ubiquity to human experience.  In suggesting 
that there is an “ideal child”, policy texts often fail to address issues that may be 
problematic to the “actual child”, which depend as much on their individual conditions, 
as well as those of their communities.  Cognitive approaches to the child continue to 
isolate children from the social and political issues that interfere with their education, and 
issues such as violence, poverty, homelessness, or warfare, to name just a few, are 
seldom accounted for when speaking of that ideal child or “ideal knowledge”.   
Every time an ideal becomes the defining tone of a policy or institution, there is, 
simultaneously, an activation of exclusion and discrimination against that which may not 
meet the ideal.  For every child that will become the rational individual praised by formal 
education, there are multiples who will never sit in a classroom, or have the opportunity 
to become that individual; for every rational individual that finds social and political 
visibility and legitimacy for herself and her group, there are multiple individuals who will 
never see their very existence recognized socially, let alone politically.  The unaccounted 
for are not “left behind” because, within a logic of political legitimation and visibility 
through rationality, it is as if they “don’t exist”. 
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Research Questions 
Given the problem stated above, the overall research question guiding this study 
is: 
How can affect theory help reframe the concept of child and knowledge in a way 
that transforms policy, as the guide to action for educators, political and social actors, and 
the community at large, thus opening up new avenues for thought and action within 
educational discourse, research, and praxis? 
In order to answer the question above, I will address the following sub-questions: 
1. How does formal education, through policy, serve to stratify and territorialize/over-
code the child, and the body of the child as a) normal/abnormal; and b) future adult? 
2. What are some of the social and political implications of over-coding the school 
child? 
3. How can an affective approach to the child help expand dominant psychological 
views of child development, further expanding the potential of childhood 
experiences, viz. affective experiences, and thus alleviate some of the social and 
political implications of over-coding? 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to deterritorialize the ideal rational child of formal 
education and policy texts by juxtaposing it with the affective child found at the margin 
and outside of the regime of perception that permeates policy, as well as political 
discourse, here identified as narratocratic (Panagia, 2009).  The goal is to expose the 
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paradox between the normalizing and equalizing purpose of public education (Means, 
2011; Mozère, 2007; Püschel  & Vorman, 2012), stated in the rhetoric of policy and 
politics (Cole, 2005; Lall, 2012; Peters, 1996), and the social gaps it actually produces 
and perpetuates (Püschel  & Vorman, 2012), while proposing affect as a frame for 
thinking children and education in multiple and differentiated ways.   
In order to add to the possibilities of positive deterritorialization of this child/adult 
I discuss what I believe are expressions of children’s deterritorialized experiences often 
missed, not only by formal education, but also by policy writers across the board, 
children’s rights organizations, and each individual and community locked in social and 
political exile within their own countries.  These deterritorialized experiences are often 
found in the life conditions of disadvantaged communities, and the mechanisms people 
create in order to alleviate, or cope within less than ideal conditions, such as poverty, or 
warfare.  These conditions are often expressions of the social and political status of those 
very communities.  Panagia (2009) states  
that by extending our conceptions of what counts as sources for political 
interlocution beyond the grammatical and hermeneutic limits of the semantic 
statement and the deliberative limits of philosophical arguments, we discover 
modalities of political expression that don’t simply rely on the need to 
communicate sense but also generate noise…  (p. 73) 
Additional regimes of perception are thus necessary if all are to be recognized as 
legitimate participants in political life.  As a force by way of which bodies (human, 
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animals, objects, etc.) relate to one another and transform one another, while delimiting 
“their modes of interaction and potentiality” (Means, 2011, p. 10), affect is a “key force 
in the movement, arrangement and distribution of perception and with it ethical 
possibilities which reach beyond it” (p. 10).  Through an affective approach to childhood, 
and education, I uncover some of those “modalities of political expression” (Panagia, 
2009, p. 73), which already displace, through affect, the dominant regime of perception 
of political legitimacy as defined by Panagia (2009).  In this study, the body of the child 
appears as one such modality.  The body of the child, as seen in plateau 4., displaces not 
only the concept of political participation and legitimacy, it additionally disrupts the 
concepts of child and childhood, of normal and abnormal, as well as education and 
“developmentally appropriate” educational practice (NAYEC, 2009), as described in 
widely spread educational theory and policy.  An affective approach to the child, through 
an inclusion of the body, and of children’s lived experiences, inaugurates the potential for 
additional regimes of political and educational perception to coexist with the narrative.  
This will create opportunities for expression that escape the narratocratic model, while 
including the body, and the affective intensities of the relational and contextual, 
embodied child of lived experience.  Through these, children whose social context puts 
them at risk, or fails to grant them basic rights, such as education, can gain social and 
political visibility, and subsequently see their rights recognized.  
In the face of increasing social issues resulting from social relations imposed by 
the logic of capitalism in the United States (e.g. high unemployment, high percentage of 
poverty amongst children, increased wealth gap), and the influence of neoliberalism in 
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educational rhetoric and policy (Lall, 2012; Püschel  & Vorman, 2012) it is important that 
educators, as virtual social agents, find ways to actualize their power that exceed those 
predicted by policy and corporate generated (and oriented) curriculum, and perpetuate the 
very system causing those issues (Püschel  & Vorman, 2012).  More than thinking 
critically, it is important that researchers and philosophers of education, educational 
stakeholders, teachers, and students be encouraged to think/be creatively; this entails 
changing the ways in which we construe epistemology and teaching/learning, as well as 
the ways in which humans construe their own participation in the world.  Though 
thinking critically is important as a tool to think and act upon the encounter with a 
problem, as is the knowledge and understanding of the answers provided by others 
(experts or not) about said problem, moving beyond critical thinking into the intensity of 
being creative allows us to add on to the problem, ask questions that may have not been 
asked, let the problem seep into our lives, be fully engaged with it, and be changed in the 
process – to affect and be affected: in sum, to live. 
I argue that by shifting the approach to children from an exclusively 
developmental and cognitive perspective strictu sensu, to an affective perspective will 
allow both educators and policy makers to have better insight into the issues children face 
daily.  By taking into account their context and lived experiences, researchers and 
philosophers of education, policy makers, as well as educators at large will be able to 
identify problems real children are faced with, rather than devise “ideal”, impossible to 
attain standards and expectations.  This dissertation thus explores the paradox between 
the rhetoric about education and children found in policy texts concerning childhood and 
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education, and the lived experiences of actual children (Cole, 2005; Peters, 1996), 
particularly in what concerns their opportunities and possibilities to fulfill the ideals and 
standards set for them in those texts. 
The main purpose of this study is thus threefold: 
1. To examine the assumptions about children and knowledge/learning in 
current policy – which privilege both narrative and representation as the most 
important ways of learning, and subsequently of teaching, and fail to include 
affective, embodied and embedded notions of learning and children.  
2. To explore the social and political implications of those assumptions, 
generating a critique of the intellectual Cartesian subject of the enlightenment. 
3. To offer an additional approach to understanding subjectivity and 
epistemology based on the concept of affect put forth by French philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze, in order to reframe the ways by which children and disadvantaged adults 
become socially and politically visible and legitimate. 
Significance 
As affect emerges as a new theoretical trend in thinking about the world and 
humans (Clough & Halley, 2007; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Panagia, 2009; Protevi, 
2009), and subsequently about education (Means, 2011; Semetsky, 2009; 2010), the 
encounter between affect theory and education has been explored only briefly (e.g. Lewis 
& Kahn, 2010; Means, 2011; Semetsky, 2009), and a gap remains that must continue to 
  15 
 
be investigated.  This highly unexplored intersection can not only bring about new 
concepts into both theory and practice in education, but, more importantly, open up new 
avenues for thinking children and learning in novel and underrepresented ways, with the 
potential to transform social relationships.   
The choice for early childhood education policy documents has to do with the fact 
that for children attending this level of schooling, the classroom is their very first 
encounter with systematized/formal education and regulated peer interactions, both 
incipient forms of socialization and political life.  Since my questions regarded the 
normalizing intentions/purposes of educational policy documents privileging specific 
modes of being, I was interested in finding out what and how ideas about children and 
child development were conveyed in policy texts regarding early education as that 
incipient locus of political life.  Additionally, President Barack Obama’s recent call for 
universal preschool education across the United States makes it imperative that this level 
of education continues to be studied and reflected upon.  While my intent is not to 
question the value of early childhood education, or the potential benefits children might 
derive from early exposure to classroom interaction and literacy, especially when 
compared to receiving no formal education at all, it is my intent to question the motives 
behind the President’s recent call, and the ways in which the child is understood within 
the current educational model: in the words of President Obama, “our most valuable 
resource” (http://www.c-span.org, 2013, p. 12). 
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Methodology 
Using the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze as a framework, particularly his method 
of transcendental empiricism, and the figuration of the rhizome, I create a rhizome of the 
relatively deterritorialized child as affective - i.e. multiple rather than identitarian, pre-
subjective rather than subjective, embodied and contextual rather than ideal – in which I 
express diverse and diverging modes of child-hood within human lived experience that 
escape representation and narration.   
A philosophical approach to rhizomatics/rhizoanalysis (Alvermann, 2000; Honan, 
2004; 2005; Waterhouse, 2011) via Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, allowed me to 
gather sources of different nature, as (transgressive) data (St. Pierre, 1997), and collect 
that data both intentionally, as well as unintentionally throughout my life and graduate 
career, as I developed and lived through the emergence and development of this project.  
Sources different in nature aided in generating the desired multiple and multi-faceted 
approach needed in deterritorializing human experience, while the multiple media (text, 
film, memories) provided diverse entryways into the lived experiences of young children.  
These express a variety of ways in which the idealized modern child/subject can be 
deterritorialized – and reterritorialized into an affective space of intensity, rather than 
unity and identity.  Juxtaposing the images of the child found in policy texts, film, and 
memories of childhood, provided me with opportunities to, as much as possible, look at 
children and childhood from a pre-subjective, non-linear immanent perspective.  
Methodologically, this juxtaposition reflects the rhizomatic nature of this dissertation, in 
  17 
 
which the assemblage of different sources creates a diagrammatic/rhizomatic machine of 
childhood, and explores the tension between territorialization and deterritorialization.   
As an immanent expression of ways in which childhood can be deterritorialized, 
this dissertation also encompasses an attempt at schizoanalysis of my own experience as 
a child, both within chronos, as well as in the becoming-child which inevitably emerges 
within the process of writing about childhood.   
Finally, the choice for this methodological frame has also had an impact on the 
writing process, as well as on the final product of this dissertation. Though taking into 
account the parameters of a traditional dissertation, there are sections which may not read 
as academic, or follow the order traditionally found in a dissertation.   
Given that the final product was intended as a rhizome, rather than a linear 
development of one specific argument, and “a rhizome is made of plateaus” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 21), this document is organized in plateaus rather than chapters.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) “call a “plateau” any multiplicity connected to other 
multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a 
rhizome” (p. 22).  Massumi (1987) explains that   
In Deleuze and Guattari, a plateau is reached when circumstances combine to 
bring an activity to a pitch of intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a 
climax.  The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of 
afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities, 
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creating a fabric of intensive states between which any number of connecting 
routes could exist.  (p. xiv)  
Additionally, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “one of the most important 
characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways” (1987, p. 12).  In 
this document, each plateau thus functions as an entryway into the dissertation-rhizome, 
allowing the reader to choose not only where to “enter” the document, but further follow 
the emerging connections made along the way.  The afterimages that remain with each 
reader upon encountering each plateau should open up possibilities for creative inquiry 
beyond what is found in this document. Furthermore, each plateau is an intensity.  Rather 
than present episodes from “the everyday life” of children in the “typical” classroom, I 
have chosen moments of rupture where other forms of becoming are possible.  In short, a 
diagram of plateaus (a) resists narrativization and (b) exposes intensities that would 
otherwise be dismissed as “extreme” or “atypical.” 
This project is thus both an experiment in content, as well as in method, as I 
explore the heterodoxy of becoming-child, and becoming-philosopher/researcher within 
early 21st century society.  
Dissertation Overview 
Following the Introduction, there are six additional plateaus in this document, 
each providing a different set of circumstances and associated affect-producing 
intensities.   
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In plateau 2. I discuss the methodological frame and the methods of research used 
in this study.  Using the Deleuzian concept of the nomad, his figuration of the rhizome, 
and recent instances of the use of rhizomatics as a methodological frame in the social 
sciences and educational philosophy and research, this project is an attempt at 
demonstrating as authentically as possible the immanent and affective dimensions of 
research, and writing as life, rather than as isolated processes occurring in the confines of 
the library or the office. 
In plateau 3. I use rhizo-textual analysis, as defined by Honan (2004; 2005) and 
Honan and Sellers (2008) to read two policy texts pertaining to early childhood 
education.  The Developmentally Appropriate Practice document, published by the 
National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAYEC, 2009) provides 
states with guidelines for the development of state and local policy and curricula for early 
childhood.  As the foundational text guiding educators and policy makers across the 
United States, the Developmentally Appropriate Practice text is paramount to 
understanding eventual assumptions about children and education guiding policy making 
in the United States.  The Preschool Teaching & Learning Standards, published by the 
New Jersey State Department of Education (NJDOE, 2013), is based upon the 
Developmentally Appropriate Practice document, and is intended by the state as a guide 
to teachers, parents and community at large, and outlines the expectations of the state in 
regards to young children’s academic, as well as cognitive development at the pre-school 
level.  This plateau is intended as an analysis of current dominant discourses regarding 
subjectivity and epistemology underlying policy in the United States, as represented in 
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the two documents.  The territorializing implications of such approaches are explored, as 
I attempt to read the texts from a Deleuzian, affective, rhizomatic perspective, and 
explore the advantages of the latter in light of current social and political realities, and 
theoretical trends.   
Plateau 4. discusses the social, political, as well as personal 
implications/complications of the territorializing effects of dominant notions of child and 
knowledge found in policy and political rhetoric, in light of the current social and 
political global landscape, where millions of children and young adults continue to suffer 
the discriminating effects of illiteracy.  As literacy (in increasingly different forms) 
continues to be, not only a staple of Western education, but the goal of schooling, people 
who are not literate continue to be discriminated by those that are.  The purpose of this 
plateau is to threefold: to provide a critique of what Davide Panagia (2009) has come to 
call “narratocracy”; to evoke alternative modes of political perception and being political 
that do not rely exclusively on discursive literacy (viz. affective); and to demonstrate the 
need to embrace these alternatives as ways to provide those who remain “uneducated” in 
the western sense with ways to raise awareness to their condition that are not exclusively 
discursive and narrative.  The daily lives of children in an area of Lebanon previously 
affected by armed conflict serve to illustrate childhood as it happens at the margin, in 
ways that escape those predicted in policy as “appropriate” or educative.   
Plateau 5. encompasses an attempt at schizoanalysis of my own experience as a 
child, both within chronos – through memories of childhood – and in the becoming-child 
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necessary for writing about childhood.  The goal of this plateau is to discuss the 
juxtaposition of desire that seeks to represent the ideal child and that which lives in the 
joy of life itself.  The plateau emerged while I was writing as a kind of meta-process, 
turning the writing of the dissertation itself into a part of the schizoanalytic process.  In 
this context, engaging in remembering, rather than a meaning-making mechanism, 
became an act of “re-member(ing)”, i.e. “re-assembling” parts of the instances described 
through the personal narrative, as well as in the childhood memories that appear through 
the word lists and ontographic expressions (Bogost, 2012), in order to become the 
educator/philosopher/researcher that coincides with the dissertation writer, in the process 
of writing.  
On plateau 6., I discuss the constructions that emerged from the rhizoanalysis of 
the policy texts, the documentary film, and the exercise in schizoanalysis.  I discuss the 
potential of affect in impacting personal, as well as social and political action and 
interaction, and authentic social and political change. 
Finally, the Intermezzo found between plateaus 3. and 4. provides a detailed 
review of the concept of affect, as well as of the theoretical turn to affect seen in the 
social sciences over the past decade.  It also introduces an affective approach to the child 
as an alternative to the representational concept described in plateau 3. 
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2. Methodology and Methods 
As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of this study is to deterritorialize the 
ideal rational child of formal education and policy texts by juxtaposing it with the 
affective child found at the margin, in the cracks, and outside of the regime of perception 
that permeates policy, as well as political discourse, here identified as narratocratic 
(Panagia, 2009).  The study is guided by the following overarching research question: 
How can affect theory help reframe the concept of child (viz. subject) and knowledge in a 
way that transforms policy, as the guide for action for educators, political and social 
actors, and community at large, thus opening up new avenues for thought and action 
within educational discourse, research, and praxis? 
Given the research question and the purpose of the study, attempting to 
deterritorialize the subject of education entailed recognizing the very process of research 
and writing for the completion of a doctoral program (viz. formal education), as 
imminently territorializing, and the researcher as affective being engaged in it.  This 
means that not only is affect the lens through which I look at education, and childhood, 
and frame my critiques and arguments, it also underlies my approach to research 
methods, reflected in the presence of transcendental empiricism as epistemology.  As an 
epistemological stance, transcendental empiricism causes methodology, methods, and 
content to converge, and coincide with lived experience and becoming, and rhizoanalysis 
to be the necessary methodological frame for this project.   
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Finally, given the philosophical influences and background of this study, the 
methods used in this study can also be considered essentially philosophical.   
Methodological Musings   
Background   
 Over the past decade, researchers in the social sciences, and thus in educational 
research, have turned to poststructuralism and postmodernism in order to refute the 
impositions of certainty stemming from positivistic views of research and methods 
brought to center stage in education by policies that emphasize “experimental research 
and (…) randomized controlled trials as the gold standard for high-quality research” (St. 
Pierre, 2011, p. 611).  Though postmodernism and poststructuralism are far from recent, a 
revival of positivist ideals in educational research in the early 2000’s (St. Pierre, 2011) 
has launched a subsequent “resurgence of postmodernism” (p. 612).  More traditional 
approaches to research, encompassing both quantitative and qualitative methods, are 
increasingly seen by some as reductionist of the problems they intend to address - e.g. 
assessing academic success simplistically, by correlating it with one single factor, for 
instance, teacher performance (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).  Torrance (2011) states that 
Governments, and some within the scholarly community itself, seem to be seeking 
to turn educational research into a technology that can be applied to solving short-
term educational problems, thereby also entrenching the power of the expert in 
tandem with the state. (p. 578) 
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Those suspicious of the kind of educational research described in the excerpt 
above (e.g. Lather, St. Pierre, Torrance, etc.), according to which research seems to serve 
the purpose of justifying, or legitimizing ready-made policy decisions, and of its 
consequences for the future of both academic research, and formal education at large, 
continue to explore and follow new paths for research.   
Among them is an increasing number of educational philosophers and researchers 
interested in exploring the potential of Gilles Deleuze’s thought, as well as that of his 
work with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (e.g. Alvermann, 2000; Bogue, 2004; 2008; Cole, 
2008; Colebrook, 2008; De Freitas, 2010; 2012; Gough, 2004; Gregoriou, 2004; 2008; 
Honan, 2001; 2004; 2008; Lather, 1991; Semetsky, 2006, 2008, 2010; St. Pierre, 1997; 
2004; 2011; Roy, 2003, etc.), further reflecting a need, not only for new theoretical 
frames with which to think education and educational research, but effectively a need for 
different methods of conducting research within those newfound theoretical frames (e.g. 
Alvermann, 2000; De Freitas, 2012; Honan, 2001; 2004; 2007; Lather, 2007; Mazzei & 
McCoy, 2010; St. Pierre, 2000; 2008; 2011; Waterhouse, 2011).    
Indicating this need is also the increase in the number of doctoral dissertations 
using Deleuze’s philosophy to explore methods of researching and writing that challenge  
more traditional positivistic approaches (e.g. Moore, 2010; Waterhouse, 2011; etc).  
These researchers  
engage epistemological questions and try out methodological practices inspired by 
thinking with Deleuze in qualitative research... using or thinking with the 
  25 
 
philosophical concepts and processes of Deleuze, not focusing on them on the 
abstract, but instead engaging the implications of those concepts and processes for 
research methodology and ethics in educational research.  (Mazzei & McCoy, 
2010, p. 503) 
In addition to conducting their studies, they are compelled to “ask questions about 
the limits of [their] research practices and the kinds of knowledge production enabled and 
disabled by them” (Lather, 2007 in Mazzei & McCoy, 2010), while also questioning 
some of the very defining principles underlying positivistic qualitative research.  
Concepts such as validity, reliability, or what constitutes data, are regarded by some as 
limited, specific, as well as ideologically charged assumptions about research, 
epistemology, and ultimately what it means to be human (Lather, 2007; St. Pierre, 2011).   
This movement has contributed to the advancement of what St. Pierre (2011) has 
termed post-qualitative research - a term that she explains can be used to refer to research 
that seeks to deconstruct the categories and structure of qualitative research, while 
maintaining those categories and that structure, and opening them up (2011).  The 
deconstruction par excellence that St. Pierre calls for here is that defined by Derrida: it is 
a deconstruction that “is more than working within and against a structure” (p. 613), as it 
is “also the overturning and displacement of a structure so that something(s) different can 
be thought/done... [it] is overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the 
nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated” (Derrida, 1971/1982 
in St. Pierre, 2011, p. 613).  Researchers working within this deconstructive mode are not 
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seeking to find, implement, or impose alternatives; they are, rather pursuing “the 
supplement, what always already escapes the structure” (p. 613).  In other words, that 
which, within the sameness of the structure, appears as difference (diffèrance), turning 
research into a “science that cannot be defined in advance and is never the same” (p. 
613).    
This project can be said to be post qualitative, as defined by St. Pierre (2011) to 
the extent that it deterritorializes or displaces the conventional structure of research “so 
that something(s) different can be thought/done” (p. 613).  This displacement is done 
through the introduction of transcendental empiricism as a viable frame for educational 
research, which reinvents qualitative inquiry as rhizoanalysis (Waterhouse, 2011).  
Finally, as a researcher/philosopher I am not seeking to find, implement, or impose an 
alternative, or provide a model or protocol for research, but rather pursuing “the 
supplement, what always already escapes the structure” (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 613).   
Inquiry into the Research Project: Research as Life - Life as Research   
In the following sections I describe the process that led to the establishment of 
rhizoanalysis as the necessary overarching method for this project.  The influence of 
Gilles Deleuze’s own method - transcendental empiricism - to the overall development of 
this study is also discussed.  
In her doctoral dissertation, Honan (2001) provides what she calls a “theoretical 
interrogation of the impersonating work” (p. 20) that goes into engaging in research; 
“impersonating” certain procedures that are specific to a method can at times constrain 
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the inquiry process, thus rendering the method prior in value - also known as 
“methodolatry” (Harding, 1987 in Honan, 2001).  In my work, this exercise of 
methodological self-reflection emerged because the process and the methods were never 
dissociated from one another - the data already lived in my journey to becoming a 
teacher, in the questions I would ask, and in the problems that interrupted my 
territorialized everyday experiences as a child and a student and a teacher and… and… 
(Deleuze, 1994).  I did not choose my methods; I became aware of them - they were 
brought to clarity as such in face of a “folding” and “unfolding” in the continuum of my 
inquisitive ethos.  Academia calls them research methods - I call them life. 
*** 
I mean when was the last time you just dangled your feet?  Or skipped on the 
beach, or lied on the grass and watched the clouds?  This too is research. 
(Snowber in Malewski & Jaramillo, 2011, p.196) 
*** 
For about a year I struggled to pinpoint the methods that would be most 
appropriate in the development of this project.  I struggled not only because I was seeking 
a preexisting methodological frame that I could reconcile with the overall philosophical 
frame and tone of my project – an exploration of concepts of childhood and knowledge in 
policy and in life, based on my interest in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, and my passion for children and social justice – but also because I was seeking 
a set of methods that would suit the process and path of becoming an academically 
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valuable researcher, while accounting for the person-embodied-in-all-aspects-of-life that 
is the researcher.   
At the forefront of my struggle was the fact that this had not been a linear process 
or path, orderly stemming from the research methods’ classes I had taken while working 
towards completing my coursework.  From the research methods’ classes, some questions 
had emerged, namely the (im)possibility of systematic data gathering and recording, 
while remaining objective and taking into account the subjects of a study.  The language 
was attractive, and I was both excited and hopeful at the beginning of the courses that 
there was a variety of tested and tried methods that could be applied to a variety of issues, 
and help provide answers about those issues.  As I began working on my dissertation 
proposal though, in attempting to design an empirical study that would capture what I 
was trying to convey, I was surprised to find that my efforts, and the first few ideas I put 
into paper as possibilities for a study, felt and sounded like after thoughts.  Attempting to 
use some of the more traditional data collection methods, such as classroom observation, 
or video recording and analysis, left out concerns of philosophical nature, and captured, 
in my eyes, a limited set of the elements that constitute childhood education and 
experiences.   
In addition to the limits of “conventional humanist qualitative inquiry” (St. Pierre, 
2011, p. 613), there was a surplus of ideas, an excess of sources, and a desire and passion 
for the topic that did not seem to fit within any already academically instituted method 
that I was aware of.  At that point, the very methodological lens of qualitative research 
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began to appear insufficient, or inadequate, in both the terminology it employs, as well as 
the requirements it imposes upon the final product of academic research.  The latter were 
especially important because there had been at one point a critique to modern 
epistemology in my work, and the very arguments I was looking to put forth in the 
dissertation postulated principles that challenged those seemingly underlying traditional 
humanist qualitative research.  Concepts such as validity, or reliability, while 
reconceptualized by qualitative research to accommodate flexibility, ambiguity, and the 
importance of context, particularly as poststructural and postmodern trends in the social 
sciences began to transform the face of research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011), have 
nonetheless remained adaptations of the original “scientific method” (St. Pierre, 2011), 
and thus continue to suggest that “results” that can produce a principle of some kind are 
more valuable than analyses that highlight difference.   
Moreover, one of the stated purposes of qualitative research, particularly in 
traditional humanist approaches, is a quest for meaning (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011; 
Lather, 1991).  Qualitative researchers are after meaning: they seek “the social meaning 
people attribute to their experiences, circumstances, and situations, as well as the 
meanings people embed into texts and other objects” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p. 4), 
as they “try to extract meaning from their data” (p. 4).  This entails interpreting data and 
subjects’ insights from the point of view of specific social signifiers, and subject 
positions (Massumi, 2002), (of both researcher and research subjects).  This process can 
either reaffirm those same signifiers and subject positions, further inscribing the very 
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subjects they are attempting to free and give voice to; or reinscribe them into newly 
created categories (the ‘resistant’, the ‘subversive’, etc.).  (Massumi, 2002).    
The primacy of language and meaning-making is in fact a critique found in affect 
theories, according to which phenomena often exceed the linguistic realm, or remain at 
the pre-conscious, pre-subjective level (Clough & Haley, 2007; Gregg & Seigworth, 
2010).  While affect theories do value, and in fact call our attention to, the value of 
context and social construction (viz. social signifier) in the phenomena they study, 
meaning making is not the goal or purpose guiding their inquiry.  In affect theories, 
researchers often describe, demonstrate, and further elaborate on the implications of the 
phenomena they are studying; their particular account is valuable because it offers an 
elaborate and transdisciplinary insight into the phenomena, often uncovering or exposing 
the “in-between”, the uncommon, and the exceptional rather than the pattern, and 
validating it, not as exceptional, but as part and parcel, or fold (Deleuze, 2004) of the 
process by which it has remained invisible in the light of other approaches (Alvermann, 
2000; Clough & Haley, 2007).   
Finally, the reason why it seemed plausible initially to use traditional qualitative 
research in this project, was the fact that qualitative research encompasses a large variety 
of methods, informed by multiple perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011); also, because 
in qualitative research the “process itself (…) takes center stage” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2011, p. 4).  The latter was important given the fact that, as stated above, my own process 
had not followed a linear path, and also given the critique to product oriented pedagogies 
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embedded in my choice for affect as the theoretical lens traversing this project.  Yet, as 
stated above, in attempting to design an empirical study and attempting to explain or 
justify the methods I would use, contradictions between methodology and methods 
seemed to emerge making the study too academically vulnerable.  While on one hand, my 
questions appeared too philosophical to generate an empirical study, on the other hand 
these same questions originated within the realm of the empirical, and the potential 
answers to my questions too lived within the empirical.   
What followed was another return to the philosophy of Deleuze for help in 
determining the methods that would follow the methodology; Deleuze too had lived 
between the ideal and the empirical: as a philosopher he would not have been taken 
seriously as a researcher, and as a researcher he would not have been taken seriously as a 
philosopher.  Herein lies one of the biggest challenges philosophy of education has faced, 
and continues to face as its own field of studies (Ruitenberg, 2010) – and here was the 
challenge presenting itself to me as I attempted to bridge this gap and speak with the 
voice of both philosopher and researcher (and why must I choose?).  
*** 
The work of theory should no longer be the business of specialists.  The desire of 
a theory and its propositions should stick as closely as possible to the event and 
the expression of the masses. To achieve this, we must knit a new breed of 
intellectual, a new breed of analyst, a new breed of militant: blending the different 
types and running them together.  (Guattari in Deleuze et al., 2004, p. 217) 
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*** 
Transcendental Empiricism: an Epistemology of Immanence   
Deleuze’s answer to the conflict between philosophy/theory and the empirical was 
transcendental empiricism, a method through which he allowed himself to ask the 
questions that emerged from lived experience, while foregoing the need to establish his 
answers as universal or ideal.  Perhaps the question for human rights, for instance, would 
not be centered around, or stop at, the theoretical origins, or any ethical or moral ideal 
postulated by another philosopher; rather, it might stem from observing a situation in 
which there seem to be no such thing as human rights (Deleuze, 1998).  And perhaps the 
legitimacy in making an (expert) argument about an event existed in being immersed in 
the event that caused the argument (Deleuze et al., 2004).  Transcendental empiricism 
permeates all of Deleuze’s philosophy and describes the ways in which different elements 
of what we think of as reality, and human experience, come together to generate what we 
perceive as events, experiences, and ultimately the “I” or unified ego most of us identify 
with.   
Transcendental empiricism has permeated this study from the very beginning; 
though it was not until I sat down to write the dissertation that I became aware of it.  
While it was important that, as a doctoral candidate, I would be recognized as an “expert” 
to some extent, the very condition of “lack of legitimacy” forced me into a place of 
immanence and simultaneity with the very arguments I was trying to make.  I could not 
write about childhood without becoming child, and could not write about research 
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without becoming a researcher, in which case, whatever methods I had been using, even 
if I had been unaware of it, already existed, and I was in fact only looking for a 
designation that academia would recognize.  Moreover (and given my philosophical 
background), in philosophy, research often encompasses 
an on-going engagement with the literature, and the consequences of this are 
multiple: the presuppositions one brings to the enquiry are challenged, the 
questions with which one starts change their shape, and whatever one might have 
thought of as one’s method becomes caught up in the substance of one’s research 
interests.  (Ruitenberg, 2010, p. ix) 
What the above excerpt suggests is that, in philosophy – and thus in philosophy of 
education – the methodology as the overarching theory that introduces the methods, can 
often be immediately inferred from the content of the research.  Thus, taking the affective 
lens to look at education and educational issues immediately postulated a methodological 
approach that would encompass, not a choice between an exclusively 
theoretical/philosophical project, or an empirical qualitative project, but one with the 
potential to articulate both and bring them together, and in which they converged, not as 
separate entities in dialectical relationship or framing one another, but as a new entity 
on its own.  This convergence in turn postulated that sources and “data”, collected 
through(out) life, be of different nature, stemming at times from unexpected places and 
circumstances not immediately associated with academic research, such as memories, or 
the lyrics of a song.  
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In sum, while affect is the lens through which I choose to look at education (both 
formal and informal) in generating my critique and arguments, transcendental empiricism 
is the immanent epistemological stance informing my approach to research as lived 
experience – as the process by which the researcher engages with a problem.  This is so 
because, as stated above, transcendental empiricism reinvents qualitative inquiry as 
rhizoanalysis (Waterhouse, 2011) causing methodology, methods, and content to 
converge and coincide with lived experience and becoming, and rhizoanalysis to be the 
necessary, emerging methodological frame for this project.    Nomadic inquiry, affective 
engagement, and rhizotextual analysis are the overarching methods of collection and 
analysis of the data.  
Methodology and Methods 
Rhizoanalysis   
Sandra Harding (1987) defines a methodology as “a theory and analysis of how 
research does or should proceed; it includes accounts of how “the general structure of 
theory finds its application in particular scientific disciplines” (p.3).  Thus, a 
methodological analysis typically encompasses a discussion of how specific theoretical 
frames, such as functionalism, or phenomenology “should be or [are] applied in particular 
research areas” (Harding, 1987, p. 3), distinguishing it from method, which she defines as 
“a technique for (a way of proceeding in) gathering evidence” (p. 2).   
As seen above, an affective approach to research framed within Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism, encompasses the simultaneity of methodology and method.  
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In educational research, this methodological process according to which transgressive 
data (St. Pierre, 1997) can emerge as such circumstantially, be of disparate nature, yet 
still converge to inform understanding about a specific question or problem is called 
rhizomatic (Masny, 2009), or rhizoanalytic (Alvermann, 2000; Bowles, 2001; Honan, 
2001, 2004, 2005, 2007; Honan & Sellers, 2008; Waterhouse, 2011).  Within a 
rhizomatic frame, methodology appears disrupted and  
reterritorialized as a rhizomatic process (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  As an 
inductive approach, it does not apply pre-established categories.  It resists 
temptations to interpret and ascribe meaning; rather looking for what emerges 
through the intensive and immanent reading of data.  (Masny, 2009, p. 7)   
In education, rhizoanalysis has been used by an increasing number of researchers 
over the past decade (e.g. Alvermann; Bowles; Hagood; Honan; Honan & Sellers; 
Waterhouse; etc.).   
By and large, educational researchers that have used rhizoanalysis to conduct their 
studies departed from Alvermann’s (2000) original definition of rhizoanalysis as “a 
method of examining... texts [and data] that allows us to see things in the middle” 
(p.118).  Within this type of analysis, sources of different origin and nature can be 
analyzed together in order to assess how each affects the others in a network that unfolds 
unpredictably the same way a rhizome would (Alvermann, 2000; Bowles, 2001; Honan, 
2001).     
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It was in order to look for “the middles”, that Alvermann (2000) re-analyzed data 
which had previously been analyzed using Norman Fairclough’s (1992) critical discourse 
analysis.  Using critical discourse analysis, Alvermann et al. (1996), and Alvermann, 
Commeyras, Young, Randall, and Hinson (1997) had traced patterns in the discourse of 
adolescents enrolled in an after-school talk about reading and texts.  Through 
rhizoanalysis, rather than focusing on patterns, Alvermann (2000) intended to uncover 
what had been missed by the previous analysis, or what had remained “invisible” in light 
of critical discourse analysis.  In the author’s words, 
Looking for middles, rather than beginnings and endings, makes it possible to 
decenter key linkages and find new ones, not by combining old ones in new ways, 
but by remaining open to the proliferation of ruptures and discontinuities that in 
turn create other linkages. (Alvermann, 2000, p. 118) 
Using rhizoanalysis, Alvermann (2000) read the transcripts not for patterns or 
meaning structures, but for the “in-between” references of the adolescents to pop-culture 
phenomena, songs, television shows, etc., as they “worked” with the texts they were 
reading (and impacted that same reading) and talking about in the after-school Read and 
Talk Club.  The result was a multidimensional map in which the pop-culture references 
emerged from the background to become legitimate parts of the rhizome that is 
adolescents’ understanding of what they read. 
Bowles (2001) used rhizoanalysis in her doctoral project as a tool to “deconstruct 
the literacy practices of four students” (p. 1) with learning disabilities.  Throughout her 
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study, the author used as data a multitude of different sources of disparate nature (e.g. 
classroom videos, students’ work samples, parents’ interviews, personal insight, etc.) in 
order to generate what she called a poststructural ethnography.  In order to analyze the 
data in a way that agreed with her poststructural frame, Bowles (2001) introduced 
rhizoanalysis, as defined by Alvermann (2000), as a way to look for what is found “in the 
middle”.  Bowles (2001) believed that, not only did the figuration of the rhizome 
illustrate well the way in which she thought of her classroom practice, as well as her 
understanding of her students and their subjectivity, she saw in rhizoanalysis as a method 
“a possible form for fitting disparate pieces of data together in order to find new links, 
links that might help me better understand who my students were and what their practices 
might mean” (p. 127).  According to Bowles (2001), the advantages of rhizoanalysis are 
in being able to cross analyze sources of different nature, as mentioned above, and 
“encourage new semiotic chains that incorporated the linguistic, cognitive, and intuitive 
data” (p. 127) she was collecting.  
Honan & Sellers (2008) also think of rhizoanalysis as a method in which 
apparently disparate sources can be brought together for analysis. The authors say that 
Data collected for educational research, while appearing to be disparate, can be 
analyzed rhizomatically to find connections between writing, artworks, video, 
interview transcripts and textual artifacts, for example.  This kind of analysis 
enables (e)merging (im)plausible readings of connections between, across and 
within various data.  (Honan & Seller, 2008, p. 111) 
  38 
 
In “(E)merging Methodologies: Putting Rhizomes to Work”, Honan & Sellers, 
(2008) refer to the concept of rhizome as the figuration that originates the different 
methods/processes they engage in (or find themselves engaged in) in their research, 
explaining that Deleuze and Guattari “introduced the figuration of a rhizome to explore 
multiplicities in thinking and in writing” (p. 111).  This figuration appears as a way to 
challenge the image of the tree, and “the arboreal metaphors that are often taken up in 
linear and modernist expressions of thought; according to the authors, rhizomatic 
thinking and writing involves making ceaseless and ongoing connections” (Honan & 
Sellers, 2008, p. 112).  In research this means being able to be open to the uncertainty of 
the course of the study, and taking that uncertainty as part of the path the researcher must 
follow in order to find the problems that need to be addressed.  In writing, it means to be 
willing to “following lines of flight [and] being open to making connections between 
quite different thoughts, ideas, pieces of data, [and] discursive moments” (Honan & 
Sellers, 2008, p. 112 ).  In sum, in collecting data, or in writing a text about collected 
data, the researcher is open to letting into the text thoughts that arise through different 
media (the researcher may have observed a classroom, or a playground, taken notes, or 
collected the children’s artwork), as well his/her own memories of childhood, among 
other factors unaccounted for in the initial plan of studies.  
In addition to thinking and writing rhizomatically, Honan & Sellers (2008) also 
refer to rhizomatic discourse analysis, or rhizo-textual analysis (Honan, 2005), which 
they define as follows: 
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A rhizomatic discourse analysis follows the lines of flight that always/already 
connect different systems in order to provide accounts of (e)merging-
(im)plausible-(mis)readings… discourses operate within texts in a rhizomatic 
fashion, intersecting and parting, over and under lapping. (p. 115) 
What this means is that no text operates exclusively as a closed system, or a linear 
self-sustaining finished product; rather, a text bears in it a variety of discourses and 
intentions, those of the author, as well as those of the reader(s).  When a researcher or 
philosopher reads a text he or she can never fully close him/herself to the emerging 
unplanned thoughts and discourses underlying and/or emerging from that text and the act 
of reading it.  
A rhizo-textual analysis involves mapping these discursive lines, following 
pathways, identifying the intersections and connections, finding the moments 
where the assemblages of discourses merge to make plausible and reason(able) 
sense to the reader. (Honan & Sellers, 2008, p. 115) 
Elsewhere, Honan (2001; 2004) uses rhizo-textual analysis to read and analyze 
policy texts; she says: “A rhizo-textual analysis is not concerned with following 
traditional, scientifically rigorous channels of inquiry; rather it is a mapping of 
connections, of the fleshy tubers that are the rhizome” (2004, pp. 269-270).  In a study 
conducted in 2001, Honan used rhizo-textual analysis to explore the “new linkages” that 
arose from the connection between a set of policy texts and two primary school teachers’ 
testimonies.  Borrowing Elizabeth Grosz’s (1994) concept of “provisional linkages”, 
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Honan (2004) identified connections “between what seemed to be disparate “lines of 
flight”” (p. 271) in the policy texts, as well as the teachers’ readings of the policies as 
regulatory of teachers’ construction of themselves and their practice.  In using rhizo-
textual analysis to read educational policy, Honan (2004) also explores the use of this 
method as a means to create a social critique of the construct of teacher in the neoliberal, 
and what she calls “managerialist” (p. 267), trend that has “infiltrated many education 
systems across the world during the last twenty years” (p. 267).  According to the author:  
The rhizo-textual analysis of the relations between teachers and texts disrupts 
commonplace understandings about these relationships, understandings that 
currently inform much of the work done by policy-makers in the USA and 
Australia, as they strive to homogenize teachers’ work into circumscribed sets of 
technical practices that can be listed, described, standardized, and evaluated 
against sets of ‘performance standards’. (Honan, 2004, p. 268) 
When comparing rhizo-textual analysis with critical discourse analysis, Honan 
(2005) states that 
Often, discourse analytic methods provide linear readings of texts, where 
discourses appear as separate and distinctly different paths.  Understanding texts 
as rhizomatic helps to make sense of the reasonableness of texts that are 
constructed from seemingly contradictory discourses.  (p.17) 
Thus, rather than attempt to separate disparate discourses from one another, 
categorize them, and analyze them separately or synthetically, rhizoanalysis allows for 
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the immanent analysis of all, understanding that they may differ or apparently contradict 
one another, while co-creating one another through that very difference. 
Finally, according to Waterhouse (2011), it is transcendental empiricism that 
reinvents qualitative inquiry as rhizoanalysis.  In her work, she follows Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1983; 1987) six principles of the rhizome - connection, heterogeneity, 
asignifying, multiplicity, cartography, and decalcomania, in order to frame her approach 
to qualitative research.  These six principles frame a conceptual shift in the understanding 
of qualitative research, and a subsequent shift in the common understanding of certain 
key research terms such as “data”, “analysis”, or “reporting of findings” (Waterhouse, 
2011).  She states that rhizoanalysis is “not a procedural method”, but rather “a 
conceptual mindset”, a “(non) method”, an “immanent experiment” (p. 17). Thus, the 
goal of rhizoanalysis is not to trace and represent the phenomena as such, but to map and 
create the connections that emerge within the process of research and analysis of the data.  
Within a rhizoanalytic frame, data is no longer understood as evidence, but as 
“transgressive” (St. Pierre, 2002 in Waterhouse, 2011), i.e. it escapes representation; 
analysis is no longer understood as interpretation, but as the creation of immanent 
rhizoanalytical connections; and reporting is no longer understood as representation, but 
as cartography, i.e. map making (St. Pierre, 1997a; Waterhouse, 2011).  
Why rhizoanalysis.  The choice for rhizoanalysis in this study stems from the 
choice for transcendental empiricism as an epistemological framework; like Waterhouse 
(2011), I tend to see rhizoanalysis as more of a “conceptual mindset”, and an “immanent 
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experiment”, than as a “procedural method” (p. 17).  As such, it has allowed me to 
remain open to the uncertainties of the course of the study (Honan & Sellers, 2008) in a 
nomadic fashion (Semetsky, 2006; St. Pierre, 1997b), and to “collect data” both 
intentionally, as well as unintentionally throughout the process.   
Furthermore, this methodology has allowed me to gather a variety of sources of 
different nature (Alvermann, 2000; Bowles, 2001; Honan, 2001; Honan and Sellers, 
2008) in order to generate the desired multiple and multi-angle approach needed in 
deterritorializing human experience.  The multiple media and nature of the sources 
provides multiple entryways into the lived experiences of young children, which express 
a variety of ways in which the idealized modern child/subject can be deterritorialized, and 
reterritorialized into an affective space of multiplicity and affective intensity, rather than 
unity and identity, making it possible to look at children and childhood from a non-
cognitive, non-linear immanent perspective. 
Finally, rhizoanalysis has also provided me with a way to look at policy 
documents that is more in line with my overall approach to research, as well as with the 
purpose of this project, since the purpose was not to produce a comprehensive analysis of 
the policy documents, but rather to “point” at what is absent, i.e. in the middle 
(Alvermann, 2000; Bowles, 2001). 
Data Sources   
The main identifiable sources of data used in this study are: 1) Developmentally 
Appropriate Practice (NAYEC, 2009); 2) the Preschool Teaching and Learning Standards 
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(NJDOE, 2013); 3) the documentary film Deadly Playground (Saleh, 2007); and 4) 
Emerging Memories and Perceptions of Childhood Experiences.   
Developmentally Appropriate Practice in Early Childhood Programs Serving 
Children from Birth through Age 8 (NAYEC, 2009).  The Developmentally 
Appropriate Practice (2009) document is a position statement of the National Association 
for the Education of Young Children (NAYEC), regarding the education of young 
children, from birth to age 8.  Its purpose is stated in the document as follows: 
The purpose of this position statement is to promote excellence in early childhood 
education by providing a framework for best practice. Grounded both in the 
research on child development and learning and in the knowledge base regarding 
educational effectiveness, the framework outlines practice that promotes young 
children’s optimal learning and development.  (NAYEC, 2009, p. 1) 
As a framework, Developmentally Appropriate Practice (NAYEC, 2009) is 
intended to be used by policy makers across the United States when creating early 
childhood state policy and curriculum, and referred back to by teachers, educators, and 
early education stakeholders.   
Preschool Teaching and Learning Standards (NJDOE, 2013).  The Preschool 
Teaching and Learning Standards (2013) is a policy document published by the New 
Jersey State Department of Education (NJDOE) regarding preschool education, in 
replacement of the Preschool Teaching and Learning Expectations: Standards of 
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Quality, published in 2004.  In the new document the preschool standards are directly 
aligned with the New Jersey K-12 Core Curriculum Content Standards.   
According to its authors, the Standards document: defines supportive learning 
environments for preschool children; provides guidance on the assessment of young 
children; articulates optimal relationships between and among families, the community, 
and preschools; and identifies expected learning outcomes for preschool children by 
domain, as well as developmentally appropriate teaching practices that are known to 
support those outcomes (NJDOE, 2013).  Additionally, “As with the K-12 content 
standards, the preschool standards were written for all school districts in the state” 
(NJDOE, 2013, p. 5) and  
are intended to be used as: a resource for ensuring appropriate implementation of 
the curriculum; a guide for instructional planning; a framework for ongoing 
professional development; as well as a framework for the development of a 
comprehensive early childhood education assessment system.  (p. 5)  
The principles of child development and learning informing developmentally 
appropriate practice, as defined by the National Association for the Education of Young 
Children (NAYEC, 2009), provide, according to the authors of the Standards, “the 
foundation for creating learning environments that foster optimal development of young 
children” (p. 12). 
The choice for early childhood education policy documents has to do with the fact 
that for children attending this level of schooling, the classroom is their very first 
  45 
 
encounter with systematized/formal education and regulated peer interactions, both 
incipient forms of socialization and political life.  Since my questions regarded the 
normalizing intentions/purposes of educational policy documents privileging specific 
modes of being, I was interested in finding out what and how ideas about children and 
child development were conveyed in policy texts regarding early education as that 
incipient locus of political life. 
Deadly Playground (Saleh, 2007).  The documentary film Deadly Playground, 
directed by Katia Saleh (2007), depicts the daily lives of children in the south of 
Lebanon, an area previously affected by armed conflict.  Though the conflict is no longer 
active, over one million land mines were left behind in the mountains and fields, 
continuing to threaten the lives of young children as they play outside.  The film was 
screened at the International Children’s Rights Documentary Film Festival, a festival 
presented by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
from November through December of 2009, for the commemoration of the 20th 
anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Screenings were held in 
several countries and the film has been touring since 2007 with the International Human 
Rights Watch Film Festival. 
Emerging memories and perceptions of childhood experiences.  As stated in 
the Introduction, memories of early childhood and of formal education emerged during 
the writing of this project initially as a meta-process, and later becoming ‘data’.  They are 
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expressions of the becoming-child necessary in writing about childhood, and the 
becoming-educational subject necessary in writing about education and subjectivity.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
I certainly haven't been shopping for any new shoes- 
And- 
I certainly haven't been spreading myself around 
I still only travel by foot, and by foot it's a slow climb, 
But I'm good at being uncomfortable, so 
I can't stop changing all the time 
I notice that my opponent is always on the go- 
And- 
Won't go slow, so's not to focus, and I notice 
He'll hitch a ride with any guide, as long as 
They go fast from whence he came-  
But he's no good at being uncomfortable, so 
He can't stop staying exactly the same 
If there was a better way to go then it would find me 
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I can't help it, the road just rolls out behind me 
Be kind to me, or treat me mean 
I'll make the most of it, I'm an extraordinary machine.  (Apple, 2005) 
*** 
According to Elizabeth St. Pierre (2002), commonly accepted notions of 
qualitative data are problematic because a) they “must be translated into words so that 
they can be accounted for and interpreted” (p. 403), as transcriptions and notes; and b) 
they are produced and collected, coded, categorized, analyzed, and interpreted in a 
specifically linear fashion (2002).  This is counter to how the actual research process 
occurs and how data is experienced by the researcher during that process (St. Pierre, 
2002; Waterhouse, 2011).  The research process “often follows rhizomatic paths, looping 
backwards and forwards – folding, unfolding, and refolding” (Waterhouse, 2011, p. 127), 
rendering important data impossible to represent – to this data that escapes language, is 
“uncodable, excessive, [and] out-of-control” (p. 127), St. Pierre calls transgressive (St. 
Pierre, 1997a; St. Pierre, 2002).  Within a rhizomatic framework, data is no longer 
understood as evidence but as “transgressive” (St. Pierre, 2002 in Waterhouse, 2011), 
because it escapes and exceeds representation, and it is uncodable because it is seen as 
“fluid and in flux” (Waterhouse, 2011, p. 137).  It follows that “analysis” is no longer 
understood as interpretation, but as the creation of immanent rhizoanalytical connections, 
and “reporting findings” is no longer understood as representation, but as cartography, 
i.e. map making (2011).   
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The data used in this study was, as stated above, gathered throughout my life and 
graduate career both intentionally, as well as unintentionally.  The primary methods used 
in this collection were: a) nomadic inquiry; and b) affective engagement.  In the 
following paragraphs I will describe these methods, and explain their role in this study. 
Nomadic inquiry and affective engagement.  The process I had been working 
through as a graduate student, a teacher, an emerging researcher, and a situated living 
parcel of the world - described at the beginning of this plateau - was, as stated above, 
constituent of the methods of research as such.  Living and “data collection” were one 
and the same, and ‘analysis’ sometimes happened while daydreaming or doing dishes.  
The method I had been engaged with is designated in the literature as “nomadic inquiry” 
(Semetsky, 2006; St. Pierre, 1997b), a designation that evokes Deleuze’s concept of the 
nomad (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  
Nomadic inquiry is a process oriented method in which the researcher follows 
his/her concerns and is open to whatever path unfolds; he or she is/becomes researcher 
with(in) the immanent process of questioning a given issue or situation.  The researcher is 
still departing from his/her own field of studies, and is aware of the dominant discourse 
of that field, but is eager to allow other discourses to enter the conversation in order to 
both expand her understanding about the issue at hand, as well as establish new 
connections which might lead to further inquiries and advancement.  This approach to the 
research process allows the researcher to ask questions as they arise, as well as 
reformulate her initial questions along the way.     
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Deleuze (1994) says that “We are led to believe that problems are given ready-
made, and that they disappear in the responses or the solution”, and “led to believe that 
the activity of thinking… begins only with the search for solutions” (p. 158).  These are 
not genuine problems, but merely pseudo-problems.  According to Deleuze (1994) 
knowing where one’s questions will lead reflects what he calls a “dogmatic image of 
thought”.  Within this epistemological frame, inquiry is an activity focused on the search 
for answers to questions that are ready-made and do not result from a genuine desire to 
question, or a question that is truly problematic to the researcher (Deleuze, 1994).  In 
establishing a project, the researcher that operates within the dogmatic image of thought 
has a strong attachment to his/her field of studies, and has taken as her own the questions 
of her field.  This researcher has, at the beginning of her project, clear and concise 
questions to guide her studies, as well as a set of answers she expects to confirm through 
the development of her study.  This reveals a product oriented attitude rather than a 
process oriented one.   
The nomadic thinker/researcher is not looking to confirm a pre-determined 
answer; he/she is looking to inaugurate a new image of thought (Deleuze, 1994), and 
create new avenues for thought and inquiry, and is driven by a desire to know what issues 
are problematic as they arise as problems (Gregoriou, 2008; Honan, 2001; 2004; Honan 
and Sellers, 2008; Semetsky, 2006; St. Pierre, 1997b; 2011).  Within this understanding 
of thought and inquiry, “to think is to be under way, to be on a path that one must clear 
for oneself, although one can have no certain destination in mind” (Marks in Parr, 2005, 
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p. 279).  A new image of thought “springs from a series of intuitions” (Marks in Parr, 
2005, p. 279). 
According to Semetsky (2006), Elizabeth St. Pierre “uses [nomadic inquiry] in the 
sense of a journey, or writing excursion into subjectivity analogous to Foucault’s care of 
the self, or “technologies of the self that people use to create themselves as the ethical 
subjects of their actions””(p. 94).  This approach describes well the process of this very 
project; as it is used in this project, nomadic inquiry is best described  
in terms of attention to particular places and earlier times, retrospective as well as 
untimely, memories and dynamic forces, capable of affecting changes and 
contesting one’s identity to the point of a transformation of who we are and, 
respectively, reconfiguration of the where of our place at this point in time.  The 
nomadic - smooth - space is an open territory, providing emancipatory potential 
for those who are situated in this space in contrast to striated, or gridded, space... 
(Semetsky, 2006, p. 94) 
The research process/space as smooth space, i.e. open, provides the researcher 
with the opportunity to engage in a process of identity/subjectivity re-construction 
through “nomadic displacement” (Semetsky, 2006, p. 94).  This displacement - the 
process by which the nomadic researcher becomes such, occurs by way of 
deterritorialization.  Semetsky (2006) explains that  
The researcher herself, in the process of inquiry, becomes a nomadic subject who 
is “more interested in the surprising intensity of an event than in the familiar 
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serenity of essence” (St. Pierre, 1997b, p. 370), an event per se constituting the 
very perplexity of a problematic situation.  (p. 95) 
In the present study, nomadic displacement occurred by way of what I have come 
to call the “affective poke”, essential in understanding affective cognition as such.  As 
stated above, a genuine problem is not ready-made: it is rather something that emerges 
from being immersed in a particular set or assemblage that causes the problem to emerge 
as such, i.e. as problematic.  An issue becomes problematic when the dogmatic image of 
thought is disrupted by affect, by affective intensities which begin to “poke” at the 
researcher causing her to eventually look at the rising problematicity of an issue.  
Affective intensities “signal” or point the researcher towards the emerging problematicity 
of a given assemblage, and the nomadic researcher – that which accepts the emerging 
challenges and questions she finds along her journey, does so because of affect - because 
to be a nomad is to affect and be affected, and to accept to be changed by the very 
journey that is research. 
Nomadic displacement brought about the memories of childhood and the episodes 
of territorialized educational experience described in plateau 5..  These emerged 
inadvertently during the research process, and became folds in the process: tiny 
movements of inflection in the continuum of my subjective unity (Deleuze, 1993), 
resulting in a conscious unfolding of education as that which is constituted within that 
continuum – not in a linear fashion, but immanently.  Those experiences, or the memory 
of those episodes, may or may not have appeared, at the time of their occurrence, as 
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either valuable or educational, and may have remained in obscurity had I not engaged in 
the becoming that brought them to clarity (Deleuze, 1993), i.e. becoming educational 
researcher, and having the desire to study childhood.  They may have remained 
fragments, or tiny specks of life never to reach the unity of consciousness (Deleuze, 
1993).  Those tiny, inconspicuous perceptions became relevant or, as Deleuze (1993) 
would say, “remarkable” (p. 88) because at least two of them entered into a “differential 
relation that determines a singularity” (p. 88). When infinitely small units of 
consciousness, i.e. tiny perceptions, enter into differential relations, they produce a 
threshold of consciousness - i.e. we become aware of them, usually in the form of 
something (a sensation, a state of mind, etc.) that is larger than them and (within our 
conscious unity) dissociated from its microscopic genesis, or germinal life (Deleuze, 
1993; Ansell-Pearson, 1999). 
The “affective poke”, which I introduce here in order to add to the methods I 
studied and used in this study, namely nomadic inquiry, can be thought of as a tiny 
perception (Deleuze, 1993), a kind of pre-conscious sense(ation) caused by 
micro/imperceptible interactions between affective intensities.  In his analysis of Leibniz’ 
work, Deleuze (1993) states that “Tiny perceptions… constitute the animal or animated 
state par excellence: disquiet.  These are “pricklings”, or little foldings that are no less 
present in pleasure than in pain” (p. 87).  The “poke” itself cannot exist if not for the 
presence of affect, and affective intensities in/of the body/bodies.  At its genesis, the poke 
is not immediately accessible to consciousness, or perception, let alone what we call 
rational cognition.  At the same time, it points toward the existence of a pre-conscious 
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cognition – an embodied cognition that, underneath awareness, perseveres in consistently 
establishing relationships with the intensities it encounters, thus providing the potential 
for learning to occur, and further relationships to be established.  In other words, 
according to Deleuze (1993) 
The animal that anxiously looks about, or the soul that watches out, signifies that 
there exist minute perceptions that are not integrated into the present perception, 
but also minute perceptions that are not integrated into the preceding one and that 
nourish the one that comes along (“so it was that!”).  (p. 87) 
As a tiny perception – a “prickling” – the poke resides within the microscopic, 
rendering perception unstable (Deleuze, 1993) (hence the discomfort).  The poke 
migrates into conscious perception when, as described above, it enters into a differential 
relationship with an-other (heterogeneous) part of the assemblage of the emerging 
problem, thus producing a “threshold of consciousness” (p. 88).   
At this point, problematicity of an issue is established, and the researcher can 
choose to pursue it.  This entails a recognition of one’s subjective continuum (our 
perceived subjective unity – woman, white, philosopher, etc.), while at the same time 
being open to the disruptions and interruptions that are necessary for the advancement of 
inquiry through nomadic displacement and deterritorialization.  This is why it was 
essential that in this study I accept the inter-ruption of those memories of childhood – 
because, in retrospect, as folds in the process, as tiny movements of inflection in the 
continuum of my subjective unity (Deleuze, 1993), not only were they already signaling 
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an emerging issue, and poking me to direct my attention toward it, they were also 
providing me an opportunity to say “so it was that!” (p. 87). 
Analysis.  Since my claim is that policy documents function as territorializing 
mechanisms according to which children and adults, students and teachers, as well as 
parents and administrators, are suggested socially preferred modes of being, it was 
important for the purpose of this project to identify, not only the dominant discourses 
shaping the policy, but also associated notions of child.  This was done through the 
rhizoanalysis of the two aforementioned policy documents.  Part of the purpose of the 
analysis was to identify dominant discourses in the policy that suggest preferred modes of 
being (i.e. dominant beliefs about subjectivity), as well as preferred kinds of knowledge, 
and learning (i.e. dominant beliefs about epistemology).  A more important purpose was 
to look beyond those general assumptions about children in order to begin to think the 
child that is “absent” from the rhetoric, but is nonetheless impacted by it.  This child may, 
or may not be physically absent from formal education as an institution, but lives in some 
way within reach of its territorializing potential.  This approach helped provide an insight 
into the paradoxical ways in which the policy speaks of children and learning, in light of 
the self-proclaimed social purpose of public education in the U.S. (NAYEC, 2009), and 
the parallel neoliberal political rhetoric. 
In order to discuss the territorializing/normalizing potential underlying 
educational early childhood policy, I analyzed the Developmentally Appropriate Practice 
(NAYEC, 2009), Preschool Teaching and Learning Standards (NJDOE, 2013).  It is 
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important to mention that this analysis does not constitute an attempt to suggest the 
improvement or further revision of the documents.  This is, rather, a philosophical 
analysis of the documents, intended to examine their development, content, as well as 
their impact, and potential social, political, and personal unintended consequences 
(Simons, Olssen & Peters, 2009). 
 Since the existing literature and research on developmentally appropriate practices 
tend to focus either on theoretical/philosophical critiques to the principles, and 
assumptions, or on the results of (attempted) implementation in the classroom given 
specific desired outcomes (e.g. academic achievement, closing of the achievement gap), 
in this dissertation I have decided to look at the principles as they are translated into the 
state policy and are thus potentially implemented.  This entailed looking beyond the 
Developmentally Appropriate Practice (2009) document, at an actual state document, in 
this case the Preschool Teaching and Learning Standards (NJDOE, 2013), where the 
principles appear translated into specific implementation standards and learning 
outcomes.  It is important to note that I am looking specifically at potential 
implementation, as it is described in the standards and learning outcomes stated in the 
state policy as a “resource for ensuring appropriate implementation of curriculum”, and a 
“guide for instructional planning” (NJDOE, 2013, p. 5).  The document (NJDOE, 2013) 
states that the “standards are not a curriculum, but are the learning targets of a 
curriculum” (p. 5) – in order to successfully achieve the preschool standards, “All 
preschool programs must implement a comprehensive, evidence-based preschool 
curriculum” (p. 5), as well as implement developmentally appropriate teaching practices.  
  56 
 
The document does nonetheless identify and describe very specific standards, teaching 
strategies, and learning outcomes, which should become manifest upon implementation.  
It is these that I have mostly focused on. 
As stated above, rhizoanalysis has provided me with a way to approach policy 
documents that is more in line with my overall approach to research, as well as with the 
purpose of this project.  Rhizo-textual analysis’ understanding of the text as a rhizome, 
i.e. as an open system that is co-created by its readers (Honan, 2004; Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987), allowed me not only to draw connections within the policy texts, and across the 
texts and the literature, it also allowed me create my own (im)plausible reading (Honan, 
2004; 2005; Honan and Sellers, 2008), and generate a critique to the construct of the ideal 
literate, rational, developing child described in the texts.  Thinking the text as a rhizome, 
and following Honan (2004; 2005), and Honan and Sellers’ research on “(im)plausible 
readings” (2008), I assume that multiple readings of the documents are constantly being 
created (by teachers, administrators, staff, etc), thus disrupting the notion of the ideal 
child, further disrupted at implementation, and through common daily activities.  
Understanding the text as both a rhizome on its own, where multiple discourses 
converge, as well as a “shoot” within the rhizomatic assemblage of education and 
schooling, I attempt to uncover the “middles”, i.e. assumptions, underlying social and 
political forces, and ideologies, at work in shaping generalized and commonly accepted 
ideas about children and childhood, normal child/human development, and knowledge 
and learning.   
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Finally, I “open up” the diagram created through the rhizotextual analysis of the 
policy document to the rhizoanalytic project that is this dissertation, in order to analyze 
and further establish connections between the ideology conveyed by the policy, and the 
expressions provided by the actual situations presented in plateaus 4. and 5., namely the 
documentary film Deadly Playground (Saleh, 2007), and the memories of early 
childhood and of formal education.  The rhizotextual analysis of the Developmentally 
Appropriate Practice (NAYEC, 2013) and the Preschool Teaching & Learning Standards 
(NJDOE, 2013) presented in this document provides “signaling” or “pointing” to the 
problems found in those actual situations via the principles, standards, and learning 
outcomes as they reflect dominant discourses about epistemology and subjectivity.  
My first encounter with the film Deadly Playground (Saleh, 2007) resulted from a 
brief encounter with the 2011 Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report 
(UNESCO, 2011).  At some point during my graduate career I grew interested in the 
issue of children’s rights, and subsequently subscribed to the Human Rights Watch Email 
Newsletter.  In March of 2011, while working on my dissertation proposal, I received a 
Newsletter about the publication of the 2011 EFA Progress Report.  Reading bits and 
pieces of the report, consistently remitted me to the arguments I had read in both Panagia 
(2009) and Protevi’s (2009) books, which had redirected the course of the project to the 
emerging field of affect studies.  While conducting that impromptu research that resulted 
from the Human Rights Watch Newsletter, I came across the documentary Deadly 
Playground (Saleh, 2007); it was showcased on the sidebar of the Human Rights Watch 
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website at the time I accessed it: within a few clicks I was watching it on the Aljazeera 
website.   
An initial “unintentional analysis” of the film originated the main argument that 
became this dissertation: a tentative answer to the problem of narratocracy, as defined by 
Panagia (2009).  For methodological reasons, I did not view the film again until I was 
writing this document.  For almost the entirety of the writing process, the film remained a 
semi-distant data source I had encountered, engaged with, and produced ideas from.  Not 
only did I want, as much as possible, to maintain the impression(s) I had gotten from my 
first encounter with the film – that unintentional, unplanned, affective encounter-analysis, 
which had pointed me to problems and ideas, I wanted to engage those problems and 
ideas without “going back”.  I viewed the film again twice while writing plateau 4.; 
intentional viewing was mostly focused on capturing images that could help convey for 
the reader the deterritorializing experiences of the children’s daily lives, rather than on 
further problematization.  
Finally, analysis of the memories encompassed moving from the narrative form 
under which they initially emerged, onto an exercise in auto-schizo-biography.  
Randomly generated word lists and ontographies, i.e. non-narrative graphic ways of 
presenting text (Bogost, 2012) were used in order to deterritorialize the narrative of long-
term memories and displace the educated subject.  
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3. The Territorialized Representation of the Child in Policy  
Notions of children and childhood tend to reflect the dominant discourses within 
the communities that produce them, and are fundamentally implicated in the policies and 
practices of those communities (Woodrow & Press, 2007).  Policy documents, in turn, 
“construct authorized versions of the curriculum subject, teacher and student” and 
“officially ‘write’ the teacher and the student - who they should be, what they are to do 
and say, and when and how they must do or say it” (Cormack & Comber, 1996, p. 119 in 
Honan, 2004, p. 271).  Policy creates and shapes “how society is desired to function and 
“be” in certain contexts, influencing the language which people value, [and] the actions 
which receive reward” (Lall, 2012, p. 2).  This will influence “how individuals interact, 
what they perceive to be “good”, and how they shape their lives in order to fulfill or 
move against cultural rewards for “success”” (p. 2).  In early education, this means that 
views of the child found in policy, which reflect dominant social and political discourses, 
impact the lives of all involved in handling the education of children, both directly and 
indirectly, ultimately impacting the daily lives of young children as well (Woodrow & 
Press, 2007).   
This plateau fulfills four main purposes: a) it offers a brief genealogy of the 
normal child of developmental psychology; b) it introduces Developmentally Appropriate 
Practice (NAYEC, 2009) as a policy framework; c) it discusses the (re)territorializing 
power of policy texts; and d) it provides a rhizoanalysis of both Developmentally 
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Appropriate Practice (NAYEC, 2009), and the New Jersey Preschool Teaching and 
Leaning Standards (NJDOE, 2013) as it pertains to their (re)territorializing effects. 
The Normal Child of Developmental Psychology 
Underlying western educational theory and policy is a notion of childhood and 
subjectivity largely rooted in the principles of enlightened modern humanism and 
rationalism (Honan, 2005; Honan & Sellers, 2008) inaugurated a few centuries ago.  
Reflecting the rational subject of modernity, the rational child 
in western liberal democratic societies is positioned as a special category of 
person who lacks, for a time, the complete range of capacities necessary for full 
functioning as a citizen [and] understood to acquire those capacities by 
progressing steadily along a universal path of development to emerge as a self-
regulating, autonomous individual, the possessor of a range of attributes.  (Tyler, 
1993, p. 35 in Honan, 2005, p. 117) 
This is the developmental model, identified by some as the model of modernity, 
deriving directly from its general ideals, and the fact that the human and social sciences, 
namely psychology and sociology, emerged during the industrialization period following 
the success of the sciences and the scientific method (Aldridge & Goldman, 2007; 
Kennedy, 2006; Postman, 1994; Polakow, 1982).  In an attempt to “explain” childhood, 
this tendency came to objectify children the same way one would objectify any other 
“object” of study (Kennedy, 2006; Walkerdine, 1984).  In fact, according to Walkerdine 
(1984), “The… notion of an individualized pedagogy depended absolutely on the 
possibility of the observation and classification of the normal development” (p.177 in 
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Honan, 2005), which depended on the establishment of a model or ideal against which to 
classify and compare each individual child.   
According to this model, children develop in a more or less linear fashion, 
according to stages, which are determined by the child’s age.  According to the 
developmental model, normal development occurs by successfully getting through each 
of the stages, which can be determined by the presence or absence of specific observable 
behaviors.  Specific behaviors are equated with cognitive achievement, and considered to 
be representative of normal development.  A child is said to be developing normally 
when she demonstrates specific observable behaviors that are consistent with those 
described in the model as appropriate for the child’s age, or stage of development.  
Observable behavior that is not consistent with that prescribed by the model may indicate 
that the child is not developing normally, or that there is some kind of developmental 
delay. 
 Though still dominant in educational discourse and policy, developmental theories 
have been critiqued by many over the past three decades.  Educators invested in more 
philosophical approaches to children and the concept of childhood (e.g. Borgnon, 2007; 
Kennedy, 2006; Matthews, 1981, 1994, 2008; Mozère, 2007; Friquegnon, 2004; Weber, 
2007) agree that the developmental approach is either incomplete or inaccurate.  They 
believe that traditional approaches to childhood and education, namely deriving from a 
developmental framework, tend to define children as incomplete beings on a journey 
towards completeness, and equate childhood with debility and lack (Borgnon, 2007; 
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Friquegnon, 2004; Kennedy, 2006; Lipman, 1981; Matthews, 1981; 1994; 2008; Mozère, 
2007; Weber, 2007). 
According to Matthews (1981), Piaget’s stage theory is an example of what he 
refers to as the “recap model”.  According to this model the child appears as a primitive 
because of the belief that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, i.e. “the succession of 
concepts and belief systems to be found in a child’s intellectual development mirrors the 
succession of concepts to be found in the evolution of our culture” (p. 12).  This model 
resonates Hegel’s theory of a teleological history of humanity as evolution of human 
consciousness, and puts children on a path towards some kind of quintessentially human 
end, i.e. the complete rational normal adult.  
One of the problems Matthews finds with this model is the idea that, since 
children are said to be at a different stage in their intellectual journey that is less 
sophisticated than that of most adults, they do not (and cannot) share concepts and belief 
systems with one another (Matthews, 1981).  This postulates that adults and children 
cannot authentically engage and understand each other.  Matthews says that, according to 
Piaget’s theory, “the prospects for a having deep conversations with young children [are] 
rather dim.” (…) “There will be nothing I can say that will bring the child up to my level 
of cognitive sophistication” (Matthews, 2009, p. 27).   
This conception – which he calls “a ‘deficit conception of childhood’, since “It is 
[based on] a deficit in cognitive structure” (p. 27) – and particularly the idea that children 
are in a state of “deficit”, “seems to have profound implications for the expectations 
parents and teachers can reasonably have when they have discussions with their children” 
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(p. 27).  According to the author, “Many of us (…) share with Piaget the assumption that 
children are well thought of primarily as lacking certain competencies that they can 
expect to develop by the time they are adults” (p. 27).  Citing Matthews, and also 
critiquing the recap model, Weber (2007) says that  
A structure of communication based on this image of the child will necessarily be 
asymmetrically weighted towards the adult.  It is a mere monologue in which the 
adult explains to children the world as it “really” is.  But I doubt whether true 
dialogue is possible at all as long as children continue to be regarded as strangers 
who inhabit an onto-genetically atavistic level. (p. 6)  
Viewing children as incomplete human beings on their way to achieving some 
form of completeness identified with adulthood – despite common assumptions that 
certain skills are more present in children than adults, namely artistic skills – does not 
change the fact that we continue to view, and worse, treat children as incomplete (Weber, 
2007).  Implied in this is the notion that the child is inferior; in relation to the complete 
adult, “our figurative language shows the child to be the loser as childhood metaphors are 
used to define mental illness, primitivism, abnormality, [and] underdevelopment” (Ellis, 
1992, p. 11).   
From a political point of view, in what concerns the role of the state in the 
creation of educational policies and their implementation through consistent funding, a 
clear implication of perceiving the child as inferior, is the possibility for colonization and 
potential manipulation for the fulfillment of the needs of the state or, in the case of 
corporate funded education, the needs of corporations.  According to Kennedy (2006),   
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It is the epistemology of schooling, which understands the child as “future 
citizen”, “standing reserve”, “human resource,” – as raw material for the 
production of an adult – in which is implicit a “deficit model” of childhood, and 
the child understood as, not just an incomplete but an imperfect form of 
subjectivity.  (p. 160) 
The child is here perceived as resource, or future work force; “Traditional state-
driven educational rhetoric, with a mixture of sentimentality and instrumentalism as 
chillingly grotesque as it is hypocritical, refers to children as “our most precious 
resource” (Kennedy, 2006, p. 166). 
Since according to psychological cognitive views of child development, children 
“conform to predictable developmental stages, or to universal patterns such as the 
Freudian Oedipus complex” (Mozère, 2007, p. 291), they also tend to emphasize the 
division between normal and abnormal. 
 In 17th century France, alongside the implementation of the Grand Renfermement 
(a phenomenon created by modern psychiatry which separated the insane from other 
socially marginalized people such as the poor, or the beggars), “philanthropic 
organizations created crèches in order to separate specific poor infants from other infants 
dwelling in slums and living amongst immoral, barbarous and unmarried workers” 
(Mozère, 2007, p. 293).  Poor children whose parents were married, “sober and 
submissive” (p. 293), had access to the crèches and could “then be saved from the evils 
of moral corruption and promiscuity” (p. 293).  According to Mozère, this event creates 
the normal child of the crèche, i.e. the child that presents the most conformity - and 
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whose parents show the most conformity - to the desirable traits of modern bourgeois 
society, and can thus be “saved”.   
When “the dispositif of power/knowledge of modern Psychiatry create[d] the 
phenomenon of the Grand Renfermement” (p. 293), what it did according to Mozère 
(2007) was create “a new social (or sociological) category - the ‘insane’”, who would 
from then on “be submitted or subjected to the (...) prevailing norms in terms of the 
opposition, ‘sane/insane’” (p. 293).  According to the Latin origin of the word, ‘insane’ is 
that which is not ‘sane’ (spelled as the Latin word sane), i.e. healthy; someone who is not 
healthy lives in pathos, which can be translated from the Latin not only as passion, but 
also as pain.  It follows, though, that one who lives in pathos, does not live in logos, viz. 
order, thus living in dis-order – in psychiatry, the term disorder is used concurrently with 
the term pathology to refer to sets of symptoms that challenge the norm(al). With the 
advancement of health care, and particularly infant health care, the notion of “normal” 
becomes equated with a notion of natural, of “naturally human”, particularly in 
opposition with the “animal” (Mozère, 2007). 
In addition to creating the insane as a new sociological category, the 
Renfermement conferred the psychiatrist with the power/knowledge that has come to 
legitimize the authority of the expert, and the health professional - the expert in 
pathology, became the expert in the (naturally) normal.  It is not until something unusual 
or unexpected happens that the normal rises as that which has been disrupted by pathos; 
at this point, the expert is called upon, not only to determine the cause of the dis-order, 
but to restore order.   
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In other words,  
when the baby grows too ‘slowly’, when it doesn’t achieve a normal weight or it 
is not interested in occupations of its age - that knowledge/power (dispositif) is 
brought to attention, resulting in orders, injunctions and protocols that are 
supposed to bring back order where disorder has been detected.  (Mozère, 2007, 
p. 293) 
Thus, restoring order encompasses eliminating, at least to a certain degree, 
pathos.  This process has, and has had, consequences for the body - when pathos is 
eliminated, and pain is eliminated, so is passion, desire, and ultimately the body. 
This naturalization of the norm(al) legitimizes the superiority of logos over pathos 
in at least two ways: a) it immanently legitimizes the authority of logos over pathos, since 
one must not exist in order for the other to exist; b) it legitimizes the authority of the 
expert, as someone who holds the logos, viz. the discourse/explanation about the 
disorder, and has the power/knowledge to “restore” order.   
When it comes to children the “naturalization of the so-called norms (...) hide[s] 
and occult[s] (overshadows) the multiplicities that live in each small child” (p. 293).  
Within this model, non-discursive, affective modes of expression derived from desire 
(sensation, perception, non-verbal) are often excluded, or used as mediating means to a 
representative end (e.g. using dance and movement in the early childhood classroom to 
teach children gross motor skills, or use of personal space (NJDOE, 2013)). 
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In Education out of Bounds (2010), Lewis & Kahn discuss the education of ‘feral 
child’ Victor, the ‘wolf-child’ found living in the woods in France in 1800.  In educating 
Victor, and attempting to turn him into the ‘citizen’ he, as a human, was “meant to be”, 
Jean-Marc Gaspar Itard intentionally dismissed what knowledge and abilities the boy had 
acquired so far, in an attempt to get rid of the ‘animal’ in the human.  His education 
project was twofold: to territorialize (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) the child’s body through 
“the molding of the body into a properly functioning social mechanism” (Lewis & Kahn, 
2010, p. 50), and, subsequently, to teach the child the ultimate human defining capability: 
language.  Yet in alienating the “animal within the boy” (p. 52), and succeeding in 
leading Victor into language, Itard finally fails to educate him into one of the most 
defining human capabilities: the capacity to invent and be creative.  Itard believed the 
capacity to invent would arise with and through language, yet the “discovery of language 
inaugurated a new emotion in Victor: human boredom” (p. 52).  The authors explain that 
boredom constitutes the “affective trace of the nonhuman animal” (p. 53) in 
humans.  Lewis and Kahn (2010) write:  
Whereas Itard focuses on the triumph of the acquisition of language and the 
immediate skills of invention that this acquisition gifts to Victor, he does not 
recognize the dialectically interwoven and mutually constituting relation between 
the human (invention) and impotence (boredom).  Thus he misses that in 
language, the human emerges as distinct only in its paradoxical proximity with the 
animal.  (p. 54) 
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Itard’s exclusive focus on the rational cognitive dimension of Victor’s education 
leads him to fail to educate the child in invention because “the surplus of animality that is 
disavowed (…) is necessary for the human subject to enter into language and invent” 
(Lewis & Kahn, 2010, p. 53).  In other words, without affect, or a focus on the pre-
subjective, sensuous dimension of the human, acquisition and possession of language, or 
of any other skill, results in the education of mere automata, capable of “using” language 
and rational discourse in a functional manner at the margin of creation and possibility to 
generate the new.  Moreover, this attempt to “humanize” Victor is at once an attempt to 
normalize this particular child, as well as a sterilized attempt to define “human”, and 
universalize what the West has come to understand as such.  In the authors’ words 
teaching Victor’s body became for Itard a concerted effort to universalize the 
body of the white, male, bourgeois tutor through the “natural language” of the 
gesture.  There was in Itard’s pedagogy a desire to make Victor’s body speak the 
normalistic language of the bourgeoning bourgeoisie and thus to supplant the 
inarticulate and savage body of violent gesticulations with the codified and 
orderly body of middle class society. (Lewis & Kahn, 2010, p. 50) 
Assuming that pathos is prior to logos, and that normal is something that is 
imposed upon individuals from an exogenous source/force, the very idea of the 
“normalized child” is not only artificial, it is also, according to Mozère (2007), “utopian; 
children escape the yoke, they flee the models and freely make use of all opportunities 
that may occur” (p. 293).  When the child is defined comparatively rather than absolutely, 
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“as an adult to be, lacking inches, dexterity, capabilities and competencies, all of which 
will be attained if she/he develops properly according to the prevailing standards in a 
given society” (Mozère, 2007, p. 292), i.e. when the child is defined by the norm(al), she 
is inevitably, at the outset, “abnormal”, and will consistently present problems that need 
to be addressed by the “experts” in her life. 
Moreover, the belief in a universal rational individual as that which is “naturally 
human” has not only legitimized the colonizing efforts of the West throughout recent 
history, but also, and more critically, legitimized the implicit cultural and political 
colonization of individuals through policy (namely educational policy) in the United 
States.  Efforts to eliminate cultural curriculum in the United States (Orozco, 2012), and 
the universalizing premise of No Child Left Behind (2001), reflect that legitimacy, and its 
social and political power. 
The rise of developmental psychology during the 19
th
 century “based on th[e] 
organismic, objectifying model, provided the legitimating theory for the deployment of 
massive modern educational systems during that same period” (Kennedy, 2006, p. 98).  
Today, under the developmental frame, education/schooling appears as the mechanism by 
which this linearly developing child becomes the normal adult, and “Adulthood is thus 
understood as a fulfillment for childhood" (Mozère, 2007, p. 291).  The human ideal is 
equated with the normal adult that results from that same education (at least ideally). 
  70 
 
The Child in Policy 
Despite numerous critiques to the shortcomings of the developmental model – 
from the limitations of perceiving children as incomplete or inferior, to the dangers of 
naturalizing the normal – according to Mozère,  
we see an ever-progressing analysis of childhood as an imperfection, as a lack 
which society has to 'fill' during the socialization process, thus transforming 
young children, in ancient times animal-like or devilish beings (i.e. the incomplete 
and imperfect infants), into acceptable adults...  (Mozère, 2007, p. 291) 
In current policy the child is still often “constructed as a rational humanistic 
identity; the stable humanist individual” (Honan & Sellers, 2008, p. 117), with “innate 
needs” to be socially bound and communicate with others (Honan, 2005), and constructed 
as the ideal literate child (Honan & Sellers, 2008), reflecting the dominance of the logos 
over pathos, and the limited role of the body in formal education.  This dominance is 
moreover reflected in the consistent emphasis on language and the value of literacy, often 
directly equated with the very value of being formally educated (Honan, 2005).  Honan 
(2005) says, 
The benefits of literacy are not only restricted to the advancement of the 
individuals, but are seen to be of value to the ‘nation as a whole’.  Literate people 
are better people because they can take part in activities related to employment, 
further education, and recreation.  There is an implicit assumption here about the 
relationship between the social development of the individual and the economic 
development of the nation.  (p.5) 
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In addition to the image above, Dahlberg and Lenz-Taguchi (1994), and Dahlberg, 
Moss and Pence (1999) (cited by Borgnon, 2007) have found two main images of the 
identity of the preschool child: the “child as nature”, and the “child as reproducer of 
culture and knowledge”.  “The child as nature is a child that has to be helped by adults to 
let free its natural, inherent capacities” (Borgnon, 2007, p. 266), and  
the child as reproducer of culture and knowledge is a child who is supposed to 
receive the fixed content of knowledge presented by adults and to adapt itself to 
it, to internalize it, to develop in a certain manner, in order to later be able to 
reproduce it as exactly as possible.  (p. 266) 
The two views of the child mentioned above, “coexist, are at work at the same 
time, and together with the focus on the individual child, they form a predominating 
notion of the identity of the learning preschool child, as an individual, natural, developing 
child” (Borgnon, 2007, p. 266).  It is important to mention that these are constructions put 
forth by the social sciences, as well as by developmental psychology, particularly the 
works of Jean Piaget, and Arnold Gesell (Borgnon, 2007). 
Provided with an a priori image of the normal developing child, the teacher’s 
function becomes that of recognizing normal development (Borgnon, 2007), and 
recognizing the individual child as a proper representation of that predetermined ideally 
developing child described by both theory and policy.  As someone whose job is to 
support the child’s “naturally normal” development, while observing the ways in which 
children respond to this support, “what the teacher is looking for is the lack of proper 
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development; she/he is functioning as a detector of lack, an observer of error” (Dahlberg 
& Lenz-Taguchi, 1994 in Borgnon, 2007, p. 267). 
From this general overview of ways in which childhood has been constructed, I 
will now turn to a concrete example of these phenomena through the rhizoanalysis of two 
current U.S. early childhood education policy documents: the Developmentally 
Appropriate Practice (NAYEC, 2009), and the Preschool Teaching and Learning 
Standards (NJDOE, 2013).  In the following pages I will introduce Developmentally 
Appropriate Practice (NAYEC, 2009) as a U.S. early childhood policy framework 
gaining international relevance; discuss the philosophical underpinnings of its 
(re)territorializing power; and analyze that power in light of potential implementation as 
it is described in the standards and learning outcomes of the New Jersey Preschool 
Teaching and Learning Standards (NJDOE, 2013). 
Developmentally Appropriate Practice in Early Childhood Programs Serving 
Children from Birth through Age 8 (NAYEC, 2009) 
The Developmentally Appropriate Practice document is a position statement of 
the National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAYEC), regarding the 
education of young children, from birth to age 8.  Its purpose is stated in the document as 
follows: 
The purpose of this position statement is to promote excellence in early childhood 
education by providing a framework for best practice. Grounded both in the 
research on child development and learning and in the knowledge base regarding 
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educational effectiveness, the framework outlines practice that promotes young 
children’s optimal learning and development.  (NAYEC, 2009, p. 1) 
As a framework, Developmentally Appropriate Practice is intended to be used by 
policy makers across the United States when creating early childhood state policy and 
curriculum, and referred back to by teachers, educators, and early education stakeholders.  
Brief History of Developmentally Appropriate Practice   
Developmentally appropriate practice, or DAP, can be traced back to the early 
1900’s “when the International Kindergarten Union appointed a panel of 19 experts to 
determine how children should be taught in kindergarten” (Aldridge & Goldman, 2007, 
p. 123).  Three reports resulted: “one advocating for highly structured, teacher-directed 
instruction; another, a play-based, child-initiated emphasis; and a third that was a 
compromise of the other two” (p. 123).  A formal document was then published by the 
National Association for Nursery Education (NANE), the Minimum Essentials for 
Nursery School Education (NANE, 1930).  It was not until the 1980’s that the NAYEC 
(former NANE), in face of the proliferation of unregulated early childhood programs led 
by untrained staff, decided to create an accreditation program for professionals working 
with young children.  This effort resulted in the creation of the first official 
developmentally appropriate practice documents in 1986, and 1987.  In the initial 
versions of the document the purpose of developmentally appropriate practice was “to 
provide guidance to program personnel seeking accreditation”, since the “accreditation 
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criteria call[ed] for developmentally appropriate activities, materials, and expectations” 
(Bredekamp, 1997, p. 35 in Aldridge & Goldman, 2007, p. 122). 
The document was revised in 1997, and in addition to the two dimensions upon 
which the original guidelines were founded, namely “age appropriateness” and 
“individual appropriateness”, the 1997 guidelines  
emphasize the teacher as a reflective decision maker, planning for children based 
on three important dimensions: a) what is known about child development and 
learning, b) what is known about the individual child in the group, and c) what is 
known about the cultural and social contexts of the students we teach.  
(Bredekamp, 1997; Bredekamp & Copple, 1997 in Aldridge & Goldman, p. 122) 
A newly revised version has been in place since 2009; its authors describe the 
differences between the 1997 and the 2009 editions the following way:   
While the basic ideas have remained the same, the revised versions of the DAP 
position statement and book reference new research, knowledge, and 
developments in the field of early childhood education.  In particular, the new 
version discusses what can be done to close the achievement gap for children 
growing up in poverty and those who are dual language learners.  (NAYEC, 2008, 
pp. 22-23) 
Though the 2009 version of DAP has included in its rhetoric current issues in U.S. 
education - such as poverty and socioeconomic inequity as causes for gaps in 
development among children as young as 36 months old (NAYEC, 2009), and has 
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seemingly addressed critiques to the efficacy of accountability based policies, such as 
NCLB (2001) - the core constructivist, psychological assumptions about child 
development, and learning remain.   
International Reach of DAP   
Aside from its role in the USA, DAP has become a commonly used, and seldom 
contested framework for early childhood education and care (ECEC) internationally 
(Bertram & Pascal, 2002; Walsh et al., 2010; Janmohamed, 2010; Viruru, 2005).   
In a study conducted as part of the International Review of Curriculum and 
Assessment Frameworks (INCA) project carried out by the National Foundation for 
Educational Research in England and Wales – though it was noted that “Childhood is a 
social construction deeply embedded within societal norms and values” (Bertram & 
Pascal, 2002, p. 8), that “Different societies and sub-groups within societies, especially in 
multicultural societies, view what is an ‘appropriate’ curriculum for young children 
differently” (p. 8), and no specific curriculum model (e.g. DAP, Montessori, etc.) was 
exclusively promoted – the authors found “remarkable consistency in the content of these 
national curriculum programs across the review countries” (p. 17).   
They also found remarkable consistency across most curriculum frameworks, 
which “identified a set of early years principles [and] provided a theoretical and 
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As read in the document, 
there was a high level of consistency across the review countries in these 
principles, reflecting a consensus in the understanding of effective early 
childhood practice. The most commonly found principles focused on:  
· a child-centered, flexible and individually responsive curriculum  
· the importance of working in partnership with parents  
· the need to offer broad and relevant learning experiences in an integrated manner  
· the importance of play and active, exploratory learning  
· an emphasis on social and emotional development  
· the need to empower the child to be an autonomous, independent learner. 
(Bertram & Pascal, 2002, p. 21) 
Though as stated above no one model was specifically promoted, some of the 
principles above resonate with those stated in the DAP document, and the latter 
framework appeared as a popular “curriculum model”, alongside Froebel, Montessori, or 
Reggio Emilia, among the 20 countries under review (Bertram and Pascal, 2002).  
Countries under review were: Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States of America, Wales, and Hong Kong. 
Additionally, in the United Kingdom, DAP has been used in “encouraging the 
debate about teaching” and pedagogy, and continues to be “highly influential” (Walsh et 
al., 2010, p. 8) in the development and implementation of early childhood education 
curriculum.  Also, in Ontario, the “seminal text often used in early childhood in training 
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is Developmentally Appropriate Practice developed initially by the [NAYEC]… based in 
Washington DC, but now extensively embedded in curriculum material, field placement 
expectations, and course readings” (Janmohamed, 2010, p. 304).  There are additional 
examples of attempted implementation in non-Westernized settings (Lewis, et al., 2006).   
Recent Research on DAP   
According to Walsh et al. (2010) the concept of developmentally appropriate 
practice has consistently been revised over the past decade.  They say that this “revision 
has been informed by shifting theoretical perspectives, new research about children’s 
learning and ―importantly ―by how DAP principles and guidelines have been 
translated into early years classrooms, tested and evaluated” (p. 13).   
A focus on issues of implementation and how to more effectively facilitate 
implementation has contributed to the taken-for-granted status of DAP principles (Cohen, 
2008), and is reflected in the literature and research on DAP.  There are two main 
categories within the empirical research in the first decade of the 21
st
 century according 
to Walsh et al. (2010): a) studies that describe “how DAP is implemented in early 
education settings and what factors are associated with the use of DAP” (p. 11); and b) 
studies regarding “the effectiveness of DAPS for a wide range of short and long term 
emotional, cognitive and academic outcomes” (p. 11).  Since DAP is a framework, which 
must be translated into practice, researchers often focus on the gap between teachers’ 
beliefs and their actual classroom practices, on the variation in interpretation of policy 
guidelines, as well as on constrains to implementation of DAP by teachers in the 
classroom, associated with administrative and parental demands for raising academic 
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standards (Walsh et al., 2010).  Other issues regarding implementation concern teachers’ 
lack of preparation and knowledge of child development, and the subsequent need for 
continued professional development (Walsh et al., 2010). 
Additionally, despite claims of the importance of developmentally appropriate 
practices in the classroom for children’s social, physical, and emotional development 
(NAYEC, 2009), assessment of the impact/effectiveness of developmentally appropriate 
practices in the classroom is often focused on correlation with academic achievement, or 
with specific executive functions associated with school readiness, such as working 
memory and cognitive flexibility (Diamond et al., 2007 in Walsh et al., 2010). 
It appears, thus, that mixed results about the effectiveness of DAP are consistently 
associated with issues of interpretation and implementation, rather than with the 
problematic of universal principles about child development and learning.  Moreover, in 
the 2009 DAP document (NAYEC), the “New research about children’s learning”, as 
well as “shifting theoretical perspectives” referred to by Walsh et al. (2010, p. 13) appear 
in the form of elusive, briefly mentioned variations within the “well supported” 
(NAYEC, 2009, p. 10), overwhelmingly “agreed upon” (Cohen, 2008) cognitive 
constructivist views of child development and learning. 
Critiques to DAP   
Critiques to DAP have focused on a few primary issues traversing its stated 
principles since the first edition in 1987, and not effectively addressed by its subsequent 
revised editions in 1997, and 2009.   
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The 1987 document offered an overly generalized view of child development and 
learning, heavily based upon developmental theory (viz. Piagetian), with little to no 
account to the influence of cultural and social context to development (Bredekamp, 
1987).  Universal ideas of child development and education have consistently been seen 
by critics as problematic, particularly as postmodern theories began to proliferate in 
educational theory and research (Aldridge & Goldman, 2007).  Though the 1997 edition 
of the document claims to address these critiques – by recognizing “variability in child 
development and learning” (Cohen, 2008, p. 9), as well as issues of cultural and social 
context (Bredekamp, 1997) through the introduction of Lev Vygotsky’s theories (Cohen, 
2008) – the continued emphasis on the “developing child” reflects Aldridge & Goldman’s 
(2007) belief that the guidelines have “virtually ignored postmodern, critical, and 
feminist thinking” (p. 130), which tend to “focus on the context, the particular, and 
refrain from the belief of universal ideas” (p. 130) made legitimate by the power of those 
who put them forth.  Evoking Foucault, Cohen (2008) claims that this power is put into 
place through the imposition of particular “regimes of truth”, such as the principles found 
in DAP, which then work to codify and prescribe – in this case “best practices for early 
childhood educators” (p. 12). 
In fact, critiques to DAP have consistently claimed that the document reflected “a 
specific culture’s notion, that of Euro-American child development and early childhood 
specialists, containing what children should know and do, [and] how adults should work 
with children (Jipson 1991)” (Cohen, 2008, p. 9).  The document has been said to reflect 
liberal, middle-class values (Aldridge & Goldman, 2007), and privilege the “discourse of 
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Anglo-American perspectives” (Cohen, 2008, p. 12), leading researchers and critics to 
question the values therein reflected (e.g. Dahlberg et al. 2004; Lubeck 1998) (Cohen, 
2008, p. 12).  Cohen (2008) says “In the context of the NAEYC community, the values of 
this document sometimes do not intersect with those underlying the childrearing and 
educational practices of some culturally and/or linguistically diverse groups” (p. 13).  
These values are also “often very different from the real-world practice, beliefs, and prior 
experiences of parents and teachers who do not share [the same] assumptions” (Aldridge 
& Goldman, 2007, p. 128). 
For instance, Hsue & Aldridge (1995), cited by Aldridge & Goldman (2007) note 
that while the views of child development found in the text are fundamentally based on 
constructivist theories of human development, particularly the theories of Piaget, 
Vygotsky, and Erikson - all dead, white, Western men -, in the U.S. “the majority of the 
people who teach are women - many of them of color” (p. 130).  Critics of DAP and its 
principles of child development and learning (e.g. Cohen, 2008; Lubeck, 1998; Williams, 
1994; Bowman & Scott, 1994) claim that one of its biggest problems is indeed the fact 
that this model does not work in all contexts; implementation is particularly problematic 
with African-American and Native-American children, students whose first language is 
not English, as well as with children from lower socioeconomic environments (Aldridge 
& Goldman, 2007). 
Policy Documents as (Re)Territorializing 
In my analysis, policy texts in general exert (re)territorializing power over those 
impacted by them, both directly as well as indirectly.  How do they work their 
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(re)territorializing power?  In the following pages I will discuss the (re)territorializing 
power of policy documents in general, while beginning to discuss the (re)territorializing 
effects of DAP (2009) in particular.   
They are Plans of Transcendence   
Policy texts often rely upon artificial necessity, enunciating postulates that may or 
may not be found in actual classrooms, or communities.  They attempt to establish, 
describe, or prescribe the necessary conditions of all possible experience, and are thus 
transcendental in nature.  To the extent that it lists and describes what are called “the 
principles of child development” (NAYEC, 2009), the DAP document can be equated 
with what Deleuze calls a “theological plan: a design in the mind of a god, but also an 
evolution in the supposed depths of nature, or a society’s organization of power” 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 128).  This is “a plan of organization or development”, which “comes 
from above and refers to a transcendence” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 128).  According to 
Deleuze (1988), this type of plan “always involves forms and their developments, 
subjects and their formations” (p. 128) directing them, while at the same time remaining 
hidden.   
The DAP (2009) as well as the New Jersey Preschool Teaching and Learning 
Standards (2013), (from here on referred to as Standards (2013)), to the extent that they 
suggest specific principles from above that determine the organization and development 
of subjects, as well as naturalize the literate child, appear as such plans of transcendence.  
Through the imposition of an artificial sense of necessity, they presuppose that which is 
not given, and force teachers and administrators to assume and presuppose that which is 
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not given – that children’s behavior ought to proceed in specific ways in order to be 
recognized as developmentally appropriate, or normal.   
They are of Signifying Nature   
Their social and political genesis and purpose, as well as the fact that they are 
expressed through language, places policy texts in the third kind of strata, as defined by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987).  In A Thousand Plateaus (1987), Deleuze and Guattari talk 
about three kinds of strata: geological strata, organic strata, and a “third kind” of strata, 
which introduces a new distribution of content and expression.  Generally speaking, 
content refers to “formed matters” (p. 43) – substance and form; while expression refers 
to the functional structures, i.e. “the organization of their own specific form” (p. 43) and 
substances; they are nothing but two variables of a function of stratification (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987.).  For instance, when speaking of geological strata, the crystal appears as 
the expression of the crystallized microparticles thus stratified (i.e. formed matter) to 
form that very crystal (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  When speaking of that third kind of 
strata, a new distribution of content and expression appears in the stratification system, or 
process.  Within this kind of strata, content is technological, i.e. it is linked to the hand-
tool couple, and the ability to modify the external world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987); and 
expression is linguistic, it operates with symbols, and it is linked to the face-language 
couple (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  Within this distribution, language is the new form of 
expression, which is semiotic, or symbolic.   
There is however, within this distribution, an additional dimension to content and 
expression: content appears as “a technical social machine that preexists [hand and tools] 
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and constitutes states of force or formations of power” (p. 63), while expression is “a 
semiotic collective machine that preexists [face and language] and constitutes regimes of 
signs” (p. 63).  As such, content and expression do more than form matter and express 
substance: “they act as determining and selective agents… in the constitution of 
languages and tools” (p. 63), and in their usages, diffusions, and communications.  They 
say: “In cases where we can discern two different regimes of signs or two different 
formations of power, we shall say that they are in fact two different strata in human 
populations” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 63).   
An important aspect of expression in this kind of strata, which we have now 
established concerns humans, and the social and political field, is the fact that it has 
become independent of content.  Language, the new form of expression, is independent 
of content because it is composed of symbols; as highly deterritorialized signs, symbols 
are susceptible of being translated, or modified from the outside, regardless of substance, 
or content (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  In short, in this kind of strata, expression is no 
longer expression of substance: expression is now mediated by language, which is bound 
to symbols, and thus to signifiers.  The danger, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) say, is 
beyond the imperialism of language: it is “the imperialism of the signifier affecting 
language itself, [and] affecting all regimes of signs and the entire expanse of the strata 
upon which they are located” (p. 65). 
 It is this dominance of the signifier that has created the conditions for the 
existence The Subject, the positioned subject as described by Massumi (2002).  As seen 
above, stratification is consistently shaken by immanent movements of 
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deterritorialization and reterritorialization, which open up the potential for 
transformation.  However, the dominance of these highly deterritorialized signs 
(symbols) continuously refers matter (content and expression) back to a signifier, i.e. a 
term determined by a regime of signs to represent a thing – a signified.  This happens 
because language belongs to the realm of the ‘signifying regime of signs’ – a regime of 
signs that is self-sustaining, i.e. that relies exclusively upon other signs ad infinitum, 
regardless of content, or form of expression (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  Within this type 
of regime, signifiers refer only to other signifiers, and there is never a return to matter or 
to other regimes that are not of this nature (for instance, forms of expression that are not 
linguistic are not accounted for); “The limitlessness of signifiance [eventually] eliminates 
the sign” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 112).  This process keeps bodies (human, social, 
technological…) in a state of relative deterritorialization, which does not entail genuine 
transformation.  Hence, the constant repositioning of the body of the subject on the grid – 
reterritorialization is limited to the available categories established by the dominant 
regime of signs, which, in the case of western culture, tends to be signifying. 
 To the extent that they are centered around ideas that are more or less abstracted 
in order to “include” the conditions of all possible educational experience, and maintain a 
hidden dimension that must be inferred through interpretation, it can be said that policy 
texts’ dominant semiotic regime is essentially signifying.  As it is conveyed in policy and 
educational theory, developmental theory has become its own regime of signs, i.e. a 
semiotic regime according to which perceptions, viz. conceptions of the child are 
distributed.  However, the principles of child development have become so far removed 
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from real children, that any “sign” of these children has been lost to the signifier taking 
their place.  This fact is what makes possible a discourse about education that does not 
seem to concern any real children – politically, the child can be referred to as a 
“resource”, because this is not a real child being talked about.  It is not likely however 
that an adult – any adult – would refer to a specific child they are acquainted with as 
such.  Likewise, problems afflicting real children can be categorized and spoken about 
with little reference to real, concrete afflictions those problems might cause in everyday 
life.  Talking about poverty as a social or political issue, is not the same as engaging with 
a child that might be cold, hungry, or sick; and blaming the achievement gap on poverty 
is nothing but engaging in the circular stratifying movement of signifying semiotics – 
there are no signs of poverty, children, or the sadness of “failing” in school in sight.   
They Contribute to the Illusion of Consciousness.   
 Policy texts contribute to the illusion of consciousness, not only by conveying 
specific epistemological and ontological models, which appear from above, and are 
postulated as necessarily derived, but by conveying a specific, necessarily and naturally 
developing human subject, whose defining characteristic is in fact that very “ability” to 
make conscious decisions about life.  That ability, and that very defining characteristic of 
a human subject, is, according to Spinoza, mere illusion (Deleuze, 1988).  That humans 
are conscious beings capable only of perceiving experiences while awake and aware is 
what causes the illusion that one can effectively decide and singlehandedly impact certain 
situations (Deleuze, 1988); the nature of consciousness “is such that it registers effects, 
but nothing of causes” (p. 19).  Paraphrasing Spinoza, Deleuze (1988) writes: “ignorant 
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of causes and natures, reduced to the consciousness of events, condemned to undergo 
effects, they are slaves to everything, anxious and unhappy, in proportion to their 
imperfection” (p. 20).  Unaware of the relations of composition and decomposition that 
occur beneath consciousness, the mind takes the effects it has conscious access to, as 
causes, thus taking itself or other minds to be the ultimate causes of conscious events.  
This reaction can turn into feelings of guilt, shame, remorse, or resentment and hatred 
towards others (Deleuze, 1988).  In either case, there is a reterritorializing movement, an 
over-identification with the feelings caused by the illusion of consciousness, as well as 
with the very experience of being conscious – an ‘I’ is required for there to be guilt, and 
an ‘Other’ is required for there to be resentment.   
They Subjectify   
This consciousness arises through a process of subjectification, proper to the 
postsignifying semiotic regime.  Contrasting the signifying regime, which Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) briefly define as “paranoid-interpretive ideal regime of signifiance” (p. 
120), is a postsignifying regime “defined by a unique procedure, that of 
“subjectification”” (p. 119).  While the first regime operates around ideas, and abstracted 
signifiers detached from content, the latter  
is defined by a decisive external occurrence, by a relation with the outside that is 
expressed more as an emotion than an idea, and more as effort or action than 
imagination…; by a “postulate” or “concise formula” serving as the point of 
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departure for a linear series of proceedings that runs its course.  (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 120) 
When one or more signs detach from the circularity of the signifying system, and 
set out to work on their own, the postsignifying regime finds the conditions to become 
relatively dominant, and the body (be it social – a people; or individual – a subject, etc.) 
is subjectified (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  The subject becomes “a subject of 
enunciation issuing from the point of subjectification and a subject of the statement in a 
determinable relation to the first subject” (p. 127).  While in the signifying regime the 
sign is alienated through the infinite circularity of signifiance, in the postsignifying 
regime “the sign is swept away via subjects” (p. 127).   
It is this double subjectification that brings about consciousness.  The young child 
that first enters a classroom lives within signs, and takes them for what they are – the 
form of expression of the very matter from which they emanate.  However the continued 
exposure to the signifying regime of formal education, and the normalizing practices it 
imposes upon them, raises for children the possibility for subjectification(s) to occur.  
The subject of enunciation turns into the subject of the statement – “Be quiet!” turns into 
“I have to be quiet”. 
By presuming to be a guide for practitioners, the policy is perhaps intended to 
function as a map; however, by providing a model of the ideal child, the document has 
already “organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to axes of 
signifiance and subjectification” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 13).  Unlike the 
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rhizomatic map defined by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the policy as a map is a tool for 
the (re)territorialization not only of students, but also of teachers in that it defines the 
limits of teaching.  The representational theater of the Oedipal classroom turns children 
and teachers alike into the limited characters of the nuclear family (mommy, daddy, and 
me) playing the repetition of the normal (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983).   
Developmentally Appropriate Practice and Relative De/Re-Territorialization 
The de/re-territorialization of the child occurs in a variety of ways through 
different social practices, one of which being formal education.  In westernized 
educational systems, (re)territorialization occurs within the hegemony of rationalized, 
narratocratic social and political approaches to that which pertains to the human (Panagia, 
2009), and the perception of the non-rational, as bad, and to an extent, non-human (Lewis 
& Kahn, 2010; Mozère, 2007).  These perceptions are postulated by an essentialized view 
of the human subject as “naturally” rational, normal, and furnished with a natural desire 
to be discursive and literate; this view of subjectivity then requires that children are 
viewed as lacking – particularly lacking in reason, norms, and discourse.  The 
naturalization of the rational, the norm(al), and the discursive/literate, legitimizes the 
need for early childhood formal education beyond childcare.  Given young children’s 
lack of what makes a human subject naturally human, formal education appears as the 
ideal mediator between the child that lacks and the normal human child.   
In the DAP document (2009), this normal human child appears to coincide with 
the child that is “prepared” to enter the social and academic world.  This preparation 
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happens by way of providing young children with “developmentally appropriate” 
educational experiences, through which each child is more likely to develop 
appropriately, i.e. according to the general principles of child development and learning 
found in the text (NAEYC, 2009) (according to which children have a natural tendency 
to develop and learn, coincidently, exactly what expert adults want them to).   
As read in the document, “A pervasive characteristic of development is that 
children’s functioning becomes increasingly complex – in language, social interaction, 
physical movement, problem solving, and virtually every other domain” (NAYEC, 2009, 
p. 12).  Increased complexity is reflected in increased “self-regulation, and symbolic or 
representational capacities” (NAYEC, 2009, p. 12).  In the document (NAYEC, 2009), 
this position on development is legitimized by references to “human development 
research” (p. 11) and “what we know from theory and literature about how children 
develop and learn… a review of that literature yields a number of well supported 
generalizations, or principles” (p. 10).  Despite critiques to its generalized views, and 
attempts at addressing those critiques (through the inclusion of references to the 
importance of context, culture, and socioeconomics for child development, and 
subsequent school “readiness” and academic success (NAYEC, 2009)), changes in 
development are nevertheless said to be “predictable”, and consistent with “Human 
development research” (p. 11), which, according to the authors, “suggests that relatively 
stable, predictable sequences of growth and change occur in children during the first nine 
years of life” (p. 11).  Throughout the document, claims about a naturally universal 
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human development are often validated by the discourse of scientific explanation (Cole, 
2005), while implicitly justifying the non-engagement with its critiques.   
 Nevertheless, the document does mention newer trends in the common 
understanding of children’s abilities, as read in the following excerpt: “The younger the 
child, the more she or he tends to think concretely and in the here and now. Yet in some 
ways, young children’s thinking can be quite abstract” (p. 12).  Another excerpt reiterates 
this “newfound” knowledge: 
Several prominent theories and bodies of research view cognitive development 
from the constructivist, interactive perspective…  They learn from the concrete 
(e.g., manipulatives); they also apparently are capable of and interested in abstract 
ideas, to a far greater degree than was previously believed.  (NAYEC, 2009, p. 
14) 
 While apparently hinting at a renewed understanding of children’s abilities, 
particularly in what concerns abstract thinking, the constructivist developmental view is 
so deeply rooted in educational discourse that attempts at including multiple perspectives 
(also seen in the reference to context and culture mentioned above) often appear to be 
more rhetorical then actual.  Moreover, according to Lubeck (1998), attempting to 
“include” “voices critical of DAP, the guidelines have become an attempt to be all things 
to all people” (Lubeck, 1998 cited by Aldridge & Goldman, 2007, p. 129), despite the 
fact that “DAP is based on specific assumptions and a highly selective theoretical 
background that cannot absorb many dissenting voices” (p. 129).  Lubeck (1998) further 
warns against what is, specifically in the 1998 version of DAP) a seemingly uncritical 
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inclusion of new ideas into old agendas, particularly since common generalizations and 
principles underlying the policy remained unchanged (Cohen, 2008).  The same 
generalized views about child development and learning can still be found in the 2009 
version of the document.   
The attempted inclusion of discourses other than the developmental in the latest 
version of DAP (NAYEC, 2009), while maintaining its general principles, do provide a 
sense that the policy is attempting to be “all things to all people”, as Lubeck (1998) had 
previously suggested.  This in fact inadvertently captures the concept of The Subject of 
traditional cultural studies as described by Massumi in the Parables for the Virtual 
(2002).  The Subject is a subject without subjectivism, constructed by external 
mechanisms (e.g. culture), whose body serves the sole purpose of positioning it on a grid 
of culturally constructed significations (e.g. male, white, etc.) (Massumi, 2002).   
Conceptually, this subject is intended to be so abstract that it seemingly 
“includes” every possible iteration of what it means to be human, and is “all things to all 
people”.  On the other hand, its positioning on the “oppositional framework of culturally 
“constructed” significations” that is the grid, locates it so specifically that it limits its 
potential to become anything other than what it is (Massumi, 2002).  In sum, in 
attempting to include critical, and dissenting voices in its discourse, the DAP guidelines 
“have become an attempt to be all things to all people” (Aldridge & Goldman, 2007, p. 
129), yet its assumptions and theoretical framework are so narrow that it alienates not 
only those very dissenting voices, it additionally alienates the real children it intends to 
describe.   
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DAP’s principles are thus both too general (universal principles of child 
development and learning), as well as too narrow (in aspiring to be universal, the 
principles are overly simplistic and theoretically narrow), i.e. in attempting to 
describe/define every child, the principles describe no child at all.  This child, which 
corresponds to the positioned Subject as defined above, is at once too abstract, and too 
specific – a body without movement or sensation, positioned on a grid of signifiers, 
whose only options seem to be either to identify with his/her current identitarian position 
(white, female, normal/abnormal, etc.) or to re-position itself on a different location of 
the grid (either by an illusion of choice and transformation, or by way of the re-
positioning mechanisms of society or culture – from child to adult, from illiterate to 
literate, etc.).  Both options require the subject to remain incorporeal, and relatively re/de-
territorialized within the strata, i.e. within the signifying regime which distributes 
perception thus providing it with identity, and recognizability.     
But how does this positioning occur?  In other words, how does the child discover 
the dominant regime of signs, and through what mechanisms does the policy, viz. 
implementation, begin to impose specific desirable modalities of expression, thus 
beginning to impart a dominant regime of perception?   
(Re)Territorialization in Process: The Standardized Child 
 Through my reading of both the DAP (2009) document, and the Standards (2013), 
I have identified three main moments/mechanisms through which the school child and 
her body are essentialized, and re-territorialized.  The process can be synthesized as 
follows:  
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a) the child is idealized through the establishment of principles and standards;  
b) implementation of developmentally appropriate practices serves to code the body 
of the child by attempting to fit it within the previously established standards; 
c) assessment becomes the mechanism by which the teacher recognizes the normal 
child, and diagnoses the abnormal child.   
The implementation process starts with the teacher becoming acquainted with the 
Standards (NJDOE, 2013), which is, according to the authors, “grounded in a strong 
theoretical framework” (p. 5); this framework is the DAP (2009), in which the child is 
defined as discussed above.  The first step is thus to identify the appropriately developing 
child, i.e. the normal child, through the establishment of principles and standards, and to 
introduce the teacher to this child.   
The first principle found in the Standards (2013) defines development as a linear 
directional movement towards greater complexity.  Though it is stated that development 
and learning can vary from child to child depending on culture or context, it is also stated 
that specific variations are normal, while others indicate inappropriate development.  
Variations in development can also be determined according to the child’s 
“developmental stage”, typically determined by the child’s age; a child’s stage of 
development must be taken into account by the teacher when planning curriculum and 
assessing the child (NJDOE, 2013).  In addition to developing linearly and going through 
stages, normally developing children are said to demonstrate emergent skills; these can be 
social skills, as well as literacy and math skills, among others (NJDOE, 2013).   
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Stating that “preschool educational experiences are intended to stimulate, assist, 
support, and sustain emergent skills” (p. 5) (Italics added), and identifying some of these 
skills with content areas, the document is already naturalizing the school child and the 
literate child as the normal child, thus naturalizing the “norm” (Mozère, 2007).  On the 
other hand, and as stated above, by suggesting a relatively fixed and universal set of ideas 
about child development and learning, the document has already “organized, stabilized, 
neutralized the multiplicities according to axes of signifiance and subjectification” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 13), and already begun the process of coding and 
positioning of the body of the child.   
In addition to this child and its preliminary coding, courtesy of cognitive 
developmental theories, the Standards (2013) further describe the normal child according 
to the achievements below.  
The child of the Standards (2013) demonstrates self-confidence, and self-
direction; identifies and expresses feelings; exhibits positive interactions and pro-social 
behaviors; expresses herself through and has an appreciation for creative movement and 
dance, music, dramatic play and storytelling, and visual arts (such as painting, sculpting, 
and drawing); has incipient knowledge and skills to make nutritious food choices; has 
incipient awareness of hazards in her environment; is competent and confident in 
activities that require gross and fine motor skills; listens and responds to directions and 
conversations; converses effectively with different audiences; demonstrates emergent 
reading skills; demonstrates emergent writing skills; demonstrates understanding of 
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numbers and operations; has knowledge of spatial concepts; understands patterns, 
relationships, and classification; uses mathematical knowledge to represent, 
communicate, and solve problems; has inquiry skills; observes and investigates matter 
and energy; observes and investigates living things; observes and investigates the earth; 
has experience in using technology; identifies unique characteristics of herself, her 
family, and others; is a contributing member of the classroom community; demonstrates 
awareness of cultures in the classroom and community; knows that people use different 
languages and expresses simple words in a language other than her own; uses 
technological devices independently, to communicate, and to begin to gain information 
(NJDOE, 2013).   
According to the document (NJDOE, 2013), implementation of developmentally 
appropriate practices in the classroom should result in the specific learning outcomes 
described in the document for each content area, which must in turn coincide with the 
initially stated standards.  Learning outcomes, i.e. preschool competencies that develop as 
a result of effective preschool teaching practices (NJDOE, 2013), should translate into 
observable behaviors the teacher can recognize as signs of appropriate development.   
Within the context of implementation, the teacher appears as the gatekeeper for 
the child’s “appropriate development” – her role is to ensure that the child is developing 
appropriately, while alerting the experts for the possible presence of abnormality in 
development.  This is done in large measure through assessment, which is stated as a 
fundamental aspect of early childhood education, and the preschool standards are 
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intended as a “framework for the development of a comprehensive early childhood 
assessment system” (NJDOE, 2013, p. 5).  Assessment is defined as “an ongoing process 
which includes identifying, collecting, describing, interpreting, and applying classroom-
based evidence of early learning in order to make informed instructional decisions” 
(NJDOE, 2013, p. 10).  Its stated purpose is to “help educators determine appropriate 
classroom activities for individuals and groups of children” (NJDOE, 2013, p. 10).  
In addition to this purpose, in early childhood education, assessment also has the 
purpose of serving to assess appropriate development, through developmental screening 
measures; these are used as “the first step in identifying children who may demonstrate 
developmental delay with language or motor sills, or problems with vision or hearing” 
(NJDOE, 2013, p. 11).  Further “comprehensive diagnostic assessment” (NJDOE, 2013, 
p. 11) will follow if any abnormalities are found upon the initial screening.  According to 
the text, screenings should be seen as only one component of the assessment process, 
which should encompass collection and assessment of children’s work, and observation 
of each child (NJDOE, 2013).  In any case, this process is intended to deem the child 
either normal (her lacking state is considered normal as per the variations predicted by 
the “scientifically grounded” knowledge of dominant developmental theories), or not 
normal, in which case further diagnostic assessment will ensue.   
Once the child’s variation in development is identified and categorized, and the 
child properly diagnosed, a team of experts composed of teachers, and counselors, will 
create an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the child.  The purpose of an IEP, 
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and of adaptations to curriculum for children with disabilities is, according to the 
document, to provide children with “the opportunity to develop their strengths and 
compensate for their learning differences as they work toward the learning outcomes set 
for all children” (NJDOE, 2013, p. 3) (italics added).  Thus, while individualized, the 
purpose of this plan is to normalize as much as possible the child upon which it will be 
implemented; in other words, she will be given additional opportunities to become 
normal. 
As stated above, according to the Standards (NJDOE, 2013), screening measures 
should be seen as only one component of the assessment process, which should 
encompass collection and assessment of children’s work, and observation of each child.  
The normal child, i.e. the child whose outward behavior is interpreted by the teacher as 
an indicator of appropriate development, i.e. falling within the principles of child 
development and learning defined in the DAP (2009) document, is recognized by the 
teacher as successful and normal, and subsequently rewarded.  Re-cognition is the 
reward; being ‘seen’ by the teacher is the reward.  As read in the Standards (NJDOE, 
2013) “The documentation/assessment process can also help young children to perceive 
learning to be important and worthwhile, as they see their teachers actively engaged in 
documenting their learning” (p. 12).  In order to be “re-cognized” however, the child 
must thus “match” the normal, ideal child of the policy; each child must thus become 
identical to the ideal in order to be recognized and seen by their teacher.   
The normal child gains recognition, visibility, and thus legitimacy from the 
teacher within the context of the classroom; the abnormal child, i.e. the child whose 
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outward behavior seems to challenge or not match that prescribed in the policy, while 
unrecognizable by the teacher, is recognized by the expert, to whom the direction of her 
education is relegated, in order to become recognizable.   
It is through this recognition that perception is redistributed and the child is 
introduced to the dominant regime of signs; at this point, items or actions which may 
not have had intrinsic value for the child gain value and thus are brought to the 
foreground as right or appropriate.  Conversely, objects or actions which may have 
been valuable for the child may at this point be disregarded, or regarded as having 
secondary value.  There is a redistribution of young children’s perception according to 
a kind of semiotic regime that is different from the pre-linguistic kind they use prior to 
learning how to use language.  They move from the pre-signifying regime, within 
which expression of forms and content are simultaneous and coincide with one another, 
and where all is explicit, i.e. there is no hidden meaning; to the signifying regime, 
where the linguistic expression of forms and content rely upon linguistic signs, and thus 
the signifier/signified pair.  The need for self-identification comes from existing within 
one such regime. 
The introduction of a dominant essentially signifying semiotic regime in the 
child’s life, and the consistent recognition of signification and of signifying behaviors 
and actions, are where the subjectification process begins, and where affect and desire 
begin to be regarded as secondary to signification.  The body, once indistinguishable 
from sensation and movement, becomes individuated and belongs now to the newly 
created subject.  The individuated body of the child now serves the purpose of housing 
  99 
 
her identity and subjectivity, becoming the vehicle, or the means by which that identity 
and subjectivity are groomed into the normalized school child, and the future adult.  
Within this self-contained subjective body, movement and sensation, rather than serve 
the purpose of expressing affective intensities (e.g. the joy of seeing a friend in the 
distance, or the exhilaration of singing out loud), now serve the purpose of representing 
the subject and the identity of the subject, as well as the purpose of representing and 
signifying for the teacher, as well as for others (among which ‘experts’), development, 
knowledge, or a skill.  According to the Standards (NJDOE, 2013), the child in the 
preschool classroom dances in order to gain an appreciation of dance, or develop a 
sense of personal space, or learn “appropriate audience skills” (p. 28).  As it is 
described in the learning outcomes, “appreciation” has to do with a sort of mediated 
enjoyment which must be perceptible to the teacher as signifying appropriate 
development.  On the teacher’s side, and according to the document, this visible, 
appropriate appreciation is the result of effective preschool teaching practices (NJDOE, 
2013.), which we have seen must be developmentally appropriate.   
In sum, coding and redistribution of perception, occur by way of replacing the 
child’s preliterate, presignifying regime of perception and expression with a dominant 
signifying semiotic regime.  A presignifying regime operates without signs, it does not 
eliminate “forms of content through abstraction of the signified” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 117), and “it fosters a pluralism or polyvocality of forms of expression that 
prevents any power takeover by the signifier and preserves expressive forms particular 
to content; thus form of corporeality, gesturality, rhythm, dance, and rite coexist 
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heterogeneously with the vocal form” (p. 117).  Moreover, within this regime “the sign 
owes its degree of relative deterritorialization not to a perpetual referral to other signs 
but rather to a confrontation between the territorialities and compared segments from 
which each sign is extracted” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 117).  What this means is 
that within a regime of this nature, the sign does not assume the purpose of 
representing, but rather that of indicating (index), or directly expressing, the very form 
of content that manifests that very sign (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) – content, 
expression, and sign coincide and are simultaneous.   
In the case of western, or westernized educational systems, the dominant 
signifying regime privileges discursive literacy over other forms of literacy, which has 
subsequently been normalized and essentialized as naturally human.  This replacement 
process de/re-territorializes the young child in two ways, which co-exist within 
stratification: a) it relatively de/re-territorializes the child through the imposition of a 
dominant signifying regime of signs; and b) it absolutely deterritorializes the child 
through subjectification.  Given that subjectification is made possible through an 
imposition of signifying strata, as an absolute form of deterritorialization, 
subjectification appears as a negative form of absolute deterritorialization.  In extreme 
cases, this absolutely deterritorialized subject will launch her own postsignifying 
semiotic regime; in this highly deterritorialized form, subjectification extrapolates all 
signifiance, and the subject may enter into, or engage in decomposing relationships, i.e. 
relationships that contribute to its perishing rather than its growth.  It is my belief that 
this is the process through which the 20-year-old human body turned cyborg 
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(introduced in the beginning of this dissertation) went through.  A signifying regime 
was imposed, an identity suggested, and a recognizable behavior required – all in place; 
except for that which we cannot see, and we cannot recognize.  The affective 
intensities, the forces unleashed by the encounter between the seemingly normalized 
abnormal, and the guns.  The signifying regime defines normal; it then measures 
normality against the visible as a symbol corresponding to what it means to be normal.  
The teacher re-cognizes the normal because she has been told what it looks like – it is 
described in the standards, and in the learning outcomes.   
In sum, when thinking of policy, and of formal education, it appears reasonable to 
refer to both as stratifying systems: they attempt to organize, are intended to provide 
form, and, like its geological counterparts, sediment, i.e. “set in stone”, what the child, or 
the classroom, or the curriculum ought to look like.  As strata, they are judgments from 
God (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), theological systems (Deleuze, 1988) stemming from 
above, transcendent.  As stratifying mechanisms, policy texts serve to stratify and 
organize the social field at the subjective level, and at the level of conscious perception, 
thus distributing perception according to specific regimes of signs.  This distribution 
makes visible and thus legitimate the subjects which appear to be organized and 
developed as per the regime, thus imposing specific subjectifying practices as desirable 
(the normal), and others as undesirable (the abnormal). Given the dominant regime, 
which we have seen favors the cognitive developmental approach to the child, which 
naturalizes the rational and the literate, it is safe to assume that visibility and legitimacy 
are given to the subjects that appear to properly represent those aspects.   
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It is important to stress that this recognition is superficial, since it is based on 
what can be observed from the outside, and stems from that illusion of consciousness 
described above.  A constant element of assessment is the fact that it is based upon that 
which is manifest or explicit in the child’s behavior or actions; in other words, upon that 
which the child demonstrates or expresses, and that is perceived by the teacher or the 
expert to represent development, skill, knowledge, or their lack.  For instance, terms such 
as “demonstrates”, “expresses”, “responds”, “uses”, and “shows” (NJDOE, 2013), are 
among the most used to describe expected learning outcomes.  Thus what goes on with 
the child is inferred from what is visible, or recognizable in the child’s behavior and 
actions as either normal or abnormal.  Since affective intensities, i.e. pre-linguistic, pre-
subjective forces of affecting and being affected between human and non-human bodies, 
are in essence invisible, and given early education’s focus on what is apparent or visible 
in a child’s actions and behaviors, it is safe to assume that these are not in the radar when 
it comes to young children’s education.   
However, relative movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
inevitably permeate, and animate the strata (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987); emotions, 
moods, states of mind, states of body (hunger, fatigue, etc.), all influence the stratified 
system of the classroom, providing it with life.  As stratifying systems, policy and formal 
education impose specific forms – that is indeed their job; they serve to territorialize the 
elements that enter into some kind of relationship with them.  However, movements of 
relative deterritorialization and reterritorialization are always present, thus concomitantly 
interrupting territorialization (an exceptionally inquisitive child, a spider on the wall, a 
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sneeze).  These deterritorializations, and deterritorialized elements and experiences are 
what Deleuze (1988) calls affective; they are pre-individual and pre-subjective, they 
permeate all interactions between bodies, and know nothing about conforming to any 
plan from above.  From a Spinozan perspective, as plans of transcendence, or plans of 
organization and development, policy documents, to the extent that they pertain to forms 
and development, they do not pertain to life, i.e. they do not pertain to the affective forces 
that permeate all action and interaction between human and non-human bodies.  Unlike a 
plan of organization or development, a plan of composition never presupposes anything 
beyond the given; in fact, this type of plan is better described not as a plan, but as a plane 
– what Deleuze called the “plane of immanence” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 128).  This is so 
because, as a plan of composition, a plane of immanence is “composed” by relations, i.e. 
by the immanent, or simultaneously occurring relations between bodies, and between the 
infinitely small particles that make up those bodies, thus making the plan manifest or 
perceptible – there is no additional dimension to be inferred (Deleuze, 1988).  Within this 
type of plan, “There is no longer a form, but only relations of velocity between 
infinitesimal particles of an unformed material.  There is no longer a subject, but only 
individuating affective states of an anonymous force” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 128).  For 
Deleuze, as for Spinoza, this is where life occurs: within the plane of immanence; this is 
also where education occurs: wherever there is life, there is education.  The child, the 
weather, and the puddle, know nothing about organization, or development, or a subject; 
but if they come into composition, they affect and are affected by one another, thus 
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potentially changing one another.  Their relationship is not necessary and may not be 
necessarily presupposed, yet this fact does not preclude it from existing.   
In the next section, I will outline a more complete definition of the concept of 
affect, and argue that affect is a new starting point for theorizing and understanding 






























The Turn to Affect 
The increasing influence of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in 
the last few decades of the twentieth century led to an emerging theory of affect across 
the social sciences.  In the face of this tendency, Clough and Haley (2007) called for what 
they have termed an “affective turn” in the social sciences.  In the foreword to The 
Affective Turn, Michael Hardt (2007) identifies two main trends in research over the past 
few decades which have paved the way to affect studies; one is a “focus on the body, 
which has been most extensively advanced in feminist theory; the other is an exploration 
of emotions” (p. ix) , mostly predominant in queer theory.  What Clough and Halley 
(2007) called the affective turn rises after these in order to extend this trend towards the 
interest for the body and emotions as pathways to understanding human action.  The 
authors explain “the turn” as a general tendency in critical theory towards affect, 
particularly “the conceptualization of affect that draws on the line of thought from Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari back through Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson” (Clough & 
Halley, 2007, p. 1).  This tendency in critical theory is characterized by a movement from 
a psychoanalytically informed criticism of subject identity, representation, and 
trauma to an engagement with information and affect; from privileging the 
organic body to exploring nonorganic life; from the presumption of 
equilibrium-seeking closed systems to engaging in the complexity of open 
systems under far-from-equilibrium conditions of metastability; from focusing 
on an economy of production and consumption to focusing on the economic 
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circulation of pre-individual bodily capacities or affects in the domain of 
biopolitical control. (Clough & Halley, 2007, p. 2) 
Part of understanding this turn is in understanding what causes it, and where it 
comes from.  The turn to affect implies a shift in understanding the human as post-human 
(Clough & Halley, 2007), evolution as postbiological (Clough & Halley, 2007; Deleuze, 
1994; Ansell-Pearson, 1999), life as both organic as well as inorganic (Clough & Halley, 
2007; Protevi, 2009), and reality at large ordered according to open systems, rather than 
equilibrium seeking closed systems (Clough & Halley, 2007; Deleuze, 1994; Ansell-
Pearson, 1999; Protevi, 2009).  The latter reflects a shift in paradigm from more linear 
forms of understanding reality towards the more complex, important for understanding 
contemporary epistemologies.  Recent advancements in the sciences have provided 
philosophers with new sets of parameters to understand and theorize human life and 
action that extend beyond common modern approaches.  Prefaced by postmodern critical 
theory, the turn to affect provides us all with new theories and methods and forces us to 
rethink the older.  An expanding body of literature (e.g. Clough, 2008; Clough & Haley, 
2007; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Massumi, 2002) reiterates not only the increasing 
interest in affect studies as a discipline, but also the increasing interest in continuing to 
establish affect as an important aspect in human, as well as non-human, action and 
experience.   
Affect   
Affect was first defined by Benedict Spinoza in his Ethics (1930); he said: “By 
affect I understand the affections of the body, by which the power of acting of the body 
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itself is increased, diminished,  helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these 
affections (p. 207)”.  In the book, Spinoza explains that body and mind are not distinct in 
their nature, but rather 
the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under 
the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension.  For this reason, 
the order or concatenation of things is one, whether nature be conceived under this 
or that attribute, and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our 
body is coincident in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind 
(Spinoza, 1930, p. 209). 
The coincidence between mind and body as originally described by Spinoza is one 
of the principal beliefs behind contemporary theories of affect, according to which mind 
and body occur simultaneously within human action, and that which rules non-humans 
and nature is the same as that which rules human action.  Ontologically, the argument is 
that Being is Univocal (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983), i.e. it is spoken in one and the same 
voice, regardless of its nature, or manifestation.   
Clough (2008) says that “affect is potential, a pre-conscious bodily capacity to 
become, to act and to be acted upon... it is a dynamism “prior to” the separating out of 
individuals or “prior to” individuation of any vital form” (p. 141).  As such, affect is not 
only not exclusively understood as human, or associated with what humans "feel", but 
rather something - a force, or a power - which can be found everywhere in the world, and 
that "travels" across different nature events and beings prior to any sense of individuality, 
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subjectivity, or identification with this or that category - human, animal, artificial, 
organic, female, Western, etc. (Clough, 2008; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Massumi, 
2002).  In other words: "Affect is the quantum indeterminacy immanent to every scale of 
matter - the subatomic, the physical, the biological and the cultural" (Clough, 2008, p. 
141).  Gregg & Seigworth (2010), state that 
Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted 
upon.  Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more 
sustained state of relation as well as the passage (and the duration of passage) of 
forces or intensities.  That is, affect is found in those intensities that pass body to 
body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that 
circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the 
very passages or variations between these intensities and resonances themselves. 
(p. 1) 
One of the purposes of Spinoza’s Ethics (1930) is to convey the urgency of life, 
what Gregg & Seigworth (2010) refer to as “Spinoza’s “not yet” (p. 1).  In its most 
incipient, “not yet” urges life to be lived and humans to take advantage of the possibilities 
for becoming opened up by a life lived in affective in-between-ness.  While this “not yet” 
puts the body in a position of (indefinite) in-definition (i.e. we are not likely to ever know 
all that a body can do), rather than mourn it as a kind of nihilism, according to which 
taking action is not worth it since no goal or purpose will ever be finally met, affect uses 
this not-yet to keep acting and seeking new encounters and new possibilities of encounter 
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between bodies.  As it is manifested in the human body, affect can be defined as the 
“visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing” (Gregg 
& Seigworth, 2010, p. 1). 
For Deleuze, as paraphrased by Means (2011), the concept of affect  
represents a pre-conceptual intensity which acts as a force of both empirical and 
virtual production.  It sets in motion relations between bodies (defined 
capaciously as human bodies, animals, objects, institutions, congregations, and 
states) and delimits their modes of interaction and potentiality.  (p.10) 
While highly influenced by the concept of affect described by Spinoza, Deleuze’s 
affective project can be traced back to Immanuel Kant (Panagia, 2007; Means, 2011; 
Wolfe, 2006); according to Kant, an aesthetic, or sensual experience contains “the 
potential to incite moments of affective intensity wherein one’s faculties of evaluation 
may be suspended” (Means, 2011, p. 2).  This temporary disruption – the aesthetic 
experience – suspends rationality, and occurs before an individual’s cognitive functions 
are able to process, and identify the nature of the disruptive intensity.  To this “pre-
conceptual [and pre-subjective] intensity of bodily suspense and disruption” Deleuze 
calls affect (Means, 2011, p. 2).  While Kant recognized the common occurrence of this 
type of experience, he would continue to attempt to re-inscribe it within the referential 
realm of rational judgment.  Conversely, “Deleuze allows [affect] to proliferate on its 
own terms, make connections, and venture outside habitual postures and rigid moral 
prescriptions” (Means, 2011, p. 3).   
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The aesthetic experience, which brings to the forefront of human experience 
affective disruption as suspended judgment, and thus the possibility for creative 
intensities to become activated, inaugurates, for Deleuze, the potential of “a creative 
plane of ethical and political invention” (p. 3).  The affective disruption caused by the 
aesthetic experience, opens up the possibility for a “critique beyond judgment” (p. 3) – 
since judgment is temporarily suspended – and a potential displacement of certain 
normative impositions of social value attributed to specific groups, people, or behaviors.  
For Deleuze, this opening presents infinite ethical possibility for social and political 
transformation, thus the social and political potential of affect, key for this project. 
Deleuze’s use of the concept of affect suggests that we pay attention to what is 
found below the individual, or subjective in humans, and begin to look for those aspects 
that motivate us aside from our ego, or self, and do not depend on the individual features 
we’ve grown accustomed to think of as that which constitutes our “selves”.  Prior to 
subjectivity, or a sense of individuality, is affect.  
Body   
In his Categories, Aristotle (2010) states that the very first question we always 
ask, and ought to ask about something, is “What” (2010).  According to Aristotle, “What 
is it?” inaugurates all thinking about something - a definition is required before we can 
think, understand, or complicate the being of an object, or concept.  Unlike Aristotle, and 
following Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari do not ask what something is, but rather “How 
does it work?” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Deleuze, 1988), and/or what does it do?  In 
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the question for the body, asking “How does it work” seeks “to uncover its capabilities, 
thresholds, limits, and capacities for generating affects and for being affected” (Means, 
2011, p. 10), rather than begin to attempt to inscribe it in a category that puts in evidence 
its generality and common defining attributes.  Asking “How does it work?” is important 
because, according to Spinoza, and later Nietzsche, we don’t know what a body can do.  
Spinoza (1930) explains that body and mind are not separated in their nature; he says 
the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under 
the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension.  For this reason, 
the order or concatenation of things is one, whether nature be conceived under this 
or that attribute, and consequently the order of the actions and passions of our 
body is coincident in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind.  
(p. 209). 
The coincidence between mind and body has come to be known as Spinoza’s 
“parallelism” - “it does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind 
and the body, it disallows any primacy of the one over the other” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 18).  
Bringing forth the body has nothing to do with attempting to enunciate its superiority, 
and should be understood within the frame of Spinoza’s effort to free human life from 
“Hatred and Remorse” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 13), which he believes are at the source of 
human consciousness (viz. conscience), and make humans not only guilty and remorseful 
of their actions, but also resentful and hateful of others (Deleuze, 1988).  Deleuze (1988) 
explains, 
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If Spinoza rejects any superiority of the mind over the body, this is not in order to 
establish a superiority f the body over the mind, which would be no more 
intelligible than the converse.  The practical significance of parallelism is 
manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was 
founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness.  (p. 18)   
Moreover, as it is explained by Deleuze (1988), Spinoza’s introduction of the 
“model of the body” (p. 18) seems to be related to his enacting of, or living a life of 
humility (according to Deleuze’s depiction, a common trait of a philosopher) - in this 
case epistemological humility.  There are powers to the body and likewise to the mind, 
that are beyond our consciousness, or awareness of them: “One seeks to acquire a 
knowledge of the powers of the body in order to discover, in a parallel fashion, the 
powers of the mind that elude consciousness” (p. 18).  One asks “How does it work?” 
because of a recognition that there are aspects to both body and mind that occur beyond 
cognition, which may hold powers one is unaware of.  Deleuze (1988) says, 
In short, the model of the body, according to Spinoza, does not imply any 
devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but, much more important, a 
devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a discovery of the 
unconscious, of an unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the 
body.  (p. 19)   
According to this view, “thought” is in fact inaugurated by the question “How 
does it work?” – because we do not know all that a body can do, and we do not know all 
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that a mind can do.  At the outset they are “constituted by the characteristic relations that 
subsume the parts of that body, the parts of that idea” (p. 19); but as they encounter other 
bodies and other ideas, they might uncover unknown powers that become manifested 
through those very encounters: “When a body “encounters” another body, or an idea 
another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more 
powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its 
parts” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19).   
The problem of consciousness is a problem of perception, namely the perception 
of the effects of those encounters and powers we are unaware of, or have no 
consciousness of.  Being conscious and valuing consciousness over body and thought 
alike, causes humans to live in a state of illusion - an illusion that consciousness and 
effects are all there is (Deleuze, 1988.).  In Deleuze’s (1988) words: “the conditions 
under which we know things and are conscious of ourselves condemn us to have only 
inadequate ideas, ideas that are confused and mutilated, effects separated from their real 
causes” (p. 19).  But according to Deleuze’s account of Spinoza, the order of causes is, as 
seen above, “an order of composition and decomposition of relations, which infinitely 
affects all of nature” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 19).     
For Deleuze, as for Spinoza, what a body is, or becomes, is contingent upon what 
it does, and how it does what it does.  A resting body is not the same as a moving body, 
and in both instances, what it is, reflects its relationship with a contextual platform, as 
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well as with other bodies, which immanently enable, circumscribe, and condition what a 
given body is/becomes.  
Moreover, it is important to refer that this “body” is not an exclusive reference to 
the human body; rather, a body is “any whole composed of parts, where these parts stand 
in some definite relation to one another, and has a capacity for being affected by other 
bodies” (Baugh, 2005, p. 30).  A community of people sharing a common interest or 
intention can be called a body; a set of parts becomes a body by way of the purpose of 
their relationship, of their coming together and affecting each other thus becoming a body 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 1987).   
What a body is capable of, and hence what a body is, cannot be known until its 
potential becomes actualized; this means that we are not likely to ever know all that any 
given body can do, and thus be.  Baugh (2005) explains: 
It is impossible to know in advance which bodies will compose with others in a 
way that is consonant with a body’s characteristic relation or ration of its parts, or 
which bodies will decompose a body by causing its parts to enter into 
experimental relations.  (p. 31) 
In the example of the body-agent/cyborg in the beginning of this document, the 
body of the killer is composed not only of the organic elements which typically compose 
the human body, but also of the guns – the guns are an integral part of the killing body: 
they are in relation to the other parts of the body under the “dominant relation, expressing 
the “essence” or a power of existing of that body” (p. 31).   
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While the aforementioned unpredictability could become the cause of a certain 
nihilistic attitude, an awareness of the fact that bodies’ power to be is in the power of 
being affected by other bodies, should rather be seen as the opening of infinite potential 
for being and transformation.  Though we may not know what a certain body can do, 
knowing that it derives its power from affect (from being in relation with, affecting and 
being affected by other bodies), suggests that there is no reason to believe that there isn’t 
anything a body is not capable of doing, and thus being.  In praxis, that which a body can 
be coincides with that which a body becomes/is.   
While Spinoza’s “not yet” puts the body in a position of (indefinite) in-definition 
(i.e. we are not likely to ever know all that a body can do), rather than mourn it as a kind 
of nihilism, according to which taking action is not worth it since no goal or purpose will 
ever be finally met, affect uses this not-yet to keep acting and seeking new encounters 
and new possibilities of encounter between bodies.   
Thus while some might have seen the poststructural “death of the subject” as the 
end, those engaged in affective understanding saw it, and continue to see it, as an urge to 
live and restore hope in the future of the world.  The death of the subject as such is 
nothing more than the loss of the Ego, and an attempt to overcome the illusion of human 
(self)control inaugurated by the Enlightenment.   
According to Brian Massumi (2002), in traditional cultural studies the body that 
is, is the body that exists as positioned on a grid, i.e. the coded body, which bears little 
importance in and of itself.  When movement and sensation are “eliminated”, so is the 
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body as a locus for affect, i.e. as visceral, pre-subjective/pre-individual dynamic 
assemblage/set (agencement) of intensities driven by desire, and by the interaction with 
other bodies (Massumi, 2002).  Though it serves the purpose of situating/positioning The 
Subject, this body is nonetheless a-subjective (rather than pre-subjective); it is abstract, 
decontextualized, and paradoxically disembodied.  It reflects an extrinsic approach to 
both body and subject, according to which both are determined by preexisting signifying 
categories (Massumi, 2002).  This body is “thoroughly mediated”, “discursive”, and 
dominated by “signifying gestures” (Massumi, 2002, p. 2).  These gestures are used to 
“make sense”, and may also be used to ‘unmake sense’ if “properly performed”, i.e. “by 
scrambling significations already in place” (p. 2). 
Affective Subjectivity 
An alternative to the rationalist view is a view of the human subject as being 
located above the individual level, “in a social field that at least constrains the field of its 
action but is often thought to more strongly constitute that subject through multiple and 
sometimes conflicting subjectification practices” (Protevi, 2009, p.3).  This view of the 
subject was advanced by philosophers such as Deleuze, who abandons the fixed, ideal, 
identitarian subject of abstract representation.  Though different notions or variations of 
the concept can be found throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre (Boundas in Parr, 2005), this fact 
attests to the very instability of subjectivity as becoming.  New relationships, and 
assemblages, made possible by openness and experimentation, and a systematic liberation 
of desire through deterritorialization and reterritorialization, create this a-subjective 
subject.  In other words, “The Deleuzian subject is an assemblage of heterogeneous 
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elements whose source is not the interiority of the traditional image of thought.  Deleuze 
insists that subjectivity is not a given; it is always under construction” (Boundas in Parr, 
2005, p. 268).  Thus, the image of the complete, fully realized autonomous individual is 
nothing but an illusion.    
This view of a transient and contingent subjectivity is also put forth by the 
advancement of a variety of fields (such as the cognitive sciences), who put in question 
the rationality argument, and tend to think of cognition as, amongst other designations, 
“embodied” and “affective” (Protevi 2009; Varela, et. al., 1993).  In Political Affect, 
Protevi (2009) claims to bring together the political critique, as well as a number of other 
common critiques of the rational cognitive individual, in order to “go above, below, and 
alongside the subject in examining politically shaped and triggered affective cognition: 
above the social, below the somatic, and alongside to the assemblage” (p. 4).  Throughout 
the book, he identifies three main concepts: the concept of “bodies politic, political 
cognition, and political affect – to examine the interlocking of the social and the somatic” 
(p. 4).  Protevi (2009) believes that “these imbrications sometimes, in the short term, 
bypass the subject and always, in the long term, constitute it” (p. 4).  Drawing from a 
variety of both scientific as well as philosophical sources, Protevi’s approach offers, not 
only an analysis of the human subject that goes beyond the traditional social sciences 
(sociology, psychology, etc.), but also a political analysis of the systems in which the 
human subject is found as such, and constituted as such.  Protevi’s book is also an 
exercise in rethinking political theory and subjectivity in terms of affective cognition 
rather than rational cognition.   
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In furthering the critique to the limitations of thinking in terms of the individual 
rational subject, Protevi (2009) suggests that we need a way to think of humans as 
collective and emotional as well as individual and rational (p. 186).   
Protevi (2009) explains this shift in understating human subjectivity, while 
challenging some of the critiques made to poststructural subjectivity, the following way: 
Thinking the subject in terms of affective cognition, situating the development of 
subjectivity in its historically variable political context, is not being “against” the 
subject.  Nor does it celebrate the alleged “death of the subject” thought to be the 
outcome of thinkers like Deleuze and Foucault.  What these thinkers really do is 
enable us to speak about subjectivity as an emergent capacity of bodies when they 
are placed in appropriate subjectification practices. (p. 31)  
Rethinking human cognition in a larger and more encompassing way, a way in 
which the body is not exiled from the cognitive process, entails an affective approach to 
human subjectivity – i.e. an approach that, as mentioned above, does not exclude the 
body from the cognitive process, and subsequently, from the social and political 
processes.   
In sum, subjectivity understood under a theory of affect is understood in terms of 
intra, as well as inter-subjectivity, manifested in context rather than ideally.  This view 
challenges that of an ideal, abstracted, and detached human subject and cognition, 
redefining the cognitive process as situated and contingent upon circumstance.  It also 
introduces the idea of shared cognitive processes (Protevi, 2009) amongst communities, 
  119 
 
insofar as the encounter and interaction between the bodies create (and constantly re-
create) the affective background where cognition and action occur.    
The affective child.  The actual child already escapes the pseudo-imposed 
developmental perspective of policy texts; Deleuze and Guattari (1987) say: 
In the case of the child, gestural, mimetic, ludic, and other semiotic systems 
regain their freedom and extricate themselves from the “tracing”, that is, from the 
dominant competence of the teacher’s language - a microscopic event upsets the 
local balance of power.  (p. 15) 
Using Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy it is possible to begin to "step away from 
the usual psychological Piagetian paradigms in Early Childhood, where children are 
supposed to conform to predictable developmental stages, or to universal patterns such as 
the Freudian Oedipus complex" (Mozère, 2007, p. 291).   
For instance, as an alternative to the ideal literate child they found in the 
Queensland syllabus Honan & Sellers (2008) propose, through their analysis of the 
syllabus, as well as the analysis of video they collected in the playground, they suggest a 
different “version of children, as (a) rhizomatic subject(s), whose discursive and 
embodied play reveals power(ful) agentic work done to negotiate curriculum spaces” (p. 
118).  The authors define curriculum as children’s everyday experiences, “investigation 
and exploration” (Honan & Sellers, 2008, p. 118).  They say: “rhizomatically, curriculum 
becomes every situation, event, person, artifact happened upon during children’s learning 
journeys as well as the journeying itself and the territory negotiated” (Honan & Sellers, 
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2008, p. 118).  Their critique to the individual rational child is grounded on the fact that, 
as observed in an early childhood playground, children move within their play in 
unplanned, unpredictable ways, i.e. rhizomatically.  These unpredictable games become 
curriculum when the child inadvertently learns something new.  Within this experience 
the child negotiates her own curriculum, making choices which, more often than not, 
have little to do with a rational choice to learn a specific skill or piece of information.   
According to the authors (Honan & Sellers, 2008), “the uniqueness of individual 
children and their action within the collective (of their) play(ing) goes beyond 
developmentalist understandings of “the “individual”, “rational” child” (p. 119).  Like 
Protevi (2009), Honan & Sellers (2008) believe that this conception is narrow and leaves 
out important aspects of human life and experience.  This conception also limits the ways 
in which we think of learning, which in turn limits the ways in which educators think of 
teaching.   
In the article “Learning from Experience: Dewey, Deleuze and “Becoming-Child” 
(2004), Inna Semetsky promotes an encounter between Deleuze and Dewey in order to 
describe the constitution of new knowledge through experience/experiment.  As Dewey, 
who believes learning comes from direct exposure to new circumstances and experience, 
Deleuze too believes teaching and learning occur within the “research laboratory” 
(Deleuze, 1995 in Semetsky, 2004).  It is by way of being exposed to opportunities to 
meet and experiment with the world that the child is able to generate the new for 
herself.  Semetsky equates Dewey’s encounter between the old and new (the moment at 
which new knowledge comes to be) with Deleuze’s becoming, in which the virtual 
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becomes actual; this occurs, again, given specific conditions which make possible the 
coming-to-be of the virtual.  The virtual has the power to become actual, (or is potentially 
actual), and 
must subsist in its virtual state…  Learning, for Deleuze, always takes place “in 
and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound 
complicity between nature and mind” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 165), leading to the 
conjugation that determines, as Deleuze says, the threshold of consciousness: 
unconscious becoming conscious. (Semetsky, 2004, p. 61) 
In the text, Semetsky transcribes the story of a little girl who suddenly gains 
consciousness of her ability to read.  At the age of four, having been exposed to a number 
of books, she did not know that she could actually read until she was faced with a book 
she had never seen before.  As she opens this new book, she becomes aware of her new 
found ability, and is transformed.  The little girl has not learned due to “direct or explicit 
instruction, but by means of the natural interaction between herself and the whole of the 
environment that has generated an “intelligence in operation” (Dewey, 1934, p. 410 in 
Semetsky, 2004, p. 62).   
This passage from one state in to the other is made possible by affect; as that 
which a body can do, affect intensifies the appreciation of an experience (Semetsky, 
2004, p. 60).  In the case of the little girl “The body’s newly acquired power to read 
“must liberate joys, vectorial signs of the augmentation of power, and ward off sadness, 
signs of diminution” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 144 in Semetsky, 2004, p. 60).  This new 
acquired power is also going to push the little girl into continuing her apprenticeship – an 
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apprenticeship, not only in reading, but also, and more importantly, an apprenticeship in 
learning itself.   
This instance shows that learning is first and foremost pre-subjective, therefore 
remaining mostly a function of the affects and the pre-subjective intensities which lay 
beneath narration and representation of a cognitive/rational subject.  Representation 
appears literally as an afterthought, a way to insert the newly acquired ability in to the 
discourse of what it “means” to learn.   
According to Ronald Bogue (2008), this child’s experience in gaining awareness 
of her new power would have been pivotal because it generates non-linguistic memories 
of “learning”: it is not the story or the content that matter in this experience, but the 
experience itself, the disruption of what she believed was her condition – non-literate – 
and the awareness of a new gained power – that of being able to read.  
Bogue employs Deleuze’s work on Proust to suggest a model of learning based on 
explication of non-linguistic signs, such as involuntary memories, images, or 
immaterial artistic signs…  Learning is a means of unfolding signs in practice, 
and an apprenticeship consists of a progressive exploration of signs and their 
signification. (Semetsky, 2008, preface, p. x) 
According to Bogue (2008), Deleuze’s analysis of A La Recherche du Temps 
Perdu (in English, Remembering things past) frames the experience of young Marcel as a 
process of apprenticeship, or a process of learning according to which signs are 
interpreted: “all learning, he asserts, proceeds via the interpretation of signs.  Everything 
that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or 
  123 
 
hieroglyphs” (Bogue in Semetsky, 2008, p. 2).  These signs are apprehended “in terms of 
their problematic instances” (p. 2), not in terms of objective or subjective criteria.  
Furthermore, in “Reading Signs/Learning from experience” (2010), Bogue and 
Semetsky define learning as an embodied, affective, informal, and contextual praxis in 
which signs are the indicators of problems and knowledge in need to be 
‘unfolded’.  Genuine learning occurs within the “unfolding” of signs that “point”, or 
“signal” us towards a problem, and happens within “a larger milieu of informal education 
in terms of learning from experience” (p. 115).  According to Semetsky (2008), 
Deleuze suggests that genuine education proceeds through a deregulation of the 
senses and a shock that compels thought against its will to go beyond its ordinary 
operations… Only through a chance encounter with an unsettling sign can thought 
be jolted from its routine patterns, and only through such an encounter will the 
object of thought cease to be arbitrarily selected and attain the necessity of 
something that itself chooses thought, that constrains thought and sets it in 
motion. (p. x) 
In “Moral Stumbling” (2010) Semetsky recalls Dewey’s concept of experience, 
and says that “For Dewey, human experience is always marked by its affective dimension 
that precedes a purely cognitive recognition of what it is about” (p. 53).  According to the 
author (2010), Peirce’s concept of abduction also reflects a quasi-intuitive dimension of 
human experience and reasoning: “in the manner of Dewey’s affective thought, every 
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abductive inference is colored by a feeling-tone and involves a particular emotion” (p. 
59). 
The focus on the aforementioned Peircean concept of “abduction”, the concept of 
“surprise”, or the idea of learning as “embodied”, can also be seen as reflecting the 
increasing importance of un-conscious, pre-subjective, pre-individual occurrences 
towards a renewed understanding of learning and epistemology, characteristic of affect 
theory.   
A semiotic/affective approach to education as theorized by various authors (e.g. 
Semetsky, Smith, Stables) would not only challenge some of the dualisms of education 
and educational discourse (e.g. mind-knowledge), but directly eliminate the primary 
body-mind dualism dominant in “classical learning theory” (Semetsky, 2010, p. 26) and 
redefine learning as an embodied experiential venture occurring at all times of one’s 
life.   
For example, through associating the movements of a child’s apprenticeship in 
walking to those of a surfer, Borgnon (2007) hopes to disturb “the orthodox thought of 
recognition and representation that makes us define, include and exclude children who do 
not fit into the pre-established schemes of development and learning” (p. 264).  Borgnon, 
believes that this exercise helps deterritorialize and reterritorialize the fixed 
developmental child; adding to the developmental attributes those of the surfer, will, 
according to the author, open up new ways of understanding and appreciating a child’s 
apprenticeship in walking (2007).     
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4. Deterritorialization and Affect 
As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of this study is to deterritorialize the 
ideal rational child of formal education and policy texts by juxtaposing it with the 
affective child found at the margin, in the cracks and middles, and outside of the regime 
of perception that permeates policy, as well as political discourse, here identified as 
narratocratic (Panagia, 2009). 
In this plateau I discuss the social and political implications of the territorializing 
effects of dominant notions of “child” and “knowledge” found in policy and political 
rhetoric, in light of the current social and political global landscape, where millions of 
children and young adults continue to suffer the discriminating effects of illiteracy.  As 
literacy (in increasingly different forms) continues to be, not only a staple of Western 
education, but the goal of schooling, people who are not literate continue to be 
discriminated by those that are.  The purpose of this plateau is to provide a critique of 
what Davide Panagia has come to call “narratocracy” (2009) and to evoke alternative 
modes of political perception and being political that do not rely exclusively on 
discursive literacy.  Embracing affective modes of expression and perception provides 
those who remain ‘uneducated’ in the western sense with ways to raise awareness to their 
condition that are not exclusively discursive and narrative.   
The daily lives of children in an area of Lebanon previously affected by armed 
conflict serve to illustrate childhood as it happens at the margin, in ways that escape those 
predicted in policy as ‘appropriate’ or educative.  They also provide insight into 
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children’s deterritorialized and deterritorializing experiences often unaccounted for in 
formal education discourse, by policy writers across the board, children’s rights 
organizations, and, through subjectification and (re)territorialization, by each individual 
and community locked in social and political exile within their own countries and 
communities. 
Education for All and the Problem of Narratocracy 
To be socially and politically visible is to be recognized by socially and politically 
validated regimes of perception; these provide people who are perceived within them 
with legitimacy, namely social and political legitimacy.  In The Political Life of Sensation 
(2009), Panagia introduces us to the concept of narratocracy or the “privileging of 
narrative as a genre for the exposition of claims and ideas in contemporary political 
thought” (p. 12). He says: “Narratocracy is a prevailing regime of perception in the 
theoretical analysis of political phenomena… it is an outline that renders an object, event, 
practice, or person at once visible and available for accountability” (Panagia, 2009, p. 
12).  As the way by which people and events become politically visible, and subsequently 
relevant, narratocracy emerges as the way by which those capable of rational, narrative 
discourse (whether nations or people) become legitimized in discriminating those who 
are not. 
Children, to the extent that they are not provided with legitimate opportunities to 
actively partake in political life, participate of the same political invisibility, though their 
everyday lives are immersed in the social dynamics directly or indirectly regulated by 
political action.  Whether within the neoliberal rhetoric of competition and meritocracy, 
  127 
 
which drives parents with financial means to enroll their children in all kinds of extra-
curricular activities, tutoring, and test-prep classes; or, on the other end of the spectrum, 
within financially and socially disadvantaged parents, and communities, where children 
may fail to receive proper nutrition, or receive a trimmed-down version of the public 
education their peers receive in wealthier communities, children’s lives are contingent 
upon the results of political action they have no say in.  And while the first are being 
provided with opportunities to become politically visible in the future, by way of 
becoming educated in the skills recognized as legitimate, and valid by the dominant 
regime of perception, i.e. narratocratic, the latter are silently being told they are not 
deserving of legitimacy and visibility, when they don’t receive the same opportunities. 
Thus far, attempts to remedy this issue have been focused on attempting to 
provide all with the tools to participate in the dominant discourses, thus gaining visibility 
and some degree of financial or political power.  In the year 1990, representatives from 
over 150 countries came together to pledge and plan to provide education for all people 
by the year 2000.  This happened at the World Conference on Education for All, held in 
Thailand, and the “intention was that children, youth and adults would “benefit from 
educational opportunities designed to meet their basic learning needs” (UNESCO).  In 
2000, as the decade came to an end, world representatives gathered again at the World 
Education Forum, in Dakar, Senegal, and adopted the Dakar Framework for Action 
(UNESCO, 2000), a document under which governments commit “to achieving quality 
basic education for all by 2015” (UNESCO).   
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In order to assess the progress of the program, UNESCO has commissioned and 
published reports every year; these reports describe the major problems still existing in a 
number of countries that impact the progress of the program negatively.   
The 2011 EFA Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2011) describes what has 
been called “the hidden crisis” in education, and refers to warfare and conflict as major 
contributing factors to poor or non-existing formal education for children and youth in 
conflict-affected countries.  According to the report, there are 28 million children in 
conflict-affected countries out of school; this number represents 40% of all children that 
are out of school worldwide.  Subsequently, literacy rates in these countries are 
significantly lower than in countries that do not live under armed conflict (UNESCO, 
2011).   
An initial reading of the report consistently remitted me to the arguments I had 
read in both Panagia (2009) and Protevi’s (2009) books, which had redirected the course 
of this project to the emerging field of affect studies.  Rather than focus on what should 
be, the report spoke of the conditions of real children and adults that remain at the margin 
of formal education.  In the specific report, the focus was on the issue of war and armed 
conflict as actual obstacles to the pursuit of formal education.   
Having spent the majority of my career, as both a teacher and a young academic, 
focused on ways to better or more effectively educate children on how to claim their 
political voice, and understand the social and political power they could claim for 
themselves and their communities, I could not help but to now think of those who would 
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never be able to access whatever strategies and tools educators came up with to empower 
them.  Ironically, these were also the people that most needed them.  The millions of 
children and adults that could not access formal education, and subsequently the 
commonly agreed upon tools and strategies to become socially and politically aware and 
empowered (Freire, 2007; Shor, 1992), were being deprived of the very ways by which 
they could become empowered because of a lack of power and legitimacy to begin with.  
How can we expect to empower children and adults through furnishing them with tools 
and strategies they consistently do not have access to?  Moreover, according to the report, 
there are already millions of children and adults who do not get exposed to the formal 
education the very EFA initiative defines as fundamental.  We have to assume that, for a 
large number, formal education will never be a part of their lives, thus they will never 
have access to the tools that could empower them to claim their rights. 
Initiatives such as Education for All are representative of this idea; thanks to the 
efforts of organizations such as UNESCO, or UNICEF, millions of people around the 
world have gained access to formal education, literacy, and health care, and have seen 
their quality of life improve exponentially.   
However, as is evidenced by EFA’s annual progress reports, the obstacles to 
implementing formal education, let alone achieving the goal of assuring that all have 
access to basic formal education by the year 2015, are often unpredictable, or ‘hidden’ 
(UNESCO, 2011).  There is moreover within these efforts, an assumption that formal 
education, in the form of basic literacy, is what disadvantaged populations need in order 
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for their lives to improve.  It is indeed what they need given dominant discourses of 
political participation and power; and it is what they need in order to gain visibility within 
the hegemonic discourse of political perception – narratocracy – which recognizes 
narration and discursive representation as fundamental in being political.  We have 
accepted the current regime of political perception as an ontological reference to what 
counts as being, and have come to accept that the only way to grant human beings with 
subjectivity is to teach them how to read and become functional within the current 
regime/system.  Are initiatives like EFA inappropriate or wrong?  No – they owe their 
very existence to a state of social and political affairs that requires them to exist, and their 
impact is often invaluable for the actual people that they benefit.  What is inappropriate is 
that they are needed; they signal the ontological inadequacy of existing, legitimate human 
beings whose political subjectivity is consistently denied by the myopia of narratocracy.  
We have attempted to fix them but haven’t questioned our system sufficiently.  Or 
perhaps we have only questioned it, but have continued to fail to interrupt it sufficiently, 
or to effectively disrupt it.   
Disrupting this system entails disrupting the dominant regime of perception, and 
exposing the cracks where other modes of perception and expression grow in wilderness.  
It entails recognizing the opportunities provided by those modes of perception and 
expression which are immanently manifest in everyday life, in the seemingly mundane, 
through emotion or sensation.  Finally, it entails infusing movement and sensation back 
into the body (Massumi, 2002), and accepting that bodies take as much part in political 
life as minds – they are one and the same anyway (Spinoza, 1930; Deleuze & Guattari, 
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1987; Massumi, 2002; Panagia, 2009; Protevi, 2009).  My argument is that the very 
existence of these moving and sensing bodies become politically recognizable – not as 
different, not as other, not as the body in need of coding or normalizing – but as 
immanent and affective, in that their very physical existence inevitably impacts social 
and political life at a micro-level.  As previously stated, multiple types of regimes of 
signs coexist in addition to the signifying; recognizing the immanent role of affect in 
political life encompasses accepting the legitimacy of both signifying, as well as non-
signifying regimes, and accepting diverse modalities of expression as valid.   
The Body as Political 
There are many instances in recent history in which people have used the body to 
gain political visibility (Means, 2011; Panagia, 2009; Protevi, 2009).  Demonstrations 
and street protests are one of the most common examples: protesters might chain or tie 
themselves to natural or manmade landmarks, engage in hunger strikes, and put their 
lives, or the physical integrity of their bodies at risk in order to make a particular political 
statement, or gain enough social visibility for their cause and thus put pressure on 
specific stakeholders that can make changes to policy.  Successful outcomes suggest the 
power of affect in impacting social and political dynamics. 
In 2001, a group of residents composed of senior citizens, parents, and students, 
from the Mexican American neighborhood of Little Village in Chicago, began a hunger 
strike in order to reclaim the building of a high school they had been promised, after their 
high school became overcrowded (Means, 2011).  Means (2011) says that 
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During this time the community staged a series of events such as theater 
performances, rallies, and prayer vigils.  These displays of sacrifice, creativity, 
and political theater represented conscious strategic decisions of the part of the 
community to maximize their message, voice, and political visibility... [and]… the 
movement gained a presence within the political community through the strategic 
mobilization of the hunger strike.  (pp. 7-8) 
Means (2011) uses the words “conscious”, and “strategic” more than once to 
describe the organized efforts of this community; not only did they have a specific goal in 
mind, which was to gain enough social and political visibility to pressure the city officials 
to fulfill their promise and build the new high school, but they also had a plan, a strategy 
that they put in place in order to achieve that goal.  To an extent, when the members of 
this community chose “hunger” strike as their strategy, they had some idea of the 
potential of affect, as it becomes activated through social recognition and sympathy.  
Without an awareness of the possibility of success, they might never have engaged in this 
type of protest, especially given the fact that they had already exhausted the prescribed 
modes of being political found in the system. 
In fact, it is important to mention that their successful efforts were not this 
community’s first choice.  Prior to the hunger strike, members of the community had 
attempted to navigate the officially recognized ways of partaking in political life by 
attending board meetings, writing letters to city officials, etc. (Means, 2011).  It was not 
until they didn’t see their initial efforts recognized that this community’s members 
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decided to plan the hunger strike, which finally granted them with enough social visibility 
and, subsequently, political visibility, and power.  In other words, it was the “shaming 
power through the images of the hunger strike generated enough affective force to drive 
Paul Vallas to the negotiating table, where the community was able to pressure an 
agreement for a new school (…)” (Means, 2011, p. 7).   
Additionally, while the use of the body for impacting political action suggests the 
power of affect in social and political dynamics, it is important to mention that the 
intentional aspect of this situation means that this is still a mediated body (Massumi, 
2002).  This is a body that is imbued with subjectivity, without which it may not have 
been seen as socially and politically relevant by the public who provided it with 
recognition and legitimacy. 
Finally, while the final result of this episode speaks of the political possibilities of 
affect, the sequence of events in this episode speaks, in addition, of a Kafkian disconnect 
between the rhetoric of democratic participation, and the actual recognition this 
participation receives, particularly when it attempts to use the mechanisms put in place by 
the state for that very purpose.  This disconnect denotes the fallibility of a system, of 
which political rhetoric says was built upon the very principles of democratic 
participation – by the people, for the people.  The invisible part of this episode is what it 
exposes about the political possibilities, or lack thereof, of those who may not have the 
means to become aware of their own power to make themselves visible politically or, 
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more importantly, whose governments fail to provide them with legitimate opportunities 
to participate – even if rhetorically.   
In sum, the members of this community had at their disposal legitimate means of 
participating in political life; in addition, they were aware of their invisibility, and of the 
need to reclaim the promise that had been made to their community.  However, had they 
not have the means to, not only become aware, but consciously generate a strategy to 
make themselves visible, while also aware of the possibility of success of that strategy, 
their children might not have had a new school.  Moreover, it was not the bare need or the 
promise of a new school which caused political action – it was rather the recognition and 
legitimacy provided to those bodies by the public which caused political action to ensue.   
The Affective Child: Legitimizing Children through Affect 
While American fiction and pop culture often portray the American child under 
one of the ends of the normal/abnormal spectrum as defined by popular culture - where 
the normal appears as that which is socially valued and desirable (popular, extroverted, 
good-looking, involved in sports, going to college, etc.); and abnormal appears as that 
which has little social value (shy, overweight, solitary, etc.) -, news reports, reality 
television shows, and documentaries often show a childhood that is populated with 
experiences often not necessarily associated with being a child.   
Children captured in this type of media often engage in behaviors society 
disapproves of, such as drinking alcohol, taking drugs, having unprotected sex, etc., (e.g. 
Teen Mom) or in behaviors or situations seldom directly associated with childhood, such 
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as extreme competition, labor, poverty, gun handling, etc. (e.g. Toddles and Tiaras, 
Dance Moms, American Winter).  This latter child is one who seems to challenge the 
ideal of the socially inscribed child – she may or may not live within a conventional 
nuclear family; she may have a demanding job in addition to attending school; she may 
not have access to a school at all, or any kind of formal education; she might be 
homeless, or she might face explicit deadly danger every day just by stepping outside her 
home, if she has one.   
The very existence of the child that escapes the description and prescriptions of 
policy texts, societal normalcy, and educational psychology textbooks, deterritorializes 
childhood turning it into a multi-modal immanently affective set of experiences.  Outside 
the protected existence of the Western ideal child, the developmentally appropriate 
educational experiences suggested in the early childhood policy are often not only 
inaccessible, but unrealistic given the circumstances under which millions of children 
around the world live. 
While in this plateau the focus is on the deterritorializing experiences of children 
living under warfare conditions, it is important to mention that marginalizing, precarious, 
often dangerous life circumstances are not an exclusive of developing countries.  
According to a recent UNICEF report (2012) on child poverty in developed countries, 
23% of children in the U.S. live in relative poverty (defined as living in a household in 
which disposable income in less than 50% of the national median income) (UNICEF, 
2012).  Additionally, currently in the U.S., the number of children that are homeless in a 
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given year averages 1.6 million – that is one in every 45 children (Murphy et al., 2013); 
approximately 42% of these children are under the age of six (Murphy et al., 2013). 
These children and their families are exponentially more vulnerable to continued 
poverty, homelessness, and lack of formal education, which in turn will perpetuate the 
same social issues which originated these to begin with.  This perpetuation often occurs 
due to a lack of recognition of these children and adults’ social and political legitimacy – 
their marginal existence goes unnoticed and unaccounted for because of their lack of 
participating in social and political life in the ways preferred for participation by policies, 
or popular culture.  Rendering social and political visibility and legitimacy to those who 
may not be able to claim it for themselves under legally prescribed ways, or through 
resistance is imperative in guarantying that children’s rights are properly enforced, and 
respected by those in political power.   
In the following paragraphs I provide an insight into the daily lives and 
deterritorializing experiences of children who escape the ideal found in policy as 
discussed in plateau 4.  While limited by the narrative format required by academic 
norms, I have attempted as much as possible to express the deterritorializing potential of 
image (particularly the “images” of the documentary film) as an affective way to 
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Deadly Playground   
The film begins with narration of the war, with in between scenes of children 
“playing war” with one another – they duck, roll, and make gun noises with their voice – 
they act out what they have seen is war.  International organizations are removing the 
cluster bombs left behind – an estimated one million.  Director Katia Saleh (2007) 
interviews the locals, and visits people whose very backyard has active cluster bombs.  
She goes around a village asking people about the bombs, they show her some and she 
asks where they found them – in the streets, they say. 
The director then goes into a town in south Lebanon, where thousands of clusters 
bombs were left behind by the Israeli at the end of their latest conflict; there, she walks 
the streets where buildings show massive signs of destruction: ruble is everywhere, while 
people, once exiled from the town, now live what they know to be a normal life.  
Children walk on the street, she asks them questions, they tell her what the destroyed 
buildings used to be, what stores you could have found there prior to the war.  She begins 
to explain that clusters bombs are left everywhere in the town, and that children, often 
unaware of the dangers of cluster bombs, continue to be victims of this war.  She says 
cluster bombs can often be mistaken for toys.   
Saleh asks two boys what they are up to, whether they know there might be 
cluster bombs in the piles of ruble by which they’re passing, and asks if they are afraid: “I 
am not afraid of anything.”, one of the boys says.  He says he has found multiple cluster 
bombs which he has either turned into the army, or depleted himself.  He is only one of 
many children in south Lebanon who will do anything to help their families survive – one 
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of those jobs entails collecting rocks in areas previously used as battle fields.  He points 
at different areas, where people have been killed or hurt by cluster bombs to show the 
director.  As they walk around this mostly rural area, he tells her that once, while taking a 
break from farming, he found one of these cluster bombs – he explains in detail what they 
generally look like and how they work.  When asked why he likes to hunt and collect 
cluster bombs, he calls it a hobby – he smiles.  When asked if he knows how dangerous it 
is, he says he knows that it is very dangerous; and when asked what happens if the bomb 
explodes he responds that he will be martyred.  A close up of the boy’s face shows what 
could be read as indifference, or sadness, or both.  He seems unfazed by Saleh’s warnings 
and questions as he gazes away from the camera. 
*** 
Saleh tells the story of a few boys unknowingly walking around a cluster bomb, 
when it exploded right under their feet – she stands with the boys outside, they tell her 
about that day – their stories are simple: they were picking pine cones, they were pushing 
a carriage, the bomb was under the grass, and they stepped on it.  “They look like a stone, 
or a matchbox car, or a little teddy bear”.  One of them died, his brother lifts his shirt and 
shows a scar, he is smiling.  When asked if the area is being cleared the boys say that 
“they” come when a bomb explodes, look for a few hours, and don’t come back for 
months or years.  When one of the boys says “they” come once a year, the injured boy 
smiles and says: “He’s a liar.  They come once every five years.”  The group of boys 
laughs out loud. 
*** 
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Saleh reunites with the boy whose hobby it is to hunt cluster bombs.  He is 
gathered with his family, working.  The family tells a story of an explosion that lightly 
hurt the children, when they were picking metal.  When asked about the boy’s ‘hobby’, a 
lady, who we might assume is his mother or aunt, says he is stubborn – he laughs and 
continues working. 
*** 
She speaks to a civilian man who collects bomblets, he believes he sees danger 
where others – namely children – don’t, because he knows what to look for.  He calls it 
his job, but he does not get paid to do it.  He tells the story of a boy who was scrapping 
metal with his father, when he lost both legs and was severely burned.  He is on a wheel 
chair and now speaks of the importance of pursuing his education, since he believes he 
will not be able to get a job otherwise – he appears to be around 12 years old.  This is the 
only reference to education and the importance of education in the entire film. 
*** 
We are shown images of children playing war on the hills, alternated with pictures 
of exploding bombs, and children playing war – jumping, rolling, making gun sounds, 
pretending to be dead on the ground.  A child lifts his arms in victory; an image of an 
exploding bomb follows.  Saleh narrates statistics, the state of demining efforts – one 
million bombs were left behind, less than 15% had been cleared; she speaks of the laws 
that allow the use of cluster bombs as war weapons, and the lack of cooperation between 
Israel and Lebanon in mapping the mines. 
*** 
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Saleh talks to the boy that collects cluster bombs as a hobby in the final scene of 
the film.  He’s saying he won’t dare go into certain areas with his friends.  When asked 
how he can be certain there aren’t bombs in the places they do play, he says he doesn’t.  
They look like rocks, and the mountain where they stand is full of rocks.  What happens 
if he steps on one of those rocks?  He replies: “I’ll die.” 
*** 
I came across the documentary Deadly Playground (Saleh, 2007) immediately 
after my encounter with the 2011 EFA progress report mentioned above.  An initial 
unintentional ‘analysis’ of the film originated the main argument that became this 
dissertation: a tentative answer to the problem of “narratocracy” (Panagia, 2009).  While 
as educators we seem to continue to focus on the image of the educated person, the 
people that, for a variety of reasons, escape that image also escape our educational 
efforts.  I assumed that if the hegemonic social and political regime of perception, i.e. 
narration (Panagia, 2009), fails to include those that are not able to access the tools to 
become the ideal literate person, and to become visible under that regime, then other 
regimes of perception must be introduced as politically valid.  If not all will access formal 
education as the way by which to gain visibility under the narratocratic regime of 
perception of politics, then other ways by which to gain political visibility must be 
present. 
The film, in that it reconstructs for viewers the experiences of the children in 
therein presented, introduces “image”, associated with sight, as a possible regime of 
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perception rendering the children visible, not only literally, but also figuratively as 
participants in the political structure: from a ground-up perspective, the children are the 
ultimate political actors immanently involved in the ultimate political experience – 
everyday life.  The everyday lives and bodies of the children in south Lebanon are 
radically political because of the imminent danger in which they are, itself caused by 
intentional political action – war. 
As a political activist, knowingly reporting the lives of the children as expressions 
of rights violations, as well as political invisibility and powerlessness, the director uses 
the film to spread the situation and make others aware of the conditions these children 
and their communities live under, and hoping to activate their affective powers.  
However, the children in the film are not characters, and their everyday experiences are 
not geared towards making any kind of statement, political or otherwise; they are not the 
individuals on hunger strike, or chained to a landmark, and are not likely aware that their 
rights are being violated.  The children in the film are actual children living their 
everyday lives in the midst of land mines left behind during warfare, exercising their 
affective dimension regardless of their ability to read, write, or protest the danger they 
face every day.  While one of the children featured in the film claims he will be martyred 
in the event of a fatal explosion, thus attributing a mediated, signifying dimension to his 
experience, this coding appears a posteriori.  In fact, in the majority of the cases 
presented by the director, fatal as well as nonfatal accidents occurred when children were 
either playing, or working to help their families support themselves, and theirs does not 
knowingly evoke an intentional political attitude, or action. 
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As a narrator, and as the director, Saleh has the story behind the cluster bombs: 
she speaks of the war, and of the parties involved, she knows the facts, and the numbers, 
which she narrates throughout the film.  Yet the children, and adults impacted by the 
situation, and whose lives are at risk everyday in doing the mundane tasks, do not speak 
of a war, or of warfare as an issue, or of the numbers that the war has produced: they tell 
stories, they describe concrete episodes in which themselves and their families were 
either at close risk of injury or effectively hurt.  The children lost a friend, who was killed 
in front of them; one of them lost a brother, and was injured himself; a mother lost a child 
– a casualty in ‘the grand scheme of things’ is an event in the lives of those involved 
(Massumi, 2002).   
Though there is a (hi)story of the conflict and of Lebanon’s political struggles 
associated with the film, and subsequently the stories of each child, what lasted in my 
memory of the film were the mundane aspects of their lives, and their mutilated bodies – 
the history of the conflict becomes encapsulated in the image of a missing leg, in the 
motion of the body that is missing a leg, in the becomings of the lived experience that is 
contingent upon the specific assemblage that is a human body with a missing leg in a 
world populated by a majority of human bodies with two legs.  The mutilated bodies of 
the children, and the eminent loss of life that permeates the entire community, are 
manifestations of the presence of affect in everyday life – the sight of the first and the 
awareness of the second disrupt order, and deterritorialize our understanding of both 
childhood, and everyday life.   
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I did not view the film again until I was writing this document.  For almost the 
entirety of the writing process, the film remained a semi-distant data source I had 
encountered, engaged with, and produced ideas from.  Part of the reason I did not want to 
view the video multiple times had to do with my approach to research and reporting; I 
believed that if I viewed the film many times I would perhaps begin to interpret, or 
attempt to represent or make meaning of it, perhaps getting to know the children as 
individuals, perhaps beginning to draw a story line, or the subjective relationships 
between the children.  As much as possible, I wanted to maintain the impression(s) I had 
gotten from my first encounter with the film – that unintentional, unplanned, affective 
encounter-analysis that had produced problems and ideas that I wanted to explore without 
“going back”.  Whatever connections emerged from my first encounter with the film, 
they had pointed me towards affect as instrumental in deterritorializing discriminatory 
practices resulting from narratocracy.  And to a certain extent, it is irrelevant what the 
director or the producer are trying to convey through their choice of images, and frames, 
because the ideas that have been produced, the potential actions that it has activated take 
the place of any lifeless meaning congealed at the time of production.   
Legitimizing Children through Affect   
In sum, for a variety of social issues that go from citizenship status to illiteracy, 
millions of children and adults are kept unaccounted for and unable to access ways that 
would grant them visibility and legitimacy in commonly des/prescribed ways.  A 
perpetuation of failing to grant them social and political existence and legitimacy because 
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of their illiterate, or illegal condition, is to negate the issues they face every day, and 
ultimately to negate the very existence of these populations.   
But to keep them at the margin does not reduce the impact of their existence on 
the bios of the community – as stated in the introduction, excluding that which we don’t 
know or don’t want to recognize as existing, will not make it disappear; their seeming 
invisibility does not render them non-existent.   
Creating ideal ways by which to become socially and politically legitimate, while 
asserting that all “must” go through these mechanisms in order to gain visibility and 
legitimacy, does not guarantee that all will have access to those mechanisms, and/or be 
able to gain and claim that visibility and legitimacy.  Herein lays the problem with policy 
texts and right’s declarations – while asserting that all “should”, “must”, or “ought” to 
“do”, “have”, or “be”, nothing in a mere text has the acting power of making sure it will 
in fact be put into practice.  This is the beginning of Gilles Deleuze’s (1996) suspicion in 
regard to right’s, and rights’ declarations: they provide humans with no guaranty that the 
subjects there cited will always be acted upon accordingly.  Policy texts do not create the 
“ideal” conditions under which that same policy would be “ideally” effective.   
In order to guarantee that these populations’ rights are enforced and that these 
children and adults are recognized as legitimate social and political elements of the 
assemblage that constitutes social and political life at large, it is imperative that their 
existence alone becomes their affective legitimizing power.  The affective recognition of 
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that power actualizes it, thereby granting political visibility to the adults and children who 
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*** 
Was I always able to be myself? Was I always given the impression that that is all 
I have to be? Instilled to think that I would find that self in the company of my peers, or 
my cultural roots, I tried identifying with the crowd – do the same things, go to the same 
places; but my self wasn’t there. Then with the people of my country, Portugal – the rich 
history, the magnificent monuments, but doubts about the atrocities that went in to the 
development of that nation, and feelings of resentment towards the results of forty years 
of fascism, got in the way, and my identity was not there either. Yet, in trying to be my 
self I would at times come across a desired otherness. A model of an-other embedded in 
social agreement, political consensus, and legitimacy – a ‘better’ self for sure – 
frustratingly desirable, yet absurd in the measures of my own self. I did not want to be 
that other I was being told to be, all I wanted was to be myself.   
Made believe that I needed an identity, in traveling and reading Deleuze, I found 
that I didn’t want one.  I wanted to be in the possibility of being; I wanted to be the 
nomad, and to become whatever my contingent self needs me to be.  And sometimes I am 
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5. Memory and Schizoanalysis: Towards an Educational Auto(Schizo)Bio-graphy 
A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, the hollow of a root, the crook of a 
branch…  An intensive trait starts working for itself, a hallucinatory perception, 
synesthesia, perverse mutation, or play of images shakes loose, challenging the 
hegemony of the signifier.  (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 15) 
I became aware of the implications of an overly (re)territorialized/ing existence 
when I encountered Deleuze, as expressed in the beginning of the dissertation via St. 
Pierre's text.  This break coincided with my first year as a teacher, and a realization of the 
role of formal education in the perpetuating of certain preferred modes of being, while 
discriminating against that which appears different.   
That breaking point manifested the converging of a variety of symptoms, 
indicating the presence of a common European disease: Transcendence (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987).  The appropriate intervention was schizoanalysis, the goal of which is  
to analyze the specific nature of the libidinal investment in the economic and 
political spheres, and thereby to show how, in the subject who desires, desire can 
be made to desire its own repression (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 105).  
The writing of this dissertation became itself part of the schizoanalytic process, 
and engaging in remembering, rather than a meaning-making mechanism, becomes 
exactly that: "re-membering" - "re-assembling" that which returns through short and 
long-term memories, while becoming the educator/philosopher/researcher that coincides 
with the dissertation writer, in the process of writing.   
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Evoking memories from the past and narrativizing them often appears as a way to 
make meaning of one’s life thus unifying the self and reinforcing individual identity.  
Such effort, often found in memoir writing, to the extent that it privileges narration and 
meaning making, often perpetuates the hegemony of narration and its legitimizing power.  
While memoirs of individuals who have played significant social and political roles in 
history have been perhaps fundamental in helping marginal groups gain social and 
political visibility, they do so by continually reaffirming their marginal condition, thus 
contributing to a reinforcement of identity and overcoding (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 
1987; Massumi, 2002).  What appears to be change is often mere repositioning of the 
body into the marginal, the other, or the resistant (Massumi, 2002).  The narratocratic 
nature of memoir thus perpetuates legitimacy, and subsequently social and political 
visibility through narration, which in turn paradoxically perpetuates the conditions of 
invisibility of non-narrative modes of expression and perception invisibly permeating the 
lives of those positioned bodies.       
This plateau is thus not intended as a memoir, and it is not meant to represent a 
psychoanalytic voyage to the past, or a search for the unity of the self as ego; nor is it an 
attempt at deriving meaning from those experiences through their inscription in models of 
sociological, or psychological analyses.   
Rather, these memories are meant as present expression of the intensities which 
populate humans’ everyday experiences, and an example or instance of children's 
singular experiences, and that which remains through memory, thus decoding the 
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linguistic signifiers typically associated with childhood and children's experiences as 
inscribed in the rhetoric of educational psychology, or psychoanalysis.  Moreover, though 
the situations lived by the child I speak of in those memories resulted from the socio-
economic, political, and personal realities which generated them, and thus speak of a 
specific social and political time, and space, they are not meant as a representation of the 
condition(s) of children growing up in rural Portugal in the eighties, and they do not 
speak to or of every child's experience.  They provide hints or signal problems. 
Memory/ies 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) say that “Neurologists and physiologists distinguish 
between long-term memory and short-term memory” (p. 16); they say that “short-term 
memory is of the rhizome or diagram type, and long-term memory is arborescent and 
centralized” (p. 16.).  According to them, “Short-term memory is in no way subject to a 
law of continuity or immediacy to its object; it can act at a distance, come or return a long 
time after, but always under conditions of discontinuity, rupture, and multiplicity” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 16).  The act of writing implies the use of short-term 
memory, and short-term ideas “even if one reads or rereads using long-term memory of 
long-term concepts” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 16).  This distinction is important here 
because the two kinds of memories are present in this project; whereas memories of early 
childhood appear as intensities, as short-term memories rupturing the continuity of 
development, the narrative about formal education, as well as the memories associated 
with each episode, appear along a continuum of attempting to make sense of education, 
and seem to fit with the definition of long-term memories.  Long-term memories are 
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organized memories, which already include reference to signifiers that provide them with 
“sense”.  Deleuze and Guattari (1987) say: “Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems 
with centers of significance and subjectification, central automata like organized 
memories” (p. 16).  This type of system “preexists the individual, who is integrated into it 
at an allotted place” (signifiance and subjectification) (Rosenstiehl & Petitot in Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987, p. 16).  In the narrative of formal education below, the attempts at 
making sense of the episodes are, and were always, consistently territorialized, i.e. 
attached to, as well as stemming from, a subjectified experience – the student, the good 
student, finally the teacher, the researcher, etc.  They led to this project because of the sad 
thoughts and passions (Spinoza, 1930; Deleuze, 1988; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) that 
continuously emerged from attempting to make sense of them.  Experiencing education 
through the transcendent lens of arborescent thought (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), and 
relying on the principle of human consciousness that permeates arborescent thought, led 
to the guilt and resentment Spinoza warned against (Deleuze, 1988).  The excitement and 
joy of learning that preceded the encounter with formal education were replaced by the 
anxiety of judgment – “anxious and unhappy, in proportion to their imperfection” 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 20).  And while Spinoza did not believe young children to be happier 
than adults by way of innocence – since all participate of the same illusion of 
consciousness – given the memories of early childhood here presented (via the word lists 
and ontographies below), which appear to be of the short-term kind (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987), it is plausible to assume that young children are, at least, more open than adults to 
a model of the body (Deleuze, 1988).  This is probably because, as stated by Deleuze and 
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Guattari (1987), “Once a rhizome has been obstructed, arborified, it’s all over, no desire 
stirs; for it is always by rhizome that desire moves and produces” (p. 14).  The long-term 
memories of formal education found in the narrative, and the fact that those specific 
memories of formal education emerged as relevant for this study, suggest that formal 
education itself functioned to obstruct the rhizome of the young child living and 
developing informally prior to her encounter with schooling.  Certainly that obstruction 
does not happen at once, with a clean cut, since “In the case of the child, gestural, 
mimetic, ludic, and other semiotic systems regain their freedom and extricate themselves 
from the “tracing”, that is, from the dominant competence of the teacher’s language” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 15).  Yet, as with Little Hans’ experience of 
psychoanalysis, “they kept on BREAKING HIS RHIZOME and BLOTCHING HIS 
MAP, setting it straight for him, blocking his every way out, until he began to desire his 
own shame and guilt, until they had rooted shame and guilt in him” (emphasis on 
original) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 14). 
Remembering 
As stated above, the questions addressed in this dissertation are motivated by my 
experiences as both a student, as well as a teacher, in light of my perceptions of the social 
and political context that we live in today, and have lived in over the past few decades in 
the West.  The social and political situation under which I was raised and formally 
educated, as well as the role that formal education had in that reality, and the way it was 
conveyed to my peers and I by parents and educators, have not only impacted my 
research interests, but perhaps even incipiently led my personal journey into philosophy 
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and research.  In this section, I describe a few situations which I believe have motivated 
my current research interests, as well as my current position regarding epistemology, and 
subjectivity.  While the narrative paragraphs presented below provide an account of my 
attempts at becoming the ideal student/subject (desiring oppression), and express the 
inconsistency and contradictions of that attempt, the randomly generated word lists and 
ontographies (Bogost, 2012) express memories of early childhood and the immanent 
affective interruptions of that overly narrative existence already present in that existence.     
Remember to re-member.  The following is an exercise in re-membering. 
We write not with childhood memories but through blocks of childhood that are 
the becoming-child of the present.  (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 1) 
 
This writing block of childhood calls forth experimental writing that is not merely 
an experiment with a given form... It is rather an invention that strives to capture a 
shift in thought that is happening to the writer and which the writer is inviting.  
The writer is thrown backward and forward to find the subject turned into parts, 
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turned around parts of a new assemblage: an autobiographical-techno-ontological 
writing block (Clough, 2008, p. 143). 
 
I was born in Portugal in 1979, five years after the revolution that put an end to a 
fascist regime in place since 1933.  My parents were raised under the regime and received 
only the mandatory formal education of the 1950’s and 60’s.  My father studied until 
fourth grade and began working in a factory at the age of 10; my mother completed sixth 
grade and began working, also at a factory, when she was 12.  My father was always 
extremely self-aware of his lack of formal education, and often failed to recognize his 
own personal and professional success in spite of the conditions under which he grew up.  
His lack of a degree made him constantly question, not only his ability to pursue his 
personal and professional goals, but mostly his social legitimacy: the extent to which he 
could aspire to succeed, and the extent to which his society would recognize and value 
his contribution.   
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Within the mostly rural social reality of my childhood in the mid-1980’s in 
Portugal, pursuing a college degree, or even just finishing secondary education, meant 
escaping the factory and the fields for a “better life”.   
*** 
 “Eu vou estudar.” 
*** 
This reality impacted profoundly the way the body would approach school at a 
young age; the body was eager to begin to attend school and especially to learn how to 
read.  Three of its grandparents could not read, and none of them attended school; that 
fact, in addition to its parents’ limited schooling, made reading and attending school 
something very special the body looked forward to. 
*** 
 “Eu vou estudar.” 
Escola 
Child’s play 
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“Being a good student” was at the forefront of the body’s academic efforts from 
the very first day.  This entailed attempting to answer a question already hinting at what 
has become this project: What is a “good student”? - i.e. what does the ideal child of 
policy look like, and how does the body become that child?  In sum, how should the body 
act in order to be the ideal child envisioned by parents and society?  This question 
remained present throughout the body’s educational life, and as it continued to invest in 
its socially recognizable ‘personal growth’, through engaging in more or less formal 
learning of different skills or information (music, ballet, art, foreign languages, student 
government, etc.).  
The continued exposure of the body to formal education did not make the 
experience more clear as it went on; in fact, the body became increasingly intrigued by 
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the whole process.  Its expectations as to what education should be, and should do for the 






In one occasion in 11
th
 grade History class, the teacher decided it was a good idea 
to discuss the behavior of the body in front of, and alongside its classmates, while 
pointing out aspects they all believed it should change.   
*** 
I was good friends with an older student who had been held back in 10
th
 grade; 
she was interested in pursuing psychology, and I was undecided between philosophy and 
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psychology; we both loved literature and discussing ideas; and we liked spending time 
together.  Aside from that, I was involved in many activities she had no interest in: I was 
an active member of the student government, I danced ballet a few times a week, and I 
also did art, all things in which she did not participate.  As far as I could gather from that 
11
th
 grade History class (I was never directly approached by any of my teachers about 
this matter), a number of our teachers believed that this friend was a negative influence in 
my life – perhaps because she was older, or because she had been held back for not 
successfully completing all of her classes - and because, according to all, I was not as 
independent from her as I should.  She was not in class that day, and I have no idea how 
this situation started, but I remember everyone looking at me while this teacher told me 
how to conduct myself independently of my friend.   
*** 
The body also remembers a few of its classmates telling it what was wrong with 
it, and how it could become better, while the teacher just sat there nodding her head.  The 
body may have expected to be socially judged and exposed by its peers as a teenager, but 
it did not expect that from a teacher.   
*** 
Too much laughing 
Dancing 
The very soft feel of a burgundy flannel dress 
Smiling 
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Time 
A lifetime of childhood 
 
I thought of a teacher as someone who would always have my intellectual and 
personal growth in mind, and who would be more invested in my education then in using 






Staring at the ceiling 
*** 
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Tiny darker dots on the wood 
Imagining dotted shapes and pictures 
Too much laughing 
The very soft feel of a burgundy flannel dress 
 
 After college I became a certified high school Philosophy teacher; in Portugal, as 
in most countries in Europe, Philosophy integrates the high school curriculum, and is a 
mandatory general course.  I taught full time for one year at a public school near my 
University under the supervision of my Didactics of Philosophy professor, and the 
mentorship of a practicing teacher from my school.  During this year, I fulfilled all the 
duties of a regular full time teacher: taught two sections of 10
th
 grade Philosophy, 
planned the yearly curriculum for 10
th
 grade for the department, attended department, as 
well as student assessment meetings, created assessment tools not only for my students, 
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but also for the department to be used in end of the year student assessment, etc.  While 
all of this was interesting and exciting, there was one aspect of the job I found upsetting: 
the student assessment meetings at the end of each grading term.  I was never called to 
attend a meeting about how to better help our struggling students, yet in the assessment 
meetings a lot of these teachers found it legitimate to make judgments about the students’ 
poor performance based on how they personally perceived their behavior, ability, or 




“Eu vou estudar.” 
Picking flowers 
Carriage rides 
Warm soft bread sweetened by homemade olive oil and sugar 
*** 
In the face of all the ‘dumb’, ‘stupid’, ‘will never make it’, and ‘parents don’t 
care’ comments, I was not only shocked, but my whole life as a student just flashed 
before my eyes (as well as that memorable History class episode).   
*** 
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At that point, the body had spent 15 years of life (?) in school, and while it was 
trying to be ‘a good student’ and parents trusted this institution like it was sacred, there 
was a possibility that, at some point, its assessment was the result of someone’s prejudice 
or misjudgment of its positioning, i.e. social background, or recognizable ability.  The 
‘smart’ label it received as a young child was probably an instance of that process, and 
certainly served the body well, especially in the earlier years.  
*** 
Crib 
“Eu vou estudar.” 
Sleep 
“Eu vou estudar.” 




I now realize that my early ‘smarts’ were nothing but a great ability to sit still for 
an extended period of time, and do as I was told.  I realize that I was especially ‘smart’ 
when the expectations and rules were clear, and I met them. 
Like myself, my students too were ‘smarter’ when I gave them clear directions, 
and tapped into their individual difficulties, or gave them an opportunity to reason out 
loud until they understood what was going on.  I could even dare say that by the end of 
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the school year some students had gotten ‘smarter’!  But it wouldn’t be true – they had 
just learned how to better match my expectations; I had told them what a philosophical 
essay should look like and, some better than others, learned how to write them 
accordingly.  In sum, I had told them what a 'good student' should do, and some had been 
able to sufficiently 'fit' my territorialized (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) idea of an 'ideal 
student' – the latter a product of my own territorialized and territorializing experience 
within formal education as an institution of my country's early attempts at democracy and 






I eventually began to see a connection between all these episodes and a parallel 
with what I had learned about modernity as a historical and philosophical movement 
while I was in college.  Philosophically, this appeared to me as a paradigmatic issue 
concerning epistemology and subjectivity, leading to social discriminatory practices.  My 
parents' social insecurity in relation to their lack of an academic degree despite the 
immense non-academic knowledge they held; my teacher's abuse of her authority in the 
classroom; the teachers' attitudes toward the children that failed to immediately 
understand the expectations school and society had for them; what all these have in 
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common is an understanding of knowledge and human subjects as fixed, rational, and 
hierarchical.  According to this understanding of epistemology and subjectivity, the 
rational academically validated is always superior.  Thus the knowledge and people who, 
for whatever reason, fail to attain that validation become immediately inferior and 
susceptible to be dismissed by that superior other, or fall in a place of lack attempting to 
somehow match or become that superior legitimate other.  Specific modes of being that 
are more acceptable or preferred socially, namely narratocratic (Panagia, 2009) and have 
come to be considered, particularly in the West, essentially human, subsequently 
legitimate the discrimination of that, or those who appear different.  Thus while that 
History teacher, as well as some of my fellow teachers in those assessment meetings felt 
entitled to act in superior and discriminatory ways toward 'less legitimate' others, my 
parents accepted that inferior position and self-discriminated.  Moving along the 
educational spectrum allowed me to see these contrasts and the social gaps they 
paradoxically perpetuated in the name of equality, and luckily, 
A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, the hollow of a root, the crook of 
a branch…  An intensive trait starts working for itself, a hallucinatory perception, 
synesthesia, perverse mutation, or play of images shakes loose, challenging the 
hegemony of the signifier.  (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 15) 
Dancing 
Too much laughing 
A lifetime of childhood 
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Picking flowers 
Thick vegetable soup 
Carriage rides 
A comforting ‘raining outside’ kind of noise 
Staring at the ceiling 
Tiny darker dots on the wood 
Imagining dotted shapes and pictures 
The very soft feel of a burgundy flannel dress 
Warm soft bread sweetened by homemade olive oil and sugar 
Falling asleep 
“Eu vou estudar.” 
 
Tears 
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 6. Profound Acceptance 
The rhizo-affective nature of this project and of the methods of research has 
enabled me to ask questions and establish folds – implications and complications – that 
might otherwise have perhaps remained in the obscurity of methodological limitations, as 
defined by traditional research methods.  While the scientific method of inquiry requires 
that at the “end” of the process the researcher provides answers to the questions posed at 
the outset of the study, a rhizo-affective study would prove inconsistent if answers were 
provided at the end – not to mention that to claim that there is an end to any inquiry 
process would immediately refute the very methodological claims discussed throughout 
the document.  Thus, this is not the end, or even an end, but still and always “middle”; 
and the emerging constructions built upon the multiple analyses carried out intentionally 
throughout this process are just that – emerging constructions that arose from this 
intentional study.  They are valuable because they present plausible implications, made 
visible through the expressions found in this dissertation, and immanently present in the 
concrete situations of actual children and adults  in different parts of the world.  Hence, 
while I do not claim to have or provide answers – nor a necessity to do so given my 
epistemological stance, or the purpose of this study – I hope to have brought to clarity 
some of the problems the children we claim to care about as teachers and educators, and 
as a society, are faced with when we impose education upon them.   
As stratifying mechanisms, policy texts serve to stratify and organize the social 
field at the subjective level, and at the level of conscious perception, thus distributing 
perception according to specific regimes of signs.  The hegemony of a signifying regime 
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of perception which privileges discursive literacy over other forms of literacy, which has 
subsequently been normalized and essentialized as naturally human, has a few important 
consequences and implications for both education, as well as social and political life: a) it 
relatively de/re-territorializes the child through the imposition of a dominant signifying 
regime of signs; b) it absolutely deterritorializes the child through subjectification; and c) 
it renders non-signifying modes of expression unavailable for social and political 
recognition and legitimation.  The child represented in educational policy and political 
rhetoric about formal education, is the relatively (de)reterritorialized child consistently 
seeking her own oppression.  Her over-coded existence hides the dangers of unaccounted 
for affective intensities immanently present in the ubiquitous movements of 
deterritorialization found in stratification.  Absolute deterritorialization is imminent, and 
its negative expression can carry devastating consequences, as seen through the actions of 
the 20-year-old human body turned cyborg introduced in the beginning of this 
dissertation. 
Given the problems that seem to emerge from the re-territorialization of the 
child/adult through policy, and social and political discourse stated above, what 
constructions emerge that can challenge those problems and provide opportunities for 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization more suited to authentic change? 
On one hand, there is a need to disrupt perception and what is worthy of social 
and political visibility in light of dominant regimes of perception, as suggested in plateau 
4; and on the other hand, it is important that children and adults begin to use affect and 
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desire to produce and create new possibilities and potentialities for themselves and their 
communities.   
In order to do so, I suggest that rather than learn resistance or resilience, typically 
associated with identifying oneself as such, i.e. as a Subject, whose body’s sole purpose 
is to position him/her on the grid of identifiers, and signifiers (culture, gender, age, 
socioeconomic status, etc.), it is important that we learn something I will call profound 
acceptance.   
Profound acceptance has nothing to do with resignation, or contentment, but 
rather with “openness”.  As a pre-conceptual intensity, “profoundness” points towards 
affective immanence as a way of being in the world; profound acceptance translates 
transcendental empiricism into a way of life, or a way of being in the world.  This is not 
an ethical proposition though – profound acceptance is, rather, intended to inaugurate an 
ontological opening/openness outside the narrativizing ontology of humanism, typically 
associated with a unified meaning-making/meaning-seeking subject.  Profound 
acceptance  is defined by a profound fearlessness of change, and of the potential that 
authentic change can create.   
Identity, pride, resistance, though fundamental in the past in effecting social and 
political change, have become shackles that chain the body to what it is, not realizing 
what it can be, or rather what it can do.  Paradoxically, it will take profound acceptance 
of the world as it is, of human and non-human relationships as they are currently 
organized, categorized, moralized, in order to move on from them into a place of 
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authentic change, of change that is not mere repositioning, and that is not extreme 
territorialization, or re-territorialization.  In the world where my body exists, I will still be 
called a woman, I will still be called white, and my relationships will still be affected by 
this situation and positioning; yet a profound acceptance of this fact will liberate my will 
to use them in a way that is joyous, that is affirmative – there is more that my body can 
do than to simply resist categorization.  There is effectively more power in letting oneself 
be affected and changed, than there is in living a life of identity and resistance – the stiff 
body will break in the event of high impact, while the smooth, flexible body will adapt, 
or change, and go on to affect other bodies it will encounter.  Profound acceptance is an 
immanent affective intensity that inhabits the flexible body, and increases its power to not 
only be affected, and thus its potential to become, but also to affect other bodies, thus 
impacting change around it. 
The concept of profound acceptance, here introduced in light of Deleuze’s 
conviction that philosophy’s purpose is to create concepts, rather than engage in 
argumentation, carries implications for education.   
As seen in plateau 3., understanding, or coding the child as the child of 
labor/work, and as lack, as lacking something – rationality, reason, intellectual ability, 
knowledge and information, discursive abilities, and experience – postulates that the 
child not only needs to be educated, but that the purpose of education is to fill, or fulfill 
that lack.  This lack is predetermined by the adults that make decisions about children 
and, in what regards formal education, made official through policy, and circulated 
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within the community of education professionals as the truth.  It is then, to a bigger or 
lesser extent, implemented by schools and teachers, and as of late, scrutinized by the 
penalizing effects of standardized test results – not conforming will result in loss of funds 
and often loss of the tools necessary to fulfill the very goals the policy states as necessary 
for children to thrive socially and personally.  In current United States, those in charge of 
making decisions about children are often influenced by corporate rhetoric and logic.  
Corporate needs, translated into corporate rhetoric, become the goals for formal, mostly 
public, education serving millions of children.  The “truth” served to the community of 
education professionals about the lack that makes of children incomplete, incompetent 
beings, is thus the truth about corporate needs and the ways those can be addressed 
through formal education.  If any compelling evidence of this was needed, President 
Obama’s words at the nation address in February 2013, during which he referred to 
children as “our most valuable resource” (http://www.c-span.org, 2013, p. 12), have 
provided it.  And while I do believe in the importance of providing children with tools 
and resources for navigating their social and financial reality, I do not believe that this 
should be the primary or exclusive goal/purpose of formal education, nor do I believe that 
formal public education should be geared towards fulfilling the ideals and needs of 
private corporate interest.  I believe, rather, that it should finally be geared towards 
serving the child – not the child as resource, but the child as life, as immanent being that 
participates of the world today and tomorrow, and exists simultaneously with its adult.   
This is the affective child, the child of life, and the child of potentiality.  This 
child is not defined by what she cannot do, but valuable for what she can do, and is not 
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equated with lack.  The child that does not lack, does not need the education of the kind 
that is meant to fulfill that lack – that predetermined lack that overlooks that which it 
does not include in its “lacking list”.  The affective child learns, engages in learning as a 
way to activate her power to become – whatever, whenever.  Learning may or may not 
come from, or occur within, formal education, thus extending value to the minor and 
decreasing the possibilities for discriminatory practices to occur.  Becoming becomes 
itself a way of living with profound acceptance of experiencing the world rather than 
holding information about it – learning that other human beings are only different if 
engaged with as such, that they are victims only if taken advantage of, and that nature and 
the world are resource only when we act upon them as such. 
For teachers as for researchers, profound acceptance means being open to being 
changed in the process of engaging with the world.  For the teacher, engaging with the 
students means engaging with other bodies like her own; accepting to be changed by the 
interactions with those bodies; and understanding the power that her actions have in the 
potential becomings of those bodies.  Additionally, this teacher is willing to challenge the 
identifiers that children’s bodies have been assigned by social convention and categories, 
so as to allow them to become, thus increasing not only her own power to effect change, 
but also that of the children as immanently engaged with the world. 
For the researcher, profound acceptance entails facing the research process as a 
nomadic journey into inquiry, and following the path of the nomadic research map as it 
folds and unfolds throughout that journey.  Inflections and foldings in the map have the 
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potential to start a rhizome where a tree once stood unshakeable in its epistemic 
certainties.  The rhizome pokes its way into existence through affect – a tiny prickling of 
discomfort, the affective poke; but the researcher has to be willing to accept it, to accept 
the possibility of displacement of her beliefs, and her apparently united self, and to 
embrace a profound fearlessness of change.  
In conclusion, understanding that “I” can become and live within the limitless 
confines of the play between territorialization and deterritorialization suggests an 
understanding of other manifestations of being as engaged in similar life – I live in the 
openness of the possibility/potentiality of being changed, and engage with the world 
knowing that my decisions can, and likely will, impact others, change them, and impact 
their becoming and further expanded becomings.  While responsibility over my own 
becoming appears diminished in light of the impact that context, circumstance, and others 
have over my condition, responsibility for others and the world increases.  We become 
responsible for one another and for the world because we understand that that which 
happens to others and what they become impacts our own becoming possibilities.  We 
understand that becoming occurs in the encounter and engagement with others by way of 
affects.  It is in this way that recognizing affect as a valid and valuable mode of social 
and political perception and expression has the potential to increase social and political 
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